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I. INTRODUCTION 
Asbestos litigation continues apace. Through 2004, approximately 
845,000 claimants have filed asbestos-related claims. 1 In 2003, 
approximately 101,000 new claimants surfaced-the most ever in a 
single year.2 Since each claimant files claims against approximately 
sixty to seventy different defendants and bankruptcy trusts, 3 this 
translates into approximately six to seven million new claims which will 
have been generated by these claimants. However in 2004, there was a 
substantial decline in nonmalignant claims filings which appears to 
herald a substantial, continuing and nonsecular trend.4 Even at 
I. See STEVEN CARROLL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE DIMENSIONS OF ASBESTOS 
LITIGATION 3 (May 2004) (unpublished, on file with author) (hereinafter RAND, DIMENSIONS OF 
ASBESTOS LITIGATION] (stating that there were over 730,000 claimants through 2002). Adding 
101,200 new claimants from 2003, see infra note 2, and 14,600 new Manville Trust claimants in 
2004, see Letter from Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust to Judges Jack B. Weinstein and 
Burton R. Lifland (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.mantrust.org/filings/ 
q4 _ 04/4thqtr04.pdf, yields a total number of approximately 845,000 claimants through 2004. 
2. In 2003, approximately 101,200 new claimants filed with the Manville Trust. See Letter 
from the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust to Hon. Jack B. Weinstein and Hon. Burton R. 
Lifland (Feb. 27, 2004) (accompanying financial statements and report), available at 
http://www.mantrust.org/filings/q4_03/4thqtr03.pdf. This represented a 64% increase over the 
approximately 56,000 claims filed in 2002. Id. Virtually all asbestos claimants file claims with the 
Manville Trust. See Declaration of David T. Austem at ml 10-13, In re Johns-Manville Corp. , No. 
82811656 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y May 2, 2004) (indicating that the Manville Trust has compared its data 
base with the data bases kept by other leading defendants and bankruptcy trusts and found a "nearly 
complete" "degree of overlap"). Accordingly, I am using the Manville Trust number IO 1,200, as the 
total of new asbestos claimants in 2003. 
3. STEPHEN CARROLL et al., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS 
AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT 41 (2002) [hereinafter RAND REPORT). 
4. New Manville Trust filings declined to 14,600 in 2004; of these, approximately 3600 
alleged malignancies. Thus the ratio of nonmalignant claims presented to the Manville Trust 
declined from 9: 1 in 2003 to 3: I in 2004. See Letter from Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust 
to Judges Jack B. Weinstein and Burton R. Lifland (Feb. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.mantrust.org/filings/q4_04/4thqtr04.pdf; Letter from Manville Personal Injury 
Settlement Trust to Judges Jack B. Weinstein and Burton R. Lifland (Oct. 29, 2004), available at 
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significantly reduced levels, however, thousands of new claimants can 
be expected to file annually. Moreover, some have estimated that future 
claimants will range in number from 1.6 to 2.1 billion.5 In addition, 
while defendants have so far paid out over $70 billion,6 leading 
estimates are that former asbestos-containing product manufacturers, 
distributors and installers, as well as owners of premises containing 
asbestos and their insurers, will have to pay out an additional $160 
billion before the litigation is concluded.7 
It may be thought that, because of the nature of the processes of 
acquiring, pressing and settling so massive and complex a series of 
claims, the legal literature spawned by the biggest litigation in history 
would be amply populated by discussion of such ethical issues as 
solicitation, reasonable fee requirements and conflicts of interest. 
Surprisingly, however, there is a notable paucity of such discussion. 8 As 
a first step in rectifying this failure of scholarship, I identify and analyze 
selected ethical issues that are commonplace in asbestos litigation. In 
doing so, I do not put this article forth as a complete treatment of the 
subject but rather offer it as a work-in-progress, and invite other scholars 
to similarly address these heretofore largely ignored issues. To put 
ethical issues generated by asbestos litigation practices into a context, I 
begin with a brief primer on asbestos litigation, in particular, on 
attorney-sponsored asbestos screenings. 
http://www.mantrust.org/filings/q3_2004/3rdqtr04.pdf. Other trusts experienced declines in the 
range of25-35%. See, e.g. , Celotex Asbestos Settlement Trust Interim Claims Report, Feb. I, 2005 
(indicating a 25% decrease in new claims filing in 2004 compared to 2003). The ratio of 
nonmalignant to malignant claims dropped from 9: I to 6.5: I. Id. 
5. Letter from David Austem, President, Claims Resolution Management Corporation, 
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, United States Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary at 2 (July 8, 2003) (on file with the author); see RAND REPORT, supra 
note 3, at 77 (stating that future projections of total claimants range from one to three million); see 
also RAND, DIMENSIONS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra note 1, at 20. 
6. RAND, DIMENSIONS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra note 1, at 11 ("We estimate total 
outlays of$70 billion through 2002."). 
7. Estimates of the total cost of asbestos litigation range from $200 to $265 billion. RAND, 
DIMENSIONS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra note I, at 20. Subtracting from that the $70 billion 
estimate of the amounts already paid by defendants and their insurers, leaves an estimated future 
payout of between $130 and $195 billion. A bill that has been introduced before the United States 
Senate Judiciary Committee would commit approximately $140 billion dollars in payment of 
asbestos claims. See infra note 9. 
8. For a discussion of asbestos-related scholarship and a critique of that literature for failing 
to acknowledge the role of specious evidence in that litigation, see Lester Brickman, On the Theory 
Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. 
L. REV. 33, 166-168 (2004) [hereinafter Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation], available at 
http://www.ssm.com/abstract=490682. 
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II. A BRIEF PRIMER ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION AND 
ATTORNEY-SPONSORED SCREENINGS 
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Approximately 10% of asbestos claims involve malignancies.9 The 
substantial majority of the remaining 90% allege mild asbestosis and, to 
a lesser extent, a condition known as pleural plaques. 10 Most of these 
claimants have no lung impairment but are characterized as having an 
asbestos-related injury or illness or the basis of x-ray readings by 
certified specialists. 
Substantially all nonmalignant claimants are recruited by screening 
companies-entrepreneurial entities begun by individuals with no health 
care background that are hired by plaintiff lawyers to solicit potential 
"litigants."11 These enterprises arrange and publicize screenings aimed at 
former industrial and construction workers with pre-1972 occupational 
exposure to asbestos-containing products. At these screenings, x-rays are 
administered in an assembly line basis often using mobile x-ray 
equipment housed in truck trailers brought to union halls, hotel and 
motel sites and shopping center parking lots; in addition, pulmonary 
function tests are administered. 12 There are no material health benefits 
associated with these screenings. 13 Rather, the sole purpose of asbestos 
screenings is to recruit "litigants" and generate supporting medical 
documentation. 
On the basis of my research, I have concluded that nonmalignant 
asbestos litigation today mostly consists of: 
(1) a massive client recruitment effort accounting for 90% of all 
claims currently being generated and resulting in the screening of over 
750,000 and perhaps as many as 1,000,000 "litigants" in the past fifteen 
years; 
9. See S. REP. No. 108-118, at 18 (2003) (citing Hearing on Asbestos Litigation, Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of David Austem)); RAND, 
DIMENSIONS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra note I, at 12 (noting that malignancies count for 13% 
of claims). 
10. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 44-54, 60-62. 
11 . "Litigants" is a term used by screening enterprises to refer to those screened. Id. at 80 
n.128. The word "patient" is not applied to screened recruits; in fact, both the screening enterprises 
and the doctors hired by plaintiff lawyers to render diagnoses emphatically deny the existence of a 
doctor-patient relationship. Id. at 85 n.161. 
12. Id. at 65. Fixed site x-ray facilities are also used. 
13. Id. at 63-65. In fact, there may be detriment. & e id. at 65 n.96; see also David Egilman & 
Susan Rankin Bohme, Attorney-Directed Screenings Can Be Hazardous, 45 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 
305, 305 (2004); Statement of Ass'n of Occupational and Envtl. Clinics, Asbestos Screening (Apr. 
2000), at http://www.aoec.org/content/principles_ l_3 .htm (last visited May 18, 2005). 
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(2) generating claims of injury though most of these "litigants" 
have no medically cognizable asbestos-related injury and cannot 
demonstrate any statistically significant increased likelihood of 
contracting an asbestos-related disease in the future; 
(3) the claims of injury are often supported by specious medical 
evidence, including: (a) evidence generated by the entrepreneurial 
screening enterprises and B-readers-specially certified x-ray readers 
that the plaintiff lawyers select because they produce "diagnoses" which 
are not a product of good faith medical judgment but rather a function of 
the millions of dollars a year in income that they receive for these 
services, and (b) pulmonary function tests which are often administered 
in knowing violation of standards established by the American Thoracic 
Society and which maladministration often results in findings of 
impairment which would not be found but for the improper 
administration of these tests; 
(4) the claims of injury are further supported by "litigants'" 
testimony which frequently follows scripts prepared by their lawyers 
which are replete with misstatements with regard to: (a) identification 
and. relative quantities of asbestos-containing products that they came in 
contact with at work sit.es (in order to shift the focus of testimony from 
certain manufacturers which have declared bankruptcy to others which 
are solvent), (b) the information printed on the containers in which the 
products were sold, and (c) their own physical impairments; 14 
( 5) being asserted in a civil justice system that accommodates the 
interests of these "litigants" and their lawyers by dispensing with certain 
evidentiary requirements and proof of proximate cause, under a legal 
regime which I have termed "special asbestos law." 15 
It is thus beyond cavil that the quantum of specious claiming in 
asbestos litigation constitutes a massive civil justice system failure. 
I have previously noted the near complete absence of discussion in 
the scholarly literature of the high incidence of specious claiming in 
asbestos litigation and have advanced some theories to explain this 
glaring omission. 16 It is also notable that there is a dearth of scholarly 
discussion of ethical issues that are prevalent in asbestos litigation 
despite compelling evidence that such issues abound. 
Ethically mandated candor requires an acknowledgement at the 
outset that an effort to identify ethical issues in asbestos litigation may 
14. These conclusions are documented in Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra 
note 8. 
15. Id. at 54-59. 
16. Id. at 43-44, 166-70. 
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be largely academic. If the Model Rules of Professional Conduct1 7 were 
to be amended to include the provision: "These Rules shall not apply to 
asbestos litigation," it is doubtful whether there would be a substantial 
change in current litigation practices or enforcement efforts by 
disciplinary agencies. Even egregious violations of rules of ethics 
usually generate disinterest from bar disciplinary counsel and state 
supreme courts when the subject is asbestos litigation. 18 
Despite the virtual absence of enforcement of ethical rules in this 
arena, it would be an overstatement to assert that ethical rules are simply 
inapplicable to asbestos litigation.19 Nonetheless, ethical rules and 
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2003) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] . 
18. See, e.g., Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 72 n.109, 117-19 
n.289 (listing such examples of clear ethical violations as charging screening expenses of those who 
test negative against the recoveries of those who test positive, thus charging an "unreasonable 
amount for expenses," in violation of Model Rule l.5(a); and a patently unethical payment 
arrangement between a screening enterprise principal and an attorney). 
19. A more exhaustive empirical examination than I have undertaken would be required 
before such a position could be advanced. Moreover, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' 
disqualification of Senior District Court Judge Alfred M. Wolin from presiding over a number of 
asbestos bankruptcies on the grounds that a conflict of interest gave rise to an appearance of 
impropriety is at least suggestive of the continuing relevance of conflicts of interest principles. The 
facts relating to Judge Wolin 's extraordinary recusal begin with his appointment on November 27, 
2001 , by then-Chief Judge Becker of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to preside over five 
asbestos-related chapter 11 cases, which were then pending in the District of Delaware, termed the 
"Five Asbestos Cases" by the court, which were transferred to him from bankruptcy court. In re 
Kensington Int'! Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 214-15 (3d Cir. 2003). Chief Judge Becker explained that the 
single-judge consolidation would facilitate the development and implementation of a "coordinated 
plan for management" of these cases that "carr[ ied] with them tens of thousands of asbestos 
claims." Id. at 215 . The five bankruptcies that Judge Wolin was appointed to coordinate involved 
the following corporate entities: Owens Coming, W.R. Grace & Co., USG Corporation, Armstrong 
World Industries, Inc., and Federal-Mogul Global, Inc. Id. at 214. "On December 28, 2001, Judge 
Wolin (as a self-proclaimed asbestos 'neophyte,' In re Kensington Int'! Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 303 (3d 
Cir. 2004)) named five 'Court Appointed Consultants' to assist him in the Five Asbestos Cases. The 
five individuals he named were David Gross, Judson Hamlin, William Dreier, John Keefe, and 
Francis McGovern, all of whom had prior experience with asbestos or mass tort litigation." 
Kensington , 353 F.3d at 215. Judge Wolin also announced with this order that he would conduct ex 
parte meetings with his advisors and the attorneys. Id. 
Two of the court-appointed advisors, David Gross and Judson Hamlin, were also counsel 
for future asbestos claimants in the G-1 Holdings bankruptcy. Id. at 216. (For a discussion of the 
Future Representative see infra Part VJ.D.) While the G-1 Holdings case was unrelated to the Five 
Asbestos Cases and Judge Wolin had no role in the G-1 Holdings proceedings, "[t]he G-1 Holdings 
bankruptcy [also] faced a wave of asbestos lawsuits." Id. (citing Official Comm. of Asbestos 
Claimants of G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Heyman, 277 B.R. 20, 24-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). The Third 
Circuit also noted that many of G-1 Holdings' "significant creditors, as well as asbestos-claimant 
creditors," also had claims against the debtors in the Five Asbestos Cases. Id. at 215-16. 
Subsequently, Kensington International Limited ("Kensington") and Springfield 
Associates, LLC ("Springfield"), creditors of Owens Coming, and three creditors of W.R. Grace & 
Co., filed motions for Judge Wolin 's recusal on the grounds that Gross and Hamlin had conflicts of 
interest. Id. at 216. Kensington and Springfield and the other creditors then filed emergency 
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asbestos litigation appear to exist on separate planets. Despite the risk of 
irrelevance, I will focus on four areas of asbestos practice which raise 
ethical concerns: fee-setting in light of "reasonable fee" limitations; 
client recruitment techniques raising "solicitation" issues; witness 
preparation practices; and conflicts of interest. The first three issues 
focus on plaintiff lawyer practices; the fourth, conflicts of interest, 
focuses on both plaintiff and defense counsel. Separate consideration is 
accorded to conflicts of interest that occur in the course of asbestos 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
Petitions for Writs of Mandamus with the Third Circuit when Judge Wolin "withdrew the recusal 
motions from the Bankruptcy Court and stayed the corresponding discovery." Kensington, 368 F.3d 
at 293. The Petitions alleged that Judge Wolin, through his association with Gross and Hamlin, and 
through his ex parte communications with his advisors and the attorneys, "created a perception that 
his impartiality 'might reasonably be questioned' under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)." Id. The Third Circuit 
responded by refusing to rule on the merits of the Mandamus Petitions, but vacating Judge Wolin's 
order staying discovery and directing that he issue an expedited ruling on the recusal motions before 
him which he had refused to do. Kensington, 353 F.3d at 223 . 
On February 2, 2004, Judge Wolin denied the recusal motion in a 102-page opinion. In re 
Owens Coming, 305 8.R. 175 (D. Del. 2004). The Third Circuit had retained jurisdiction in the 
matter, see Kensington, 353 F.3d at 214, and following Judge Wolin's refusal to recuse himself, the 
Petitioners appealed to the Third Circuit again. Appellant's Brief, In re Kensington Int') Ltd., Nos. 
03-4212, 03-4526, 2004 WL 419442 (3d Cir. Feb. 23, 2004). In this second appeal, Petitioners 
argued that Gross and Hamlin were in a position to urge Judge Wolin to make rulings that they 
could then cite to the judge in the G-1 Holdings bankruptcy, to their profit. Indeed, they noted that 
Gross and Hamlin had "cited Judge Wolin's decisions as precedents in regard to disputed issues in 
G-1 (Holdings]." Id. at 12 (citing Joint Appendix 2728- "May 6, 2003, letter from Gross to District 
Judge Bassler urging him to withdraw the reference of estimation issues to Bankruptcy Judge 
Gambardella, and relying on Judge Wolin's order of April 25, 2003 in [the Owens Coming 
bankruptcy]"). 
The Third Circuit then decided to recuse Judge Wolin. Kensington, 368 F.3d at 318. The 
Court concluded that Gross and Hamlin had conflicts of interest because of their obligation to "act 
as zealous advocates for the future asbestos claimants in the G-1 Holdings bankruptcy," while they 
were obligated to remain neutral in their advisement to Judge Wolin. Id. at 303-04. The Court 
further held that "a reasonable person, knowing all of the relevant circumstances, would conclude 
that Judge Wolin's impartiality might reasonably be questioned in the Owens Coming, W.R. Grace 
& Co. and USG Corp. bankruptcies." Id. at 294. With regard to the ex parte communications, the 
Court stated that it "look[ed] with disfavor upon both the extent to which, and the manner in which, 
Judge Wolin engaged in ex parte communications," but did not include that as a reason for 
disqualification. Id. 
The recusal of Judge Wolin for an appearance of impropriety based on the conflicts of 
interest of two of his advisors is itself recognition of the applicability of ethical rules to asbestos-
related bankruptcy proceedings. To be sure, bankruptcy law has a specific provision with regard to 
conflicts of interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2005) ("the trustee, with the court's approval, may 
employ one or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, 
that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons, to 
represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties under this title"). 
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Ill. "REASONABLE FEES ... AND EXPENSES" 
Ethical rules mandate that lawyers "shall not make an agreement 
for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee."20 In many if not most 
asbestos representations where the client is recruited through an 
attorney-sponsored screening and then sold to a law firm higher up on 
the food chain, contingency fees paid by the client often are 40%. Many 
of these claims have involved little and even insubstantial risk. This is 
especially the case where there were agreements to settle all of a law 
firm's inventory of cases as well as future claims to be brought py that 
firm on behalf of litigants to be recruited, according to an agreed on 
matrix of claim values.21 Accordingly, charging standard contingency 
fees of 40% or even 33 1/3%, would appear to constitute charging an 
"unreasonable fee." Nonetheless, I am unaware of any invocations of 
Rule 1.5 in asbestos litigation with regard to fees.22 
Lawyers are also precluded from "charg[ing], or collect[ing] ... an 
unreasonable amount for expenses. "23 Litigation expenses in asbestos 
litigation amount to tens of millions of dollars annually, · and consist 
largely of payments to screening enterprises for recruiting litigants, 
payments to B-readers and other medical professionals, and expenses 
incurred in the course of actual litigation including expert witnesses, 
deposition transcription costs, filing fees, etc.24 
20. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. l.S(a). 
21. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 63, 64 & n.91 (2004). 
22. The failure to apply ethical rules limiting fees to "reasonable amounts" in contingency 
fee-financed litigation is not confined to asbestos litigation; rather it is a systemic failure, though 
often more egregious in the case of asbestos litigation. See generally Lester Brickman, Contingency 
Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates, and the Disciplinary System: The Case Against Case-by-Case 
Enforcement, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339 ( 1996). For an analysis of the competitiveness of the 
market for contingency-fee financing of tort litigation, see generally Lester Brickman, The Market 
for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: ls It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65 
(2003). 
23. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. l.5(a). 
24. Litigation expenses incurred by plaintiff attorneys and charged to plaintiffs were 5% of 
the total compensation paid by defendants and their insurers. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. 
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION 36 (1983). In cases that proceed to trial, these 
expenses range from 6-9% of total plaintiff compensation, and can at times be as high as 12%. Id. at 
36. This calculation, however, was published in 1983, prior to the advent of attorney-sponsored 
screenings, id. at 20, which began in earnest in approximately the mid 1980s. See Brickman, 
Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 63 n.87. Since virtually all nonmalignant claims are 
generated by these screenings, see SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 18 (citing Hearing on Asbestos 
Litigation, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of David 
Austern)); id. at 84 (citing Letter from Steven Kazan to the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein which 
states that "90% of the [Manville] Trust's last 200,000 claims have come from attorney-sponsored 
x-ray screening programs"); and involve tens of million of dollars a year paid to screening 
enterprises, B-readers and other medical professionals, these substantial litigation expenses may not 
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In a typical nonmalignant claim, plaintiff lawyers will name sixty to 
seventy different defendants. As settlements are reached, lawyers send 
checks to claimants with a cursory listing of expenses that have been 
deducted, including the lawyer's fee. 25 
According to RAND, plaintiff contingency fees are approximately 
34% of recoveries and litigation expenses are about 7% bringing the 
total of fees and expenses to approximately 41 % of recoveries. 26 My 
own unscientific sporadic observations indicate that unless restricted by 
court rule,27 a substantial number of fees in asbestos litigation are 40% 
be reflected in the 5% calculated by RAND. No updated data on the percentage of plaintiff 
recoveries that plaintiff attorneys deduct for litigation expenses is available. 
25. In most tort settlements, settlement checks are made out to both lawyer and client. 
Typically, the lawyer has the client endorse the two-party check, deposits it to his client security 
account and then issues a check to the client for the client's share after deducting the contingency 
fee and litigation expenses advanced by the lawyer. I have not been able to ascertain whether this 
model prevails in asbestos litigation. Based on an assortment of anecdotal data, there is some 
indication that the client learns of the settlement when he or she receives a check in the mail from 
the attorney. It may be that in such cases, clients have signed retainer agreements authorizing their 
attorneys to endorse settlement checks on their behalf and deposit the checks into the firm's trust 
account without the need to have the client separately endorse the settlement check before its 
deposit. Another alternative is that there has been an aggregate settlement or the settling defendant 
has sent the firm a single check combining the settlement amounts due to multiple clients. In both 
cases, the check would be made out to the attorney and would not be a two-party check. 
26. Email from Stephen J. Carroll, Senior Economist, RAND, to Lester Brickman, Professor 
of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (Aug. 10, 2004 16:53 EST) (on file with author); 
Notes of conversation with Stephen J. Carroll (April 18, 2005) (on file with author). RAND data 
expresses plaintiffs' lawyers' fees and expenses as a percentage of total expenditures. Plaintiff legal 
fees and expenses accounted for 24%-30% of total expenditures per claim between January 1, 1980 
and August 26, 1982. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL. , RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, VARIATION IN 
ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES xviii (1984) [hereinafter RAND, VARIATION 
IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION]. To convert this data to a percentage of plaintiffs' gross recoveries, the 
following formula is used: plaintiff lawyers' fees and expenses expressed as a percentage of total 
expenses, divided by gross plaintiff compensation expressed as a percentage of total expenses, 
multiplied by I 00. Based upon this formula and the above data collected by RAND in the 1980s, it 
can be determined that plaintiffs' lawyers' fees and expenses were 39%-44.8% of gross recoveries. 
See id. at xvii-xviii . 
27. Some court rules restrict lawyers' fees in personal injury lawsuits. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 603.7(e)(2), 691.20(e)(2), 806.13(b), 1022.3 l(b) (2005). New Jersey 
has a court rule that, if enforced, would significantly limit fees in many asbestos cases brought in 
New Jersey. See NJ. Civ. PRAC. R. I :21-7(i), which provides, in pertinent part: 
When representation is undertaken on behalf of several persons whose respective claims, 
whether or not joined in one action, arise out of the same transaction or set of facts or 
involve substantially identical liability issues, the contingent fee shall be calculated on 
the basis of the aggregate sum of all recoveries ... and shall be charged to the clients in 
proportion to the recovery of each. 
Vast savings to clients would result if, as the New Jersey Rule provides, contingent fees 
were applied on the aggregate amount in mass asbestos settlements. For example, if an attorney for 
I 00 plaintiffs reached a settlement with five defendants that provided for an aggregate payment of 
$24 million ( or $240,000 for each plaintiff), and the facts alleged would fall under the ambit of Rule 
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of recoveries28 and that expenses charged to clients often total another 
10%, so there is often, at best, an even split of the recovery between 
lawyer and client. 29 
The expenses advanced by the lawyer which are deducted from the 
recovery are typically broken down into broad categories which are 
listed on the statement that accompanies a check sent to the client 
representing the client's share of a settlement.30 These expense totals are 
I :21-7(i), but the rule is ignored, then under New Jersey Civil Practice Rule l:21-7(c), which limits 
contingent fees to 33 1/3% on the first $250,000, 25% of the next $250,000, and 20% on the excess 
of $250,000, the contingent fee on the aggregate amount would be $8 million. However, if the fees 
are calculated pursuant to Rule I :21-7(i), which would take into account the aggregate nature of the 
mass settlement, the total fee would be $4,845,833-which would be 39% less. On the basis of 
conversations with New Jersey practitioners, Rule I :27-7(i) appears to be routinely ignored by New 
Jersey plaintiffs' attorneys and is unenforced by New Jersey courts in asbestos cases. 
28. RAND obtained the information on plaintiff lawyer fees from confidential 
communications with several plaintiff law firms. See notes of conversation with Stephen Carroll, 
Senior Economist, RAND (Apr. 18, 2005) (on file with author). Judge Jack Weinstein estimated in 
1991 that plaintiff lawyer fees ranged from 33-45%. Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint Eastern & 
Southern Dists. Asbestos.Litig.), 129 B.R. 710,867 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991). At that time, I estimated 
that the fees ranged from 25-50%. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a 
Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1834 n.60 (1992). The 
reorganized Manville Trust that Judge Weinstein approved capped fees at 25%. I estimated that this 
generated effective hourly rates of $1 ,500-$2,750. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the 
data from the law firms that allowed RAND access to fee information may not have been 
representative of fees being charged in the litigation. Baron & Budd, one of the leading asbestos law 
firms, which including its affiliates have represented 40,000-50,000 claimants, charges a standard 
contingency fee of 40% and presumably was not one of the firms that provided RAND with access 
to its fees. "Asbestos Litigation," a one page advertisement prepared by the law firm of Fitzgerald & 
Associates, undated circa 2000, stated: "Many firms take a fee of 40% from the total amount of the 
recovery. The client's 60% is then first used to reimburse the law firm for out of pocket expenses. 
The net result, in many cases, is that the check to the law firm is larger than the check to the client." 
Exhibit 39, Deposition of Charles Lewis, In re Asbestos Cases (ACR XXIII Asbestos Cases), No. 
89-2-18455-9-SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2002). 
29. See, e.g., Settlement Statement to (redacted) issued by Baron & Budd, undated, circa 1997 
(on file with author). The statement indicates receipt of $4,000 from Combustion Engineering and 
deductions of 40% (contingency fee) and 22% for expenses ($886.85) totaling $2,486.85, 
amounting to 62% of the settlement, as follows: 
Attorneys fee (40%): $1,600.00 
Partial Litigation Expenses 
Medical Exams & Reports : $390.00 
Filing & Service Fees: $150.00 
Travel: $62.85 
Misc. Postage, Copies, etc.: $99.88 
IRS & Social Security Reports : $77.50 
Sub Total Expense: $886.85 
Balance Due Claimant: $1513.15 
Id. ; see also Settlement Statement to (redacted) issued by Baron & Budd, Sept. 24, 1997 (on file 
with author). This statement indicates receipt of $2500 from Asten Group, Inc. and deductions of 
40% (contingency fee) and 20% for expenses ($500.00), as follows: 
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substantial and are virtually never subjected to any verification process. 
Thus, the opportunity exists for lawyers to pad these expense totals in 
violation of Model Rule l.5(a).31 Absent an audit of such statements, it is 
not possible to say whether this practice is widespread. 
IV. SOLICITATION 
Most if not virtually all nonmalignant asbestos claims today are 
recruited through attorney-sponsored asbestos screenings. 32 In a typical 
screening, a lawyer is solicited by and hires a screening enterprise on a 
per diem basis to conduct a screening of persons who had been 
occupationally exposed to asbestos-containing materials prior to 1972. 
At the outset of a screening, either the screening enterprise or a 
representative of the law firm requires the person to be screened to sign 
a retainer agreement provided by the firm that is paying for the 
screening.33 On its face, this form of solicitation violates Model Rule 
7.2(b)34 because it involves lawyers paying agents, i.e., screening 
enterprises, to recruit clients. 35 It has been suggested that because many 
Id. 
Attorneys Fee (40%): 
Partial Litigation Expenses 
Travel : 
Misc. Postage, Copies, etc.: 
Sub Total Expenses: 






30. There is a dearth of data with regard to actual practices. My description is based on a 
small number of instances where, in conversations, lawyers have commented on their settlement 
payment practices. 
31. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 1.5(a). In one instance that I could document, a 
lawyer who contracted to screen thousands of "litigants," under an arrangement to refer claimants to 
one or more of the leading asbestos law firms, charged screening expenses for those "litigants" who 
tested negative for asbestos exposure in the x-ray screenings against the recoveries of those who 
tested positive. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 72 n.109; cf 
Buckwalter v. Napoli, Kaiser & Bern LLP, No. 01 Civ. 10868, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5231 at •1 , 
•10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2005) (where one law firm in the "Fen-Phen" litigation accused another law 
firm of "deduct[ing] false costs and disbursements from their clients' final settlement amounts"). 
32. For a detailed account of these screenings, see Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, 
supra note 8, at 62-103. 
33. If a "litigant" shows up for a screening who has previously signed up with a different law 
firm, he is informed that he is not eligible for the free screening and can either pay a fee , usually 
$50-$80, for the screening or else leave. 
34. Lack ofprivity with the solicitor is not a defense. Model Rule 7.2(b) provides: "A lawyer 
shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services .. .. " MODEL 
RULES,supra note 17, at R. 7.2(b). 
35 . In some instances, lawyers or their screening enterprise agents make indirect payments to 
the union locals for agreeing to sponsor the screening, in the form of hiring union officials' wives to 
work at the screenings, or by rental payments to the union local for agreeing to allow screenings at 
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of the screenings proceed through use of union locals as intermediaries, 
this raises associational issues that may privilege the conduct. 36 I 
disagree. The use of union locals in the screening process is simply a 
client acquisition means, not one that invokes associational rights, and 
therefore does not privilege this conduct. 37 Moreover, while the letters 
sent to the former workers urging them to sign up for screenings usually 
emanate from the union locals, the actual letters sent out by the union 
locals as well as the letters they write to the lawyers inviting them to 
conduct screenings, are in fact drafted by the lawyers. The entire process 
is a "turnkey" one with all of the work being done by the lawyer's agent, 
the screening enterprise, for a fee paid by the law firm. 38 If solicitation 
remains proscribed by the rules of ethics and that prohibition has not 
been eradicated by prevailing constitutional interpretation, 39 then 
asbestos lawyers hiring screening companies to solicit clients, and the 
law firms higher up on the litigation chain to which the claims are 
routinely referred, are engaged in solicitation in violation of Rule 
7.2(b).40 
V. WITNESS PREPARATION 
The most significant part of witness preparation in asbestos 
litigation involves product identification. For each defendant named, and 
usually each claimant lists sixty to seventy defendants, a client or 
their offices; in some instances, payments are made to "litigants" in the form of door prizes or 
"giveaways" of TV sets, etc., to encourage attendance at screenings. See Brickman, Theories of 
Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 72 n.109; cf North Carolina State Bar Ethics Comm., Formal 
Op. 2004-2 (Apr. 23, 2004) (opining that it is improper solicitation for a lawyer who sends targeted 
direct mail to accident victims, to offer free promotional merchandise to recipients who call the 
lawyer's office) 
There are also indications that some lawyers and screening enterprises split legal fees . See 
Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 117-19 n.289 (describing alleged illegal 
and unethical conduct and quoting a screening enterprise principal as stating that the payment 
arrangements he entered into with that attorney "were never what they actually look like on their 
face" and intimating that the reason was because the real arrangements were unethical if not illegal). 
36. See Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Ethics on the Lunar Landscape of Asbestos Litigation, 31 
PEPP. L. REV. 175, 182 (2004). 
37. For a discussion of associational rights, see Lester Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways 
Through the Legal Process: The Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 595, 628-37 (1973). 
38. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 72-74. 
39. For a discussion of the constitutionally permissible scope of the prohibition of in-person 
solicitation, see STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 
995-97 (6th ed. 2002). 
40. Model Rule 8.4(a) prohibits acting through another to violate the Rules. See MODEL 
RULES,supranote 17, atR. 8.4(a). 
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witness on behalf of the client usually must demonstrate that the 
claimant was sufficiently exposed to that defendant's asbestos-
containing product at a particular place during a specific time period that 
it was a substantial factor in causing the asbestos-related injury being 
alleged. Frequently, the places of exposure are sites where the claimant 
worked, e.g., construction sites, industrial plants, shipyards and on board 
ships, twenty, thirty or even forty or more years earlier. 
To assist claimants to recall the asbestos-containing products they 
were exposed to twenty to forty years earlier, paralegals at law firms 
show claimants binders containing pictures of certain asbestos-
containing products and ask them to identify the products with which 
they came in contact. There is evidence that one of the leading asbestos 
law firms went beyond mere memory enhancement and used the "picture 
book" and other techniques to "implant false memories" in clients; these 
witness preparation techniques were also used to steer clients away from 
identifying products of manufacturers such as Johns-Manville which had 
entered bankruptcy and were paying only a fraction of the value of 
claims.41 While it is unethical for a lawyer to assist or induce a client or 
witness to testify falsely or to off er evidence that the lawyer knows to be 
false,42 nonetheless, no criminal or disciplinary proceedings ensued.43 
According to that law firm, its witness preparation techniques 
typify asbestos law as practiced and were neither unethical nor illegal.44 
Traditionally, legal ethicists have declared that the witness preparation 
techniques used, including the technique of telling the witness before he 
relates critical facts that certain facts that he might relate or the failure to 
relate certain facts would be highly injurious to his cause and then 
41. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 139-66. 
42. Model Rule I.2(d) states: 
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer 
knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any 
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a 
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. 
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. l.2(d). 
However, " [t]here is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of 
questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed 
with impunity." Id. at R. 1.2 cmt. 9. 
Model Rule 3.4(b) states: "A lawyer shall not ... falsify evidence, counsel or assist a 
witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law." Id. at R. 
3.4(b). Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly ... offer evidence that 
the lawyer knows to be false .... " Id. at R.3.3(a)(3). Model Rule l .O(t) states that while "knows" or 
"knowingly" refers to "actual knowledge," "knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." Id. at 
R. l .0(t). 
43 . Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 163-66. 
44. Id. at 148. 
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asking the witness to relate the facts,45 sometimes referred to as the 
Anatomy of a Murder model of witness preparation,46 clearly transgress 
the line dividing the ethical from the unethical. However, a number of 
scholars have opined that the witness preparation techniques in question 
are not unethical.47 
In my view, the techniques described in the above cited material are 
unethical if not illega148 and violate Model Rules 3.3(a)(3) and 3.4(b). 
Moreover, there is evidence that the use of product picture books 
containing pictures of products that law firms want clients to identify as 
well as other witness preparation techniques described in the cited 
materials are in widespread use in asbestos claiming. This may explain 
how claimant and witness testimony with regard to products used at sites 
twenty to forty years earlier has shifted over time as former payors into 
the tort system enter bankruptcy and other solvent companies are drafted 
into the litigation. These periodic sea changes in testimony minimize the 
product share of companies in bankruptcy, enlarge the shares of solvent 
defendants and constantly expand the universe of defendants.49 
The absence of any disciplinary enforcement of Model Rules 
3.3(a)(3) and 3.4(b), even in the case of egregious violations,50 would 
appear to indicate a further failure of the disciplinary process to apply 
ethical rules to asbestos litigation. 
VI. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN ASBESTOS REPRESENTATION: 
THE PLAINTIFFS' SIDE 
A. Sources of Law 
No ethical issues raised by asbestos litigation loom larger than 
those generated by the rule that a lawyer may not represent conflicting 
interests-a principle which applies with equal force to asbestos-related 
45. See id. at 146 n.420. 
46. See id. at 146-48. 
47. Id. at 145 n.417. One leading ethics scholar has stated that "[i]n the absence of ethics 
opinions, disciplinary decisions and cases involving judicial sanctions dealing with improper 
coaching as an ethics violation, patterns of 'aggressive' coaching are prevalent in many sectors of 
the litigation bar." Cramton, supra note 36, at 188. 
48. I have expressed the view in an expert' s affidavit that a witness preparation document 
used by the firm, referred to as the "script memo," suborned perjury. Brickman, Theories of 
Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 430. 
49. Id. at 137-41 ; see also id. at 108-10. 
50. For an example of a lawyer brazenly instructing her client to change his testimony with 
regard to product identification, see id. at 143 n.409. 
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bankruptcy proceedings. There are at least three sources of conflicts of 
interest law51 that apply to asbestos litigation: the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, United States Supreme Court pronouncements on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and the Bankruptcy Code. 
1. Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
The beginning point of any discussion of conflicts of interest is the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct-in particular Rules 1.7 and 1.9. 
Rule l. 7 prohibits attorneys from representation in which there is a 
"concurrent conflict," that is, where "there is a significant risk that the 
representation [of a current client] will be directly adverse to another 
client" or "that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a 
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. "52 
51 . Lawyers are subject to regulation under at least four legal regimes: criminal law; civil law, 
which includes liability for breach of contract and malpractice; fiduciary law, which establishes a 
standard of conduct and which can give rise to liability for breach of that standard; and disciplinary 
law, which is usually created by state supreme courts and which is mostly expressed in codes of 
ethics which the courts promulgate. The relationship between disciplinary law (rules of ethics) and 
fiduciary law is explored in Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet 
Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 44 nn.65-66 (I 989). The origin of fiduciary 
obligation is summarized in Lester Brickman, The Continuing Assault on the Citadel of Fiduciary 
Protection: Ethics 2000's Revision of Model Rule 1.5, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181, 1186-92 (2003). 
A more accurate count of the number of sources of applicable conflicts of interest law would 
include fiduciary law which, though largely replicated in disciplinary law, has independent and 
wider application to lawyers' conduct. For a discussion of conflicts of interest law from the broader 
perspective of fiduciary law see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§§ 121-135 (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] . 
52. Model Rule 1.7 provides: 
Conflict of Interest: Current Clients 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest 
exists if: 
(I) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a 
third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under 
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent 
and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against 
another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before 
a tribunal; and 
( 4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. I. 7. 
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Rule 1.9 prohibits attorneys from representing clients whose interests 
conflict with those of a former client. 53 The purpose of these rules is not 
only to ensure that attorneys will loyally and effectively represent their 
clients and that clients can trust their attorneys, but also to safeguard the 
adversarial representation on which our legal system is based. 54 
In some cases, attorneys may proceed to represent clients though 
there are concurrent conflicts, provided the attorney obtains the 
interested clients' informed, written consent to proceed with the 
conflicted representation. 55 "Informed consent requires that the client or 
former client have reasonably adequate information about the material 
risks of such representation to that client or former client. "56 A variety of 
sanctions and remedies may be imposed where an attorney fails to 
decline representation or obtain waiver of a conflict.57 
Some conflicts are so paramount that public policy, as reflected in 
both fiduciary law and ethical rules, forbids the representation regardless 
of client consent.58 In such cases, the tribunal's interest in vigorous 
advocacy for both sides outweighs the clients' and lawyer's interests in 
waiving the conflict and proceeding with the representation.59 
53 . Model Rule 1.9 provides: 
Duties to Former Clients 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent 
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's 
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former 
client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
Id. at R. 1.9. In addition to Rules 1.7 and 1.9, Rule 1.8, which prohibits aggregate settlements unless 
there is informed client consent, is also relevant. 
54. RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, at § 121 cmt. b. Other policy considerations underlying 
conflict of interest law are the desire for lawyers to protect clients' confidential information and the 
goal of ensuring that lawyers will not "exploit" clients, as by creating pressure for the client to give 
the lawyer gifts in order to buy the lawyer's loyalty. Id. 
55. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 1.7; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 51 , at§ 121 
cmt. e. 
56. RESTATEMENT, supra note 541, at § 122. The Model Rules of Professional conduct define 
"[i)nformed consent" as "denot[ing] the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct 
after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of 
and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct." MODEL RULES, supra note 
17, at R. I.O(e). 
57. RESTATEMENT, supra note 541, at § 122 cmt. f. Sanctions include "professional 
discipline," disqualification or injunction from participating in the matter, and in some cases, 
forfeiture of legal fees. Id. Injured clients can pursue legal malpractice claims. Id. If the unwaived 
conflict prejudicially affects the outcome of litigation, the disposition may be reversed or set aside. 
Id. Some conflicts may even subject the lawyer to criminal sanctions. Id. 
58. I GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 11-59 (3d 
ed. 2004 Supp.). 
59. Id. 
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Unwaivable conflicts exist where 1) the law prohibits the representation 
(as in joint representation of multiple defendants in a criminal trial), 
2) the attorney's clients assert claims against one other (including cross-
claims) in the same litigation,60 and 3) where "it is not reasonably likely 
that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to the 
affected clients . .. .',61 An objective standard applies in determining 
whether an attorney is able to provide adequate representation despite 
the conflict of interest. 62 The analysis "includes the requirements both 
that the consented-to conflict not adversely affect the lawyer's 
relationship with either client and that it not adversely affect the 
representation of either client.',63 Thus, even where a client purportedly 
waives his or her right to conflict-free counsel, the conflict may so 
impair the lawyer's ability to provide "competent and diligent 
representation"64 that the law prohibits the representation. 
2. Federal Rule 2365 Asbestos-Related Jurisprudence 
The United States Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue of 
conflicts of interest in class action asbestos litigation, holding that failure 
to avoid conflicts of interest mandated rejection of proposed mega-
asbestos class action settlements. 
In one such action, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the Third Circuit's reversal of the trial court's 
certification of a settlement-only class intended to achieve "global 
settlement of current and future asbestos-related claims.',66 Counsel for 
defendants, the twenty former asbestos manufacturers that comprised the 
60. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. l.7(b)(3). 
61. HAzARD & HODES, supra note 58, at 11-59-11-60; RESTATEMENT, supra note 51 , at 
§ 122 cmt. b. Rule l.7(b)(l) requires that in order for the concurrent conflict to be waivable, "the 
lawyer [must] reasonably believe ... that [he or she] . . . will be able to provide competent and 
diligent representation to each affected client." MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 1.7(b)(l). In 
addition, effective waiver is not possible where a client cannot give informed consent because s/he 
"lacks capacity to consent" or possesses "inadequate understanding of the nature and severity of the 
lawyer's conflict." Id.; see RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, at § 122 cmt. b. "Decisions holding that a 
conflict is nonconsentable often involve facts suggesting that the client, who is often 
unsophisticated in retaining lawyers, was not adequately informed or was incapable of adequately 
appreciating the risks of the conflict .... " RESTATEMENT, supra note 51 , at§ 122 cmt. g(iv). 
62. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 58, at 11-60; RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, at § 122 
cmt. g(iv) (stating that an attorney may not represent a client where "joint representation would be 
objectively inadequate despite a client's voluntary and informed consent"). 
63. RESTATEMENT, supra note 541 , at§ 122 cmt. g(iv). 
64. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. l.7(b)(l). 
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (2005). 
66. Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc. , 878 F.Supp. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated by 83 F.3d 
610 (3d Cir. 1996), ajf'd sub nom. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 , 597 (1997). 
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Center for Claims Resolution (the "CCR"), and counsel for thousands of 
inventory plaintiffs (those with then-pending claims), had agreed on 
enormous settlements for all inventory claimants, contingent on court 
approval of a separate class action settlement binding all future 
claimants. 67 The proposed global settlement provided that unimpaired or 
"exposure-only" claims would not have any value,68 though unimpaired 
inventory claimants were generously compensated. 69 In formulating the 
global settlement, which established an administrative procedure and 
payment schedule for claims handling, plaintiffs' counsel purported to 
act on behalf of a class of anticipated future claimants with whom 
counsel had no attorney-client relationship.70 
The Court rejected the certification of the class because it failed to 
meet the structural requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.71 
The Court found, inter alia,72 that the class lacked adequate 
representation, a requirement that "serves to uncover conflicts of interest 
between named parties and the class they seek to represent,"73 and also 
67. Id. at 600-02. The consideration for the Futures Agreements included "CCR's agreement 
to settle some 50,000 pending asbestos cases for approximately $750 million .. . [which] was 
paid ... by CCR . . .. " Proposed Fifth Amended Complaint at ml 170-174, G-1 Holdings, Inc. v. 
Baron & Budd, No. 01 Civ. 0216 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2003) 
68. The settlement did, however, provide that exposure-only claimants might later qualify for 
benefits if they "developed[ed] a compensable disease and [met] the relevant exposure and medical 
criteria." Amchem, 521 U.S. at 604. 
69. Id. ; see Lester Brickman, Lawyers ' Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the Brave New 
World of Aggressive Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL' Y REV. 243, 295 (2001). 
70. Amchem, 21 U.S. at 601 (Plaintiffs' counsel "endeavored to represent the interests of the 
anticipated future claimants, although those lawyers then had no attorney-client relationship with 
such claimants."). 
71. Rule 23 provides that 
(a) .. . [o)ne or more members ofa class may sue or be sued as representative parties on 
behalf of all only if (I) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims 
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, 
and ( 4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
The proposed class in Amchem sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which provides 
Id. 
(b) ... [a)n action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision 
(a) are satisfied, and in addition: . .. (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the 
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 
72. The Court also held that the class did not meet Rule 23 's predominance requirement. 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622-23. 
73. Id. at 625. 
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"factors in competency and conflicts of class counsel."74 The Court 
identified intra-class conflicts of interest (primarily conflicts between the 
interests of currently injured class members and not-yet-identified future 
claimants),75 and held that "[t]he settling parties, in sum, achieved a 
global compromise with no structural assurance of fair and adequate 
representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected."76 
In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,77 another mega-asbestos class action 
settlement, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's affirmance of the trial 
court's certification of a Rule 23(b)(l)(B)78 (or "limited fund") 
mandatory settlement-only class.79 Defendant Fibreboard negotiated the 
settlement of 45,000 inventory claims with plaintiffs' counsel, 
contingent on either global settlement of all future asbestos claims 
against Fibreboard or Fibreboard's success in separate insurance 
coverage disputes in which it was then involved. 80 The terms of the 
74. Id. at 626 n.20. 
75. The Court stated that 
the named parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on behalf of a single 
giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses. In significant respects, the 
interests of those within the single class are not aligned. Most saliently, for the currently 
injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs against the 
interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the 
future . 
Id. at 626. 
76. Id. at 627. The Court, however, "decline[ d] to address adequacy-of-counsel issues 
discretely." Id. at 626 n.20. 
Id. 
77. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Section 23(b)(l)(B) provides: 
(b) . . . [ a ]n action may be maintained as a class action if . . . (I) the prosecution of 
separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of. . . 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a 
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the 
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests . ... 
79. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821. The proposed class included "those with present claims never 
filed, present claims withdrawn without prejudice, and future claimants," but excluded those who 
had sued Fibreboard before but had "retain[ ed) the right to sue again 'upon development of an 
asbestos related malignancy,' plaintiffs with claims pending against Fibreboard at the time of the 
initial announcement of the Global Settlement Agreement, and the plaintiffs in the 'inventory' 
claims settled as a supposedly necessary step in reaching the global settlement." Id. at 854. 
80. Id. at 824. At the insistence of plaintiffs' counsel, Fibreboard then settled its insurance 
disputes with a Trilateral Settlement Agreement. Id. at 825. The proposed Global Settlement 
Agreement included no opt-out provision, id. at 834 n.13, and established a trust and a series of 
remedies plaintiffs would have to pursue before resorting to the courts. Id. at 827. The settlement 
further provided that plaintiffs who did resort to a court could recover a maximum of $500,000 and 
would receive the funds over a longer period of time than those plaintiffs who resolved their claims 
without litigation. Id. 
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inventory settlements were significantly more favorable than those 
negotiated for class members. 81 
The Court held that the class failed to meet the requirements for a 
limited fund class action, 82 and stated that conflicts of interest between 
inventory claimants and class members, as well as intra-class conflicts, 
required "the structural protection of independent representation."83 "[l]t 
is obvious after Amchem," the Court stated, "that a class divided 
between holders of present and future claims (some of the latter 
involving no physical injury and attributable to claimants not yet born) 
requires division into homogeneous subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), 
with separate representation to eliminate conflicting interests of 
counsel."84 Since "the full payment of [the separate inventory claim 
settlements] ... was contingent on a successful" global settlement, 
plaintiffs' counsel were pitting their own financial interests against the 
interests of class members and "could [not] be of a mind to do their 
simple best in bargaining for the benefit of the settlement class";85 "[t]he 
resulting incentive to favor the known [inventory] plaintiffs [because 
that generated the most income for the lawyers] ... was ... an egregious 
example of the conflict noted in Amchem resulting from divergent 
interests of the presently injured and future claimants. "86 
81. The Court stated that "[a]s for the settled inventory claims, their plaintiffs appeared to 
have obtained better terms than the class members." Id. at 855. 
82. Id. at 848. Specifically, the Court found that the fund in this case was "limited" only by 
agreement of the parties, and that "exclusions from the class and allocations of assets [were] at odds 
with the concept of limited fund treatment and the structural protections of Rule 23(a) explained in 
Amchem." Id. 
83. Id. at 855. 
84. Id. at 856. 
85. Id. at 852. 
86. Id. at 853. The Court further indicated that counsel's conflicting interests may have 
contributed to the substantive unfairness of the proposed settlement, stating that 
[ o ]ne may take a settlement amount as good evidence of the maximum available if one 
can assume that parties of equal knowledge and negotiating skill agreed upon the figure 
through arms-length bargaining, unhindered by any considerations tugging against the 
interests of the parties ostensibly represented in the negotiation. But no such assumption 
may be indulged in this case, or probably in any class action settlement with the potential 
for gigantic fees. In this case, certainly, any assumption that plaintiffs' counsel could be 
of a mind to do their simple best in bargaining for the benefit of the settlement class is 
patently at odds with the fact that at least some of the same lawyers representing 
plaintiffs and the class had also negotiated the separate settlement of 45,000 pending 
claims, the full payment of which was contingent on a successful Global . Settlement 
Agreement or the successful resolution of the insurance dispute . . .. 
Id. at 852 (citations omitted). The Court noted that the inventory settlement terms were more 
favorable than the terms of the Global Settlement. See id. at 855. 
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Thus, in both Amchem and Ortiz, the Court held that in a Rule 23 
class action, the inherent conflict between the interests of present 
claimants and future claimants and the conflicting loyalties of the 
attorneys for the present claimants who purported to also represent the 
interests of future claimants required rejection of both settlements. Such 
conflicting interests require the structural protection of separate counsel 
for each of the classes competing for a share of the available assets. 
3. Bankruptcy Proceedings 
Conflict of interest principles are made applicable to bankruptcy 
proceedings through various statutory prov1s1ons and judicial 
decisions.87 Under § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee, or 
debtor in possession, 88 may employ attorneys to represent the trustee or 
assist in administering the trustee's duties, provided that the attorneys 
are "disinterested persons,"89 and "do not hold or represent an interest 
adverse to the estate. "90 Similarly, § 1103 empowers creditors' 
87. See Silbiger v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917, 920-21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 
U.S. 813 (1950), and cert. denied, 340 U.S. 831 (1950) (holding that an attorney had a conflict of 
interest in representing holders of two different series of bonds in a reorganization proceeding); see 
also 4 DANIEL R. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 17 .2 (7th ed. 1998) (stating that 
courts can enforce standards for the quality of attorneys' work in bankruptcy proceedings by 
applying the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (which the current Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct has since replaced)). 
88. In a majority of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings the debtor serves as trustee of the 
bankruptcy estate and is labeled "debtor in possession." See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2005). The trustee 
or debtor in possession is appointed by the court, in accordance with 11 U .S.C. § 1104(a). Within 30 
days of the appointment of a trustee by the court a party in interest can request that the United States 
Trustee convene a meeting of the creditor's committee at which, the creditors shall elect one 
disinterested person to act as trustee. See 11 U .S.C. § I I 04(b) (2005). The debtor in possession, 
subject to any limitations prescribed by the court, has the same rights, powers, and duties of a 
trustee serving in a Chapter 11 case. 11 U.S.C. § I 107(a) (2005). The duties of the trustee are set out 
in 11 U.S.C. § II06.SeealsoCOWANS,supranote87,at§ 17.2. 
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2005). Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a 
"disinterested person," inter alia, as one who "does not have an interest materially adverse to the 
interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or 
indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor ... or for any other reason." 11 
U.S.C. § 101(14)(E) (2005). 
90. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). But see 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b) (stating that professionals, such as 
accountants, attorneys, or appraisers, hired by debtor in possession will not be solely disqualified 
based on their previous "employment by or representation of the debtor before the commencement 
of the case." Section 327(e) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the trustee or debtor in possession to 
hire special counsel that had previously represented the debtor, for a particular purpose other than 
representing the trustee in his duties as trustee. This representation must be in the best interest of the 
estate, and special counsel must not hold any "interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate with 
respect to the matter on which such attorney is to be employed." See 11 U.S.C. § 327(e). Section 
327(e) counsel are not subject to the disinterested standard. 
854 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:833 
committees appointed by the United States Trustee under § 110291 to 
hire attorneys, provided that, "while employed by such committee[s], 
[the attorney does not] represent any other entity having an adverse 
interest in connection with the case. "92 
The United States Trustee is responsible for monitoring and 
advising the court with respect to hiring counsel under § 327.93 In 
addition to filing comments on such applications,94 a United States 
Trustee may intervene and be heard in any bankruptcy proceeding.95 If 
the court determines, with or without intervention by the United States 
Trustee, that an attorney hired under §§ 327 or 1103 fails to meet the 
requirements set forth in those sections, it may, under § 328, deny the 
conflicted attorney compensation and reimbursement of expenses.96 
a. Rule 2019 
As additional protection against conflicts of interest, Federal Rule 
of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019(a) requires that attorneys representing 
more than one creditor file a verified statement listing the creditors, the 
amount and nature of their claims ( as well as the acquisition date of 
claims acquired within the last year), the facts surrounding the attorney's 
employment in the case, and the nature and amount of any claims or 
interests owned by the attorney at the time he or she was hired. 97 This 
91. Section I 102 delegates to United States Trustees the task of appointing creditors' 
committees. 11 U .S.C. § 1102(a)( I) (2005). The statute further provides that parties in interest may 
request that the court order the United States Trustee to appoint additional committees "if necessary 
to assure adequate representation of creditors or of equity security holders." Id. § 1102(a)(2). 
92. 11 U.S.C. § l 103(b) (2005). Section l 103(b) further provides that "[r]epresentation of one 
or more creditors of the same class as represented by the committee shall not per se constitute the 
representation of an adverse interest." See also COWANS, supra note 87, at § 17 .11 . 
93. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(H) (2005). 
94. Id. 
95. 11 U.S.C. § 307 (2005). 
96. 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (2005). 
97. Rule 2019(a) provides: 
(a) Data required. In a chapter 9 municipality or chapter 11 reorganization case, except 
with respect to a committee appointed pursuant to § 1102 or 1114 of the Code, every 
entity or committee representing more than one creditor or equity security holder and, 
unless otherwise directed by the court, every indenture trustee, shall file a verified 
statement setting forth (I) the name and address of the creditor or equity security holder; 
(2) the nature and amount of the claim or interest and the time of acquisition thereof 
unless it is alleged to have been acquired more than one year prior to the filing of the 
petition; (3) a recital of the pertinent facts and circumstances in connection with the 
employment of the entity ... . The statement shall include a copy of the instrument, if 
any, whereby the entity, committee, or indenture trustee is empowered to act on behalf of 
creditors or equity security holders. A supplemental statement shall be filed promptly, 
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requirement enables the court to identify actual or potential conflicts, so 
that it may require conflicted counsel to withdraw from representing one 
or more of the lawyer's clients.98 Every law firm representing more than 
one plaintiff against a defendant in bankruptcy is required to file this 
statement.99 However, in practice, plaintiff lawyers representing large 
numbers of asbestos claimants in bankruptcy proceedings have routinely 
failed to file such disclosures and have strongly resisted efforts to secure 
compliance. 100 On two occasions, however, courts have mandated 
compliance with Rule 2019. In one instance, Bankruptcy Judge Judith 
Fitzgerald issued an omnibus order requiring all counsel representing 
more than one creditor in several specified asbestos bankruptcy 
proceedings to comply with Rule 2019 or else the votes of their clients 
would not be counted. I0I However, although Judge Fitzgerald ordered 
setting forth any material changes in the facts contained in the statement filed pursuant to 
this subdivision. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a). 
98. See 2 FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 184, Rule 2019 Selected Case 
Comment(Alan N. Resnick and Henry J. Sommer, eds., Collier Pamphlet Ed. 2004). 
99. Id. Exceptions to this requirement exist where counsel represents a plaintiff class, or 
where the attorney is hired by a§ 1102 creditors' committee. See id.; FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a). 
100. See, e.g., infra note 104 (discussing the attempt by a leading asbestos plaintiff lawyer, Joe 
Rice of Motley, Rice (formerly Ness, Motley) to evade service of process to appear at deposition 
relating to the Rule 2019 proceeding). 
IOI . See Order Requiring Filing of Statements Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019, In re Owens 
Coming, No. 00-3837 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug 25, 2004). This order was directed at counsel 
representing more than one creditor or equity security holder in Owens Coming, Armstrong World 
Industries, W.R. Grace & Co., USG Corp., United States Mineral Products Company, Kaiser 
Aluminum Corporation, Inc., ACandS, Inc., Combustion Engineering, Inc., and The Flintkote 
Company bankruptcies. The order required that counsel supply to the court the following 
information for each creditor alleged to be represented by counsel: 
• a table of contents listing each claimant by last name then first name and for 
each claimant Exhibit A and Exhibit B, subparts 1 though 7 as described 
below; if information required to be submitted as Exhibit A or Exhibit B 
items I through 7 does not exist for a particular claimant, the table of contents 
shall so state. 
• Exhibit A shall consist of copies of any powers of attorney or other 
agreement or instrument whereby the entity, committee, or indenture trustee 
is empowered to act on behalf of creditors or equity security holders. 
• Exhibit B shall consist of all the following: 
1. the name and address of creditor ... ; 
2. the last four digits of the Social Security Number of any such 
creditor ... ; 
3. the nature and amount of the claim or interest and the time of 
acquisition thereof or an allegation that the claim or interest was 
acquired more than one year prepetition; 
4. a recital of the pertinent facts and circumstances in connection 
with the employment of the entity or indenture trustee and, in the 
case of a committee, the name or names of the entity or entities at 
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counsel to submit exhibits in compliance with Rule 2019, she muted the 
effect of her decision by ordering that the exhibits were not to be 
scanned into the docket and instead would be kept by the court, thus 
essentially causing the exhibits to be filed under seal. 102 U.S. Bankruptcy 
Judge Kathryn C. Ferguson, presiding over the Congoleum bankruptcy, 
ordered full compliance with Rule 2019. 103 Judge Ferguson's order was 
in response, inter alia, to a motion to compel the law firm of Motley 
Rice to provide the information called for by Rule 2019.104 U.S. District 
whose instance, directly or indirectly, the employment 
arrangement was arranged or the committee was organized or 
agreed to act; and 
5. with reference to the time of the employment . . . , 
• the amounts of claims or interests owned by the entity, 
the committee members ... ; 
• the times acquired; 
• the amounts paid therefore, and 
• any sales or other disposition thereof 
6. a description of how counsel became involved with the claimant; 
7. a copy of the fee agreement, if any, between counsel and the 
claimant(s) or between counsel and any other law firm or entity 
representing a claimant. 
Id. Paragraph (7) was thereafter amended to read: "(7) a copy of the instrument, if any, whereby the 
entity, committee or indenture trustee is empowered to act on behalf of creditors or equity security 
holder." Amendatory Order Requiring Filing of Statements Pursuant to Fed. R. Bank. P. 2019, In re 
Owens Coming, No. 00-3837 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 27, 2004). 
102. See Order Requiring Filing of Statements Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019, In re Owens 
Coming, No. 00-3837 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 25, 2004). 
[E]xhibits required to be filed and listed below shall not be electronically filed but shall 
be submitted to the Clerk on compact disk ("CD"). Two sets of CDs shall be submitted 
and shall be identified on their faces as "Set I" and "Set 2" and shall note the name, 
address, and telephone number of the attorney and firm submitting the disks. 
Id. at 2. 
103. See Order Requiring Compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 2019 and Granting Other Relief, 
In re Congoleum, No. 03-51524 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 26, 2004). Judge Ferguson gave all counsel 
representing more than one creditor IO days to fully comply with the requirements of 2019. If 
counsel did not comply, the disclosure statement allowing the claimants to vote on the 
reorganization plan was to be sent directly to the claimants, thereby bypassing the uncooperative 
counsel. Id. at 2. 
104. Joe Rice of Motley Rice is regarded as a leading asbestos attorney and has been closely 
involved in a number of asbestos-related bankruptcies. See Motion to Compel the Law Firm of 
Motley Rice LLC to Comply with its Obligation Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 
2019, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 03-51524 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 6, 2004). In that motion, attorneys 
for insurers stated that Rice had "either refused to answer ... questions [posed at depositions 
tailored to elicit Rule 2019 information] or answered them evasively and non-responsively, so as to 
obscure the identity of his clients." Id. at 2. Though Mr. Rice was alleged to have "purported to 
'speak for' the claimants when he, together with Mr. [Perry] Weitz [of Weitz & Luxenberg 
negotiated the Congoleum pre-pack]," id. at 5, he refused to identify his clients. Id. at 4. Insurers 
contended that according to Rice ' s testimony, "he may or may not represent anywhere between a 
few and approximately seventy five thousand individual claimants in this bankruptcy proceeding." 
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Court Judge Chesler affirmed Judge Fitzgerald's order, holding that 
complete disclosure in compliance with Rule 2019 is necessary to ensure 
the overall fairness of the reorganization plan. 105 
B. "Limited Funds" and Limited Numbers of Law Firms 
In asbestos litigation, most claimants are represented by just a 
handful of law firms. 106 These firms both directly contract with 
Id. at 7. Insurers further contended that "Mr. Rice's clients are not exclusively individual claimants 
after all, but rather that he extracted fee sharing agreements from attorneys who represent other 
claimants in connection with the prepetition process, whereby he conferred preferential security 
interests on their clients." Id. at 8. Insurers suggested that Rice refused to comply with Rule 2019 
because doing so may demonstrate that Rice, in representing some individual claimants and also 
other plaintiff lawyers representing most of the tort claimants in the Congoleum bankruptcy, may be 
involved, as well, in representing conflicting interests and that he may not have secured the 
informed consent of his clients to these conflicts. Id. at 11. 
The vigor with which Rice has resisted providing the Rule 2019 information is illustrated 
by Rice's alleged attempts to evade being served with a subpoena to appear at a deposition to elicit 
Rule 2019 information. See Transcript of Motion Hearing Before the Honorable Kathryn C. 
Ferguson, In re Congoleum, No. 03-51524 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2004). Joe Rice was subpoenaed 
by the court to answer questions regarding his failure to comply with Rule 2019. As related by 
counsel for those trying to execute service: 
[I]t's a sort of bizarre story of Mr. Rice refusing to schedule his deposition and at the 
same time ducking service, putting us through extensive, extensive efforts sort of 
chasing him around South Carolina after he wouldn't schedule a deposition, to have 
process servers follow him from one gated community to another to finally serve him. 
Id. at 6; see also infra note 212. 
105. See In re Congoleum, No. 04-5634 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2005). Judge Chesler affirmed the 
bankruptcy court's order requiring appellants' compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 2019. In 
particular, he affirmed the challenged elements of Judge Ferguson's Rule 2019 Order requiring 
appellants to list and explain any "co-counsel, consultant or fee-sharing relationships and 
arrangements whatsoever, in connection with this bankruptcy case." Id. at 24. Judge Chesler held 
that the information being sought does not come within the privilege of the attorney-client 
relationship as long as it is relevant. Id. at 28. The facts before the bankruptcy court regarding the 
representation of plaintiffs and fee sharing between plaintiffs lawyers, "suggested the opportunity 
for abuse of fee sharing relationships" and therefore, complete Rule 20 I 9 disclosure is "inextricable 
from the overall fairness of the reorganization plan." Id. at 14. 
106. These include Baron & Budd and its affiliated firm, Silber Pearlman, Motley Rice 
(formerly Ness Motley}, Weitz & Luxenberg, Kelley & Ferraro, Goldberg, Persky, Jennings & 
White, as well as Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, Brayton & Purcell, Cooney & Conway, Kazan 
McCain, Levy Phillips & Konigsberg, Cumbest, Cumbest, Hunter & McCormick and the Law Firm 
of Peter Angelos, among others. See Frances McGovern, ASBESTOS LEGISLATION II: SECTION 
524(G) WITHOUT BANKRUPTCY, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 233, 247-48 (2004): Professor McGovern states: 
Id. 
The [asbestos] plaintiffs' bar is represented by approximately twenty-five lawyers who 
serve on the various asbestos bankruptcy committees. Roughly seven to fifteen of those 
lawyers can effectively speak for all of their peers. If those seven to fifteen lawyers can 
agree among themselves on the details of a prepackaged bankruptcy, there is a 
substantial likelihood that there will be no critical opposition from the plaintiffs to an 
eventual plan of reorganization. 
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screening enterprises to acquire clients and also acquire clients through 
arrangements with law firms lower down on the food chain which hire 
the asbestos screening enterprises to solicit "litigants"-persons with 
pre-1972 occupational exposure to asbestos-containing products who are 
found to have either 1/0 asbestosis on the ILO scale or pleural plaques 
by the handful of B-readers consistently hired by plaintiff lawyers. 107 
As noted, the number of claimants, which so far approximates 
845,000108 (accounting for perhaps fifty to sixty million claims), is 
projected by some to grow to at least double that number in the next five 
to eight years, 109 barring a legislative reordering of the litigation. 110 It is 
therefore likely that the assets of at least some if not many of the solvent 
defendants who are at risk will be insufficient to pay all remaining 
present and future claims. Because present as well as future claimants 
are thus competing for a finite and insufficient quantum of assets, they 
are engaged in a zero-sum game111 in which winners' winnings will be at 
the expense of other winners whose consequent lowered recoveries 
properly denominates them as losers in the zero-sum game. This poses a 
quintessential conflict of interest for lawyers representing the full 
spectrum of claimants. Those clients whose claims are pending are 
seeking to maximize their recoveries. As a consequence, newer clients 
may be precluded from recovery or subjected to lower recoveries by the 
depletion of assets in favor of clients further along in the claiming 
process. Moreover, all present clients are seeking maximum recoveries 
and therefore have interests adverse to future clients to be recruited by 
these firms. This is especially the case if defendants which are providing 
major percentages of current settlement funds are likely to become 
insolvent and declare bankruptcy, precipitating a process whereby a 
portion of funds that would otherwise be available to pay current 
claimants must be set aside to pay the claims of future claimants. 112 
107. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 72, 91-94. 
I 08. See supra note I. 
109. See supra note 5. 
I 10. See THE FAIRNESS IN ASBESTOS INJURY RESOLUTION ("FAIR") ACT, S. 2290, 108th 
Cong. (2004), S. 1125, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing, as an alternative to tort litigation, the 
creation of a trust fund in the amount of $140 billion to be funded by defendant companies in 
asbestos litigation, § 524(g) trusts and insurers). Senator Specter introduced a new discussion draft 
of the Act to the 109th Congress on February 7, 2005. 151 Cong. Rec. SIOl l (2005). 
111. See Francis Heylighen, Zero Sum Games, at Principia Cybernetica Web, 
http://pcp.lanl.gov/ZESUGAM.html ("Zero-sum games are games where the amount of 'winnable 
goods' is fixed. Whatever is gained by one actor is therefore lost by the other actor; the sum of 
gained . . . and lost . . . is zero.") (last visited May 18, 2005). 
112. Conflicts of interest issues raised by bankruptcy are separately considered in Part V.C. 
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Accordingly, law firms which represent large numbers of asbestos 
claimants and which recruit new claimants who will be actively 
competing for limited resources simultaneously with the firms' current 
clients are violating Model Rule 1.7 if they fail to secure the informed 
consent of new clients and current clients with pending claims to the 
conflicts of interest. 113 As Amchem and Ortiz implicitly held, class 
counsel's representation of future claimants is impaired when it is also 
engaged in simultaneous representation of present clients with differing 
interests. 114 Moreover, such representation violates these firms' fiduciary 
obligations to current clients because the new clients' claims will reduce 
the amounts actually payable to current clients. 115 
In addition to concurrent conflicts of interest which arise when 
lawyers represent current asbestos claimants while actively recruiting 
new claimants to become additional clients, lawyers who previously 
represented a client may not thereafter represent a client in the same or 
substantially related matter in which the client's interests are materially 
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client 
consents after consultation.116 Such a situation may be presented when a 
lawyer previously represented client A in a suit against company B 
resulting in a liquidated but unpaid claim against B which is now in 
I I 3. I am unaware of any widespread practice of plaintiff lawyers of seeking informed consent 
to such conflicts . Model Rule J.O(e) defines informed consent as "the agreement by a person to a 
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and 
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course 
of conduct." Thus, to obtain informed consent, the firms must assure that the clients with the 
differing interests are aware of the relevant circumstances including an explanation of how the 
representation could have adverse effects on the clients' interests. Even were these conditions to be 
complied with, serious questions exist as to whether a waiver from litigants so recruited would be 
valid under Model Rule l.7(b)(l). See supra text accompanying notes 58-64. 
114. See MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. l .7(b); see also Roger Cramton, Lawyer Conduct 
in the "Tobacco Wars," 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 445-447 (2001). 
115. See Findley v. Falise (In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig.), 878 F. Supp. 
473, 492 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that an attorney had an ethical obligation to disclose a 
conflict of interest to new clients and secure waiver where his success in representing current clients 
would deplete assets available to new clients); see also Complaint, Huber v. Taylor, No. 02-0304, 
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2002), cited in Richard C. Stanley, Ethics in Asbestos: An Oxymoron?, ALI-ABA 
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Course No. SJ03) 
LEXIS Combined ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials File) at 376-77 (Nov. 2003) (an action filed 
by a group of asbestos plaintiffs against their lawyers alleging, inter a/ia, breach of fiduciary duty, 
professional malpractice, conversion and fraud, on the grounds that their lawyers "consented to a 
settlement agreement with various asbestos defendants without informing the plaintiffs of the 
settlement offer or seeking their approval; failed to inform the plaintiffs of the nature of the asbestos 
related claims of the lawyers' other clients involved in the settlement," and that "the lawyers' 
representation of these other clients along with plaintiffs posed conflicts of interest or potential 
conflicts of interest"). 
116. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 1.9(a). 
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bankruptcy, and the lawyer now represents clients C and D with claims 
against the debtor which because of the limited funds of the debtor, pit 
the interests of C and D against A. 
Conflicts of interest in asbestos litigation are not confined to 
scenarios pitting the interests of present and future claimants. Conflicts 
also arise because of the differing interests of subclasses of current 
claimants. While a few asbestos law firms confine their representation 
mostly to claimants with malignancies, most of the major asbestos law 
firms, which have the largest inventories of claimants, represent both 
malignant and nonmalignant claimants. Conflicts of interest are created 
by this common practice of representation of multiple claimants with a 
diverse disease mix. In entering into settlements with various defendants 
and thus divvying up defendants' assets among the competing claimants, 
these firms are essentially deciding the proper division of a limited fund 
among the competing inventory subgroups, in particular, as between the 
relatively small malignant subgroups which are competing with the 
much larger nonmalignant subgroups. In view of the finite assets and the 
competing interests of the malignant and nonmalignant subgroups, even 
were lawyers to include provisions in their retainer agreements 
providing for waivers of conflicts of interest, it appears doubtful that 
lawyers can provide adequate representation to each person in each 
subgroup and thus meet the objective standard for determining the 
ethical validity of conflicts waivers. 117 
A further conflict of interest arises when plaintiff firms are engaged 
both in negotiating large scale class action settlements on a state or 
national level and also handling large numbers of individual cases. This 
simultaneous representation can result in prejudicing the rights of either 
or both individual clients and class members. For example, one firm 
"agreed to abandon punitive damages for members of the class [it was 
representing] while simultaneously asserting such claims in damage 
cases." 118 
Violations of Model Rule 1. 7 as well as breaches of fiduciary rights 
of clients also occur when lawyers structure Federal Rule 42 
consolidations or state equivalents thereof to include a small number of 
seriously injured claimants in a much larger group of lesser injured or 
arguably non-injured claimants. Empirical evidence indicates that such 
aggregations often lead to lower claim values for the seriously injured 
claimants and much higher claim values than would otherwise be the 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 58-654. 
118. Cramton, supra note 36, at 197. 
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case for the lesser injured claimants. 119 Moreover, by diluting the 
plaintiff class with less injured people, plaintiffs' attorneys are 
transferring money that would have gone to the seriously injured had the 
others not been in the class. As Professors Carrington and Apanovitch 
have observed: 
[T]he guesswork associated with mass tort class action settlement 
effects a substantial modification of the property rights of class 
members. The modification of rights from those that can be enforced at 
trial to those that will be measured by weak conjecture effects a 
transfer of wealth from class members with clearly meritorious claims 
to those whose claims are more dubious. Intangible property rights are 
thus modified by any law conferring authoritv on a court to approve en 
l f I . . l . r20 masse a sett ement o persona mJury c aims. 
This strategic positioning by plaintiff lawyers generates higher 
contingency fee income than if the aggregations were limited to claims 
of similar severity121 and therefore breaches the ethical and fiduciary 
obligations of the lawyer to severely injured clients who receive less so 
that their lawyers may receive more. 122 
C. Conflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy Proceedings 
An increasing amount of asbestos claiming is now being channeled 
through the bankruptcy process, meriting separate consideration of 
conflicts of interest that arise in those proceedings. 
119. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos litigation Crisis: ls There a Need for an 
Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1873 n.231 (1992); Jack B. Weinstein, 
Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U.L. REV. 469, 480 (1999); see also Lester 
Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort System Outcomes Are 
Principally Determined by Lawyers' Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755, 1783-84 (1994); 
Paul C. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The 
Jllegitimacy of Mass Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 471 
( 1997). Judge Weinstein argues that 
consolidations do tend to encourage the commencement of suits of questionable merit. 
Since consolidated cases probably will be settled in large groups, the less defensible 
claims are likely to obtain more than they would if they were litigated (assuming they 
would have been brought at all), while the more serious claims will probably be settled 
for less then they would in individual suits. 
Weinstein, supra, at 480. 
120. Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 119, at 471. 
121. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 64 (1995) 
(noting that "[ m]ixing the cases for trial and settlement may result in a lower recovery for the more 
seriously injured, but generally it will result in a quicker fee for counsel"). 
122. See MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. l.7(a)(2). 
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1. The Uniqueness of Asbestos-Related Bankruptcies 
In a conventional Chapter 11 case, a debtor files for bankruptcy in 
order to begin the process of negotiating with its creditors over a plan of 
reorganization. 123 The end result is a reorganization plan which sets forth 
the recovery that each class of creditor or stockholder will receive and 
allows the company to emerge as a viable entity.124 For a reorganization 
plan to be adopted, it must normally be approved by a two-thirds 
majority of each class of affected creditors or stockholders. 125 However, 
if one class of creditors votes the plan down, the plan can still take effect 
if the judge finds that it is "fair and equitable"-a process known as 
"cramdown."126 Cramdown limits the ability of a creditor group to hold 
up the bankruptcy to obtain a disproportionate and economically 
unjustified amount. It is the threat of cramdown that keeps parties 
honest, pressures them to resolve their differences at the bargaining 
table, and allows the company to reorganize without protracted delays. 
Parties entitled to vote on a plan are identified through a process 
that requires all creditors to assert their claims by a court-designated 
"bar date. " 127 Claims not filed by that date are forfeited. In asbestos-
related bankruptcies, however, it is not possible to establish a bar date 
for the tort claimants. This is so because asbestos-related diseases have 
long latency periods; many victims, therefore, do not know at the time of 
the bankruptcy that they will have claims to assert against that 
company. 128 Therefore, if a conventional bar date was set in asbestos 
bankruptcies, future claimants would be barred from later bringing 
claims upon manifestation of injury. 
The early asbestos bankruptcies, beginning with the Johns Manville 
bankruptcy, attempted to solve the problem of future claims by 
123. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY iJ 1100.01 at 1100-01 (15th ed. 1996) ("Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code provides an opportunity for a debtor to reorganize its business or financial affairs 
or to engage in an orderly liquidation of its property .. . . The plan negotiation process is intended to 
lead normally to a consensual plan under which the debtor and a majority of creditors have agreed 
to both business and financial plans that offer some realistic chance of success.") 
124. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY iJ 1100.09 at 1100-01 (15th ed. 1996) ("The object in a 
chapter 11 reorganization case is normally to formulate a restructuring or reorganization plan that 
will enable the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy as a viable, profitable enterprise . ... The plan 
generally provides for the treatment of claims against and interests in the debtor and its property, 
and, if the debtor is reorganizing, a plan for the continuation of the business after confirmation."). 
125. 11 U.S.C § l 126(d). 
126. 11 U.S.C. § l 129(b). 
127. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c)(3). 
128. See RAND, VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra note 26, at 5 (noting that the 
latency period for asbestos-related diseases is between fifteen and forty years); see also Kane v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988) ("An individual might not become ill from 
an asbestos-related disease for until as long as forty years after initial exposure.") 
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estimating the amount of these future claims and funding a trust with the 
debtor's assets which was intended to provide those claimants with 
recoveries similar to those being received by current creditors. 129 
Because the trusts' assets would include equity in the debtor, it was to 
the advantage of present claimants looking to the trust for payment that 
the company emerging from bankruptcy be insulated from future 
claimants because otherwise the value of the equity would be 
depreciated. To accomplish this, bankruptcy courts issued "channeling 
injunctions," which required future asbestos claimants to sue the trust 
rather than the reorganized company. 130 To resolve doubts about whether 
the bankruptcy courts' inherent powers were broad enough to issue such 
a channeling injunction, in 1994, Congress created explicit statutory 
authority for channeling injunctions in asbestos cases: § 524(g). 13 1 
a. The Effect of the Adoption of§ 524(g) of the Bankruptcy 
Code 
Section 524(g) increased the usual two-thirds requirement for 
approval of a plan of reorganization to 75% of those claimants with 
129. See Findley v. Falise (In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig.), 878 F. Supp. 
473, 571 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that "[m]ethods for operating the trust must be established, 
'such as structured, periodic, or supplemental payments, pro rata distributions, matrices, or periodic 
review of estimates of numbers and values of present claims and future demands .. . that provide 
reasonable assurance that the trust will value, and be in a financial position to pay, present claims 
and future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner"'); Findley v. 
Blinken (In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig.), 982 F.2d 721, 732, 750 (2d Cir. 
1992) (affirming Judge Weinstein 's order directing the trustee to make $60,000 available for studies 
to be undertaken to estimate future claims against the trust and ensure that there are sufficient funds 
to pay these future claims). 
130. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 624-26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that 
the court had the authority to issue, as part of the plan, an injunction channeling all asbestos-related 
claims away from debtor and toward certain trusts for resolution); see also In re Joint Eastern & 
Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. 648 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990); Katherine M. Anand, Note, 
Demanding Due Process: The Constitutionality of the § 524 Channeling Injunction and Trust 
Mechanisms That Effectively Discharge Asbestos Claims in Chapter I I Reorganization, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1187, 1192-96 (detailing the effort to create a channeling injunction in the Manville 
bankruptcy). 
131. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2) allows courts to issue channeling injunctions to require future 
claimants to sue the bankruptcy trust directly. For examples of where such channeling injunctions 
have been issued, see, for example, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. ABB Lummus Global, Inc., 
No. 03 Civ. 7248, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10621 at *I (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re J. T. Thorpe Co., 308 
B.R. 782 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Artra Group, Inc. v. 
Artra Group, Inc. (In re Artra Group, Inc.), 300 B.R. 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ill . 2003); In re Asbestos 
Claims Management Corp., 294 B.R. 663 (N.D. Tex. 2003); see also Anand, supra note 130, at 
1197-1202. 
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allowed claims to be paid under the plan from the assets of the trust. 132 
The legislative change did not directly address the section of the 
bankruptcy code allowing a court to cram down a plan of reorganization 
and thus providing it with significant leverage in bringing parties to 
agreement. Bankruptcy courts, however, appear to operate under the 
assumption that § 524(g) exempts asbestos claimants from cramdown. 133 
Exemption from cramdown coupled with the 75% supermajority 
provision has drastically shifted the balance of forces vying for the 
debtor's assets. From the moment an asbestos bankruptcy commences, it 
is an overriding reality that the company will not be able to emerge from 
bankruptcy unless the plaintiff lawyers representing the substantial 
portion of claimants approve of the restructuring plan. 134 The same small 
132. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). The conflicts of interest in the representation 
leading to the establishment of a § 524(g) trust are exacerbated by the perverse incentives created by 
this section of the bankruptcy code. As noted, 
Bankruptcy filings by asbestos defendants . . . create additional distortions. One is that in 
order for a bankrupt asbestos firm's reorganization plan to be adopted, 75 percent of 
current tort claimants must vote in favor of the plan, but future tort claimants do not have 
the right to vote at all. (The 7 5 percent approval requirement is higher than the normal 
standard for adopting reorganization plans.) As a result, asbestos reorganization plans 
over-compensate present claimants relative to future claimants. Another problem is that 
if asbestos producers expect to file for bankruptcy, their managers have an incentive to 
encourage the filing of claims by the unimpaired. After all, these claimants have an 
incentive to vote in favor of a reorganization plan even if it provides only low 
compensation, and because there are too few claimants with serious asbestos diseases to 
block adoption of the plan, those with serious diseases tend to be under-compensated. 
Thus the voting rules for adoption of asbestos firms' reorganization plans lead to over-
compensation of unimpaired claimants and under-compensation of future claimants and 
those with serious asbestos diseases. This pattern of compensation further increases the 
cost of asbestos litigation by encouraging plaintiffs' lawyers to continue filing additional 
claims by the unimpaired. 
Michelle White, Asbestos & the Future of Mass Torts, NBER Working Paper No. Wl0308 at 18 
(Feb. 2004). 
133. See Walter v. Celotex (In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp.), 197 B.R. 372, 378-79 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1996) Though not specifically addressing the cramdown point, the court agreed that 
Celotex's attempt to circumvent the 75% voting requirement violated § 524(g). Id. at 379. The 
decision cites Ralph Mabey & Peter Zisser, Improving Treatment of Future Claims: The Unfinished 
Business Left by the Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 487 (1995), which mentions in 
passing and without authority that § 524(g) precludes cramdown. See id. Though the court stated 
that "the determination as to the scope and the extent of a § 524(g) injunction is limited to the 
determination of what was required by the [settlement agreement]," id. at 379, nonetheless, the 
decision is relied on by asbestos creditors to support their argument that § 524(g) precludes 
cramdown. 
134. Judge Wolin, who was presiding over five asbestos related bankruptcies, see discussion 
supra note 19, has stated: 
[Section] 524(g) creates an unlevel playing field and gives the asbestos claimants 
virtually an absolute veto over a consensual plan .... You could have 99 other issues to 
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cadre of plaintiff lawyers who appear in most asbestos bankruptcies have 
thus been vested with near complete and substantially unchecked power 
to dictate the terms of the plan. 135 Bankruptcy judges understand that this 
is so and with rare exception, accept, adopt and otherwise ratify 
whatever is needed to satisfy plaintiff lawyer demands, which typically 
include adoption of trust structures and trust distribution procedures that 
allow claims to be paid even if they lack valid evidence of actual injury 
and proof of actual exposure to the debtor's products. 136 
This near unbridled power is compounded by the practice of voting 
for the confirmation of the § 524(g) trust on a one-claimant-one-vote 
deal with but ultimately it's going to boil down to, Can the debtor get a 524(g)? And if 
the debtor can't get a 524(g), everything else is for naught. 
Roger Parloff, Tort Lawyers: There They Go Again, FORTUNE, Sept. 6, 2004, at 186, 194 (quoting 
Judge Wolin). 
135. Their power over the process is also aggrandized by the provision in § 524(g) that the 
trust to which all claims will be channeled hold or be capable of holding, under certain 
circumstances, a majority of the voting stock of the reorganized company. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 
(g)(B)(i)(llI). 
Id. 
The requirements of this subparagraph are that the injunction is to be implemented in 
connection with a trust, that, pursuant to the plan of reorganization is to own, or by 
exercise of rights granted under such plan would be entitled to own if specified 
contingencies occur, a majority of the voting shares of-
(aa) each such debtor; 
(bb) the parent corporation of each such debtor; or 
(cc) a subsidiary of each such debtor that is also a debtor. 
The practical effect of this provision is that when the reorganized company emerges from 
bankruptcy, the corporate officers may be operating under the aegis of the plaintiff lawyers who 
control the bankruptcy and who through their designees, the trustees of the trust, will control the 
majority of shares of the reorganized company. This has the obvious effect of deterring these 
officers from opposing plaintiff lawyers by, for example, seeking to restrict claiming eligibility 
against the trust to those with actual asbestos-related injuries that have resulted from exposure to the 
debtor's products. 
However, in recent pre-packaged asbestos bankruptcies, see infra text accompanying 
notes 163-69, ownership of debtor company stock remains almost exclusively with the parent 
company. See Mark Plevin et al., Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 883 (2003). In these pre-packs, the debtor and plaintiff's counsel agree that the 
debtor's parent can retain control of the debtor stock, in return for a nominal promissory note given 
to the § 524(g) trust which is secured with company stock. Only if the debtor defaults on the note, 
which is very unlikely given its nominal value, will the stock become property of the trust. As there 
is thus a situation in which the trust would be entitled to own a majority of the debtor stock, this 
agreement complies with the literal wording of 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(B)(i)(lll). 
136. See, e.g., In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 295 B.R. 459 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re 
Combustion Eng'g, Inc. , No. 03-10495, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1044 (Bankr. D. Del. July 2, 2003). 
But cf In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004), discussed infra at note 169; see 
also Written Statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
of Yeshiva University, Before Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, July 21, 2004, at 25 [hereinafter House Comm. on the Judiciary 
Statement]; Leahy's Legal ATM, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2005, at Al2. 
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basis, not by the value of the claims. 137 Equal valuation of claims is not a 
legal requirement, but rather a convention which furthers the interests of 
plaintiff lawyers mostly representing nonmalignant claimants, where 
each claim is valued at $1 for the purpose of counting votes. 138 Thus, an 
unimpaired claimant who may have no asbestos-related illness 
recognized by medical science, has the same one vote as does a 
mesothelioma clµJmant with a claim value in excess of one million 
dollars. 
The near unbridled power is further compounded by the virtually 
unregulated voting process. Plaintiff lawyers claiming appointment as 
attorney-in-fact for their asbestos clients, deliver their votes in a block-
listing the names of those they claim to represent and the total vote for 
and against. While there is, in theory, a limitation on who is eligible to 
137. A perverse refinement of this prov1S1on has come into use. In the pre-packaged 
bankruptcy agreement that created, inter alia, the Combustion Engineering Settlement Trust, which 
was a pre-petition entity to pay current inventory claims of certain plaintiff lawyers, three classes of 
claims were created. One class was to be paid 95% of the agreed pre-bankruptcy settlement, leaving 
the remaining 5% "stub claim" as a claim to be asserted in the bankruptcy case. The second class 
was to be paid 85% pre-bankruptcy with a 15% stub claim to be asserted in the bankruptcy case and 
the third class was to paid 75% with a 25% stub claim remaining. See Plevin et al., supra note 135, 
at 900. Thus, though thousands of claimants received substantial pre-petition settlements, they 
continued to be entitled to vote on the plan's approval because of the artificially-created "stub 
claim" device. This use of this artifice has been criticized by the Third Circuit, which rejected the 
Combustion Engineering Bankruptcy Plan principally on grounds of discriminatory treatment of the 
future claimants. See In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d at 238-242. The court found the plan 
inequitable in that the future and non-participating claimants received neither funding through nor 
representation during the establishment of the CE Settlement Trust, essentially the initial phase of 
the settlement. Id. at 245. The court further recognized that while "stub claims" are often used and 
permissible in many bankruptcy proceedings, the use of them here, coupled with the unequal 
representation of claimants, was problematic. See id. at 243-44. 
138. Notably, there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that precludes the Bankruptcy Court 
from decreeing that varying values be applied to injuries of varying severity. For example, one can 
imagine a system in which mesothelioma claims are valued at $1 million, lung cancers at $50,000, 
and mild asbestosis with lung impairment at $10,000 and $1,000 without. Each claimant's vote 
would be multiplied by the value of their claim, and then totaled to determine the outcome of the 
vote. It seems remarkable that plaintiff lawyers who specialize in mesothelioma and other cancer 
claims have apparently not advanced such an argument. See Mark D. Taylor & Scott L. Alberino, 
Who Is Authorized to Vote on a Plan of Reorganization?: Issue Pending in the USG Bankruptcy 
Case Could Alter the Asbestos Bankruptcy Landscape, 2 MEALEY'S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP. 6 
(2003) (examining the possibility of disabling the block voting of unimpaired claimants through a 
weighted voting procedure); see also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Defining the Edge of Tort Law in 
Asbestos Bankruptcies: Addressing Claims Filed by the Non-Sick, 14 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 61 
(2004) (propounding a legal framework that bankruptcy courts should use to assess whether 
unimpaired claimants have a right to payment and including a requirment that to state a claim in a 
bankruptcy proceeding and therefore be eligible to vote on the plan of reorganization, an asbestos 
claimant should have to demonstrate physical injury or functional impairment caused by asbestos 
exposure). 
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vote on approval of a § 524(g) trust, 139 in practice, there are no controls 
over who gets to vote. The absence of any auditing process to confirm 
that the claimants have exposure to the debtor's product, that counsel 
represents them, that counsel has authority to cast their ballots, and even 
that the listed claimants actually exist, is indicative of the control that 
plaintiff lawyers exercise over asbestos bankruptcy proceedings. 140 
These voting practices perversely operate to provide additional 
stimulus to plaintiff lawyers to sponsor additional screenings141 because 
the more claimants they generate, the more control they can exert over 
the bankruptcy process and the more fee income they can obtain. More 
perversity is added by the incentive that plaintiff lawyers have to cast the 
votes of the clients they represent in favor of the interests of these 
current claimants-whom they represent--over that of the as yet 
unidentified future claimants whom they might represent. This 
highlights a defect in the implementation of § 524(g): that lawyers for 
current claimants are casting a block vote on the adoption of a 
139. See 11 U.S.C. § i 126(a). Any holder of an allowed claim may vote to either accept or 
reject a plan for reorganization. According to § 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, all claims are 
allowed unless a party in interest objects. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) provides that 
claims should be estimated but provides no mechanism for doing so and does not require 
verification of claims. Section IO 1 (5)(a) of the code defines a claim as the "right to payment, 
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, 
unmatured, disputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(a); see also 
Taylor & Alberino, supra note 138. Only those who have a claim, or right to payment, against the 
debtor, and whose claims are to be paid by the § 524(g) trust, may vote on a § 524(g) plan. 11 
U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). There is another class called "demands." Those holding demands 
are not entitled to vote on a§ 524(g) plan. Demands are defined by§ 524(g)(5) as follows : 
a demand for payment, present or future, that-
(A) was not a claim during the proceedings leading to the confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization; 
(B) arises out of the same or similar conduct or events that gave rise to the claims 
addressed by the[§ 524 injunction]; and 
(C) pursuant to the plan, is to be paid by a[§ 524(g)] trust . ... 
11 U .S.C. § 524(g)(5). If the claims of nonmalignant asbestos claimants who demonstrate no lung 
impairment were classified as demands, they would not be entitled to vote. See Alan N. Resnick, 
Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2045, 2073 (2000) (indicating that the adoption of § 524(g) referred to future rights to 
compensation for asbestos-related injuries as future "demands," rather than "claims"); see also 
Debtor's Motion for a Declaration with Respect to Voting Rights of Certain Putative "Claimants" at 
I, In re USG Corp., No. 01-2094 (Bankr. D. Del. August 21, 2002) (seeking an order that for voting 
purposes only, persons seeking to vote on a plan of reorganization be required to demonstrate 
impairment as determined according to objective medical criteria to be adopted by the court). 
140. There appears to be a link between plaintiff lawyers' concerted efforts to avoid 
compliance with Rule 2019, see supra notes 97-105, and the voting procedure practices that prevail. 
The extensive litigation now occurring in the Congoleum bankruptcy may shed some light on this 
interrelationship. 
141. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 62-63 . 
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reorganization plan that may pit the interests of present claimants ( and 
their lawyers) against future claimants, who of course, are not yet in 
being and so cannot vote on the plan of reorganization. 142 
Even were § 524(g) not to be encumbered by the perverse 
incentives it creates, the fact that nonsick claimants vastly outnumber 
malignant claimants and others with serious illnesses, 143 often leads to 
significantly shortchanging the latter in the asset division. This is 
reflected both in settlements that are entered into on the eve of a 
bankruptcy filing and the provisions of the trusts created under § 524(g) 
setting forth the medical and exposure criteria for claiming against the 
trusts and the claim values set forth in the plan of reorganization. 144 
2. The Unprecedental Control Vested in Plaintiff Lawyers 
The same baker's dozen or so law firms that represent the large 
majority of asbestos claimants also represent the majority of claimants in 
bankruptcy proceedings. 145 These leading asbestos law firms largely 
142. See In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2004) ("manipulation [of 
the voting system] is especially problematic in the asbestos context, where a voting majority can be 
made to consist of non-malignant claimants whose interests may be adverse to those of claimants 
with more severe injuries"). It is the role of the future claims representative to assure that there is 
equivalence in the compensation provided to future claimants with that provided to current 
claimants. Id. at 237-38. The future claim representative is discussed infra at notes 165 et seq. It was 
the lack of equivalence that led the Third Circuit to reverse the lower court's approval of the plan in 
the Combustion Engineering bankruptcy. Id. at 242. 
143. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
144. In the course of more than seventy bankruptcies of companies because of asbestos-related 
liabilities, bankruptcy trusts have been created in the Celotex, National Gypsum, Johns-Manville, 
Eagle-Picher, UNR, United States Lines, Prudential Lines, E.J. Bartells, Lykes Brothers Steamship, 
Rutland Fire Clay Co., Keene, Delaware Insulation Industries and H.K. Porter bankruptcies. 
Bankruptcy trust assets already approximate $4 billion. Added to this are the recently confirmed 
trusts in the Western MacArthur and Halliburton subsidiary bankruptcies. With respect to the latter, 
DII Industries and Kellogg Brown and Root were put into bankruptcy by their parent Halliburton. 
Pursuant to the confirmed plan, Halliburton funded the asbestos and silica 524(g) trusts with 
approximately $2.4 billion cash and 59.5 million shares of Halliburton stock. In addition, 
Halliburton is providing up to $350 million in DII financing for Debtors to meet financial 
obligations during and after Reorganization Cases and has entered into a third-party master letter of 
credit covering draws on approximately $1 .1 billion in letters of credit issued on behalf of various 
debtors. See In re Mid-Valley, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1553 at *21 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. July 21, 2004). 
The total value of the assets committed to the trust approximates $5 billion. See Russell Gold, 
Halliburton Finalizes Settlement for $5.1 Billion Over Asbestos, WALL Sr. J., Jan. 4, 2005, at A3 ; 
see also, Halliburton Asbestos Settlement Wins Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at C4. An 
additional $20 to $30 billion may be added to trust assets as up to a score of companies now in 
bankruptcy, including Owens Coming, W.R. Grace, Armstrong World Industries, USG, 
Combustion Engineering, Congoleum, J.T. Thorpe, Bums & Roe, Pittsburgh Corning, Federal 
Mogul, G-1 Holdings (the former GAF), and Babcock & Wilcox, establish such trusts. 
145. A memorandum filed in the Owens Corning ("OC") bankruptcy estimates that the handful 
of law firms listed above, see supra note 106, represent over 100,000 asbestos claimants in the OC 
2005] ETHICAL ISSUES IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 869 
control the asbestos bankruptcy process. While the U.S. Trustee selects 
the members of the various committees, which includes the members of 
the "asbestos creditors committee,"146 the practice is for those tort 
creditor/clients to cede control to their attorneys through powers of 
attorney. 147 Thereafter, the appointed members of the committees 
immediately fade from view. The handful of law firms so selected not 
only constitute the asbestos creditors' committees, 148 they draft the 
critical part of the plan of reorganization which establishes the criteria 
for the payment of the very claims which they are asserting. In addition, 
they effectively select the trustees to operate the § 524(g) bankruptcy 
trusts that will be created to actually pay the claims, the administrator of 
the trust and the representative appointed to represent the interests of 
future claimants; they also constitute the trust advisory committees 
which have authority over trustees' actions and veto power over changes 
in the trusts' structure. Medical and exposure criteria to be met by 
claimants are set forth in a document called the Trust Distribution 
Procedures ("TOP"). 149 The TDPs that have been established reflect this 
bankruptcy proceeding. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Structural Relief Required to 
Eradicate the Legal Ethical Conflicts of Asbestos Law Firms (filed by Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors) at 5, In re Owens Coming, No. 00-03837 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 24, 2003). 
Moreover, prior to the filing of the OC bankruptcy, approximately 111 law firms said that they 
represented approximately 235,000 claimants; of these, 10 law firms represented approximately 
120,000 of these claimants. See id. at 6. 
146. See 11 U.S.C. § I 102(a)(I) (2005). 
147. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1102.02 (2)(a)(iii)(A) (15th ed. 1996). (The general view is 
that a creditor may designate whatever individual it wants to serve on the creditors ' committee on 
its behalf. The type of person most often designated by the appointed creditor is the creditor's 
attorney). See In re Celotex Corp., 123 B.R. 917 (Bank:r. M.D. Fla. 1991) (noting potential for 
conflicting fiduciary duties when attorneys on committee represent more than one person); In re 
M.H. Corp., 30 B.R. 266 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (attorneys were discouraged to be members of 
the committee, but were to be approved if the creditor so desires, although attorney may only 
represent a single entity). 
148. An examination of the bankruptcies of Armstrong World Industries, Babcock & Wilcox, 
Combustion Engineering, Federal-Mogul, G-1 Holdings, Global Industrial Technologies, Owens 
Coming, Pittsburgh Coming, W.R. Grace and USG indicates that there is a high concentration of 
the same law firms which effectively constitute the asbestos tort creditors committees in these 
bankruptcies. Thus, Baron & Budd is in nine of these ten bankruptcies as is Weitz & Luxenberg, 
Goldberg, Persky (7), Kazan, McClain (7), Kelley & Ferraro (6), Ness Motley (6), Silber & Perlman 
(4), and Peter Angelos, Cumbest, and Levy Phillips-each serving on two committees. 
149. See 11 U .S.C. § 524 (g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) ("the trust will operate through mechanisms such as 
structured, periodic, or supplemental payments, pro rata distributions, matrices, or periodic review 
of estimates of the numbers and values of present claims and future demands, or other comparable 
mechanisms, that provide reasonable assurance that the trust will value, and be in a financial 
position to pay, present claims and future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the 
same manner"). In light of this requirement, many TDPs include a matrix of payment values for 
varying asbestos-related conditions. See, e.g., MANVILLE PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT TRUST, 
2002 TRUST DISTRIBUTION PROCESS § D, available at http://www.mantrust.org/FTP/C&DTDP.pdf 
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power by allowing substantial portions of trusts' assets to be paid out 
irrespective of whether claimants are actually injured or were 
sufficiently exposed to defendants' products for that to have been a 
substantial factor in causing their injury. 150 This unprecedented degree of 
control exercised over the bankruptcy process results in numerous 
conflicts of interest. 
a. Conflicts Generated by Control of the Asbestos Creditors 
Committees 
While serving as de facto members of the asbestos creditors 
committees, 151 this handful of law firms cast the claimants' votes they 
control to approve the plan of reorganization and the creation of the 
§ 524(g) trust. The voting rights being exercised which were delegated 
to the law firms by their clients are fiduciary in nature, i.e., the firms 
have been entrusted with clients' rights which must be exercised in favor 
of each client's fiduciary rights. In theory, these law firms have an 
obligation to advise their clients with conflicting interests how to instruct 
their own counsel to vote to apportion the limited funds to be available 
150. An illustration of the degree of control over asbestos-related bankruptcies exercised by 
plaintiff lawyers is provided by the awarding of contracts to claim-processing entities to process the 
claims that were settled in prepackaged bankruptcies as well as the claims to be paid by the § 524(g) 
trust. Kenesis, Inc. was hired to do claim processing for three prepackaged bankruptcies and then 
subcontracted the work to another company, called the Clearing House. See Parloff, supra note 134, 
at I 96. The sole proprietor of the entity was a paralegal on leave from the Ness Motley firm who 
cleared "just under a million dollars" for running the company, and then sold it and returned to Ness 
Motley. Id. The effect was that a paralegal on leave from the Ness Motley firm was determining the 
validity of claims submitted by that firm and others. See also In re Nat'! Gypsum Co., 243 B.R. 676 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex 1999) (suggesting that the managing trustee of the NGC Settlement Trust resign 
as a condition for the trust to be allowed to purchase stock held by that trustee in a claims 
processing enterprise); Memorandum of the United States Trustee in Support of Objection to 
Debtor's Application to Employ the Kenesis Group, In re ACandS, Inc., No. 02-12687 (Bankr. D. 
Del Aug. 7, 2003) (concluding that the debtor had retained a claims handling firm that was owned 
by the debtor's law firm to do postpetition claims processing which had subcontracted the work to 
an affiliate of a law firm representing claimants, without disclosing these relationships or seeking 
bankruptcy court approval). 
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103. The creditors committee is entitled to hire "attorneys, accountants, 
or other agents, to represent or perform services for such committee." 11 U.S.C. § I 103(a). These 
attorneys for the creditors committee may not simultaneously "represent any other entity having an 
adverse interest in connection with the case. Representation of one or more creditors of the same 
class as represented by the committee shall not per se constitute the representation of an adverse 
interest." 11 U.S.C. § I !03(b). See, e.g, In re Celotex Corp., 123 B.R. 917, 923 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1991) (sustaining the U.S. trustee's objection to two law firms', Caplin & Drysdale and Rydberg, 
Goldstein & Bolves, petition to be appointed as legal counsel for the Official Asbestos Personal 
Injury Creditors Committee due to current and potential conflicts of interest). 
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to pay the competing claims. It is difficult to see how this fiduciary duty 
can be effectuated in a context in which conflicts of interest abound. 
b. Conflicts of Interest in the Bankruptcy Process 
Among the claimants represented in the bankruptcy, a relatively 
small percent list malignancies such as mesothelioma, lung cancer and 
other cancers. The large majority allege pleural plaques or mild (1/0) 
asbestosis.152 These nonmalignant claims include both those alleging 
impairment on the basis of pulmonary function tests typically 
administered during attorney-sponsored asbestos screenings, and those 
who do not allege impairment-the so-called "unimpaireds."153 Because 
of the zero-sum nature of the bankruptcy process, each of these 
groupings of claimants has differing interests. In particular, the 
malignant subgroups (mesothelioma, lung cancers and other cancers) 
have interests which conflict with the nonmalignant subgroups. These 
conflicts of interest are magnified by the routine failure to comply with 
Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) which requires that any entity purporting to 
represent more than one creditor in a Chapter 11 case "shall file a 
verified statement" listing the name and address of each creditor and the 
nature and amount of each creditor's claim.154 
In addition to conflicts of interest between current claimants 
represented by the same law firms, there are also conflicts of interest 
152. See supra notes 9- IO and accompanying text. 
153. These appears to be considerable confusion over the case of the word "unimpaired" in 
reference to asbestos-related claims. In this context, the term is widely used to refer to non-
malignant asbestos-related claims. However, a significant but unknown fraction of non-malignant 
claimants are found to be impaired on the basis of performance on pulmonary function tests 
administered by screening enterprises. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos litigation, supra note 8, 
at 86. However, on the basis of my research, I have concluded that at least many and, in some cases, 
virtually all of those found impaired on this basis would likely not have been found impaired if the 
tests were administered in a medical setting, as for example, in a hospital setting. See id. at 111-128. 
See also Report of Dr. Gary K. Friedman for Owens Corning, undated circa 2000, titled "Subject: 
Owens Corning Impaired Nonmalignant Claim Submissions 1999-1999 (approx.)." A study of a 
pulmonary function tests administered to a "stratified random sample" of 1691 nonmalignant 
asbestos claims selected from 22,578 claims submitted to the Owens Corning Corporation under its 
NSP settlement program, indicated that only 13.3% of the sample met the appropriate medical 
standards for validity of the tests. Id. at 2, 4. Moreover, the finding that only 13.3% of those 
claiming impairment presented valid evidence of impairment was predicated "on the acceptance of 
an underlying diagnosis of nonmalignant, asbestos related disease based on all submitted x-ray 
reports without an audit of the actual films or exclusion of more probable causes." Id. at 4. 
However, there were "serious questions" with regard to the reliability of the x-ray readings and this 
placed "downward pressure on the 13.3%." Id. The claim sample was of claims filed in the period 
1991-1999. /d. at. 3. 
154. FED. R. BANKR. P. 20 l 9(a); see also supra notes 97-105. 
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resulting from the representation of those current claimants while at the 
same time actively recruiting new claimants to compete for the limited 
resources. As noted, the Supreme Court held in Amchem Products v. 
Windsor, 155 that class members were deprived of adequate representation 
by class counsel in a mega-asbestos settlement because of intra-class 
conflicts of interest between currently injured class members and future 
claimants not yet identified. There had to be, said the Court, "structural 
assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse 
groups ... affected." 156 Moreover, in the other mega-asbestos settlement 
struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court, Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 157 the 
court held that class counsel's inventory settlement on different and 
more favorable terms than those provided in the proposed class action 
settlement for future claimants constituted a concurrent conflict of 
interest. Applying the thrust of these holdings to the bankruptcy context 
leads to the conclusion that because malignant and nonmalignant 
claimants in the same bankruptcy proceeding are competing for a limited 
share of the same assets, that is, one subgroup's gains are at the expense 
of the other subgroups, law firms which simultaneously represent such 
different subgroups in the same bankruptcy proceeding must disclose 
those conflicts and obtain the informed consent of their clients 
(assuming that it is a waivable conflict). That same reasoning would 
apply to the representation of both present claimant/creditors and future 
claimants who will seek compensation from the § 524(g) trust. As stated 
in Ortiz, there has to be both structural protection of independent 
representation for subclasses with conflicting interests and also separate 
counsel to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel. 158 
An additional conflict of interest exists in the case of the 11 l 
plaintiff law firms that entered into National Settlement Program 
agreements with Owens Coming ("OC") in 1998, two years prior to its 
155. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). See supra text accompanying notes 66-76 for a discussion of 
Amchem. 
156. 521 U.S. at 594. 
157. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). See supra text accompanying notes 77-86 for discussion of Ortiz. 
158. 527 U.S. at 855-56; cf Md. Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 2003-10. The Opinion responds to the 
following facts . Lawyer represents asbestos clients in suits against defendants A, B and C. A filed 
for bankruptcy under Chapter I I and the creditors committee asked Lawyer to be the Futures 
Representative. To resolve any conflict, Lawyer announced that he would no longer represent 
clients suing A but would continue to represent his clients suing B and C. The Bar Association 
opined that Lawyer's proposed action would not cure the conflict and would still violate Rule 1.7, 
stating: Lawyer's obligations to the futures "(to preserve as much of the ' pie' for these future 
claimants) will necessarily require [that lawyer] to advocate against [present claimants whom 
Lawyer still represented against other asbestos defendants] (who themselves want as large a piece of 
the 'pie' from [the debtor] as they may be able to obtain." Op. 2003-10, at 6-7. 
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bankruptcy filing, setting forth specific amounts for various types of 
injury that OC would pay to claimants who were clients of these 
firms. 159 Under the terms of these agreements, in addition to settling 
current inventory claims, most of the firms agreed to recommend to their 
future clients that they agree to accept specified amounts in settlement of 
their claims. 160 To be eligible for payment, claimants had to satisfy 
certain documentary conditions, including providing a release. 161 
Claimants who accepted the standing OC offer and signed releases 
accepted by OC thus entered into contracts with OC. Approximately 
60,419 contracting claimants had not yet received the contractually 
specified amounts when OC filed for bankruptcy. 162 These claimants 
therefore had fixed liquidated claims against the debtor equivalent in 
most respects to the claims of commercial debt holders evidenced by 
debentures or notes. 
Post bankruptcy, these same law firms also represent persons who 
rejected OC's offer as well as other asbestos claimants asserting 
unliquidated and contingent tort claims. The conflicts of interest between 
the contract claimants and the contingent tort claimants are manifest. 
Contract claimants' interests are to minimize the value of the 
unliquidated claims in order to maximize their own pro rata recoveries. 
This would include demonstrating that the contingent tort claimants did 
not have valid claims under state law, that they had no actual injury or 
that exposure to OC's products was not a substantial factor in causing 
any asbestos-related injury that they did have. At the same time, these 
law firms had a duty of loyalty to the contingent tort claimants to obtain 
the maximum recovery possible. 
159. 
OC and Fibreboard established a National Settlement Program ("NSP") in 1998. By 
October 4, 2000, most of OC's pending cases had been settled in the NSP. Under the 
NSP, 111 plaintiffs ' firms settled their entire inventory of pending asbestos 
claims . .. against Owens Coming, and agreed to use certain procedures when asserting 
future claims . . .. The terms of these settlements are set forth in I 07 separate NSP 
agreements. Although there are variations among NSP agreements, each of them settled 
an identifiable group of claims for agreed-upon dollar amounts . . .. 
Report of Mark W. Mayer on Owens Coming's Pre-Petition Asbestos Personal Injury and Wrongful 
Death Claims at 3-4, In re Owens Coming, No. 00-03837 (Bankr. D. Del May 21, 2002). 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. As of October 5, 2000, OC had received 60,419 claims for which it had executed releases 
which OC had not fully paid. Of these, 48,856 had been approved for payment and the remaining 
11 ,563 had not. Id. at 4. 
874 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:833 
3. Pre-Packaged Bankruptcies 
Increasingly companies which are overwhelmed by asbestos 
litigation and facing insolvency are resorting to negohatmg a pre-
packaged bankruptcy ("pre-pack"). In a pre-pack, the Chapter 11 plan is 
negotiated between the leading attorneys representing the asbestos 
claimants and the debtor-to-be and voted on before the company files its 
bankruptcy petition. 163 
This enables the debtor to file a plan and disclosure statement along 
with the petition and the bankruptcy court to hold a single hearing to 
determine the adequacy of the disclosure and whether the plan should 
be confirmed. The consensual confirmation of a plan of reorganization 
may occur only if each impaired class of creditors votes to accept the 
plan by a simple majority of creditors within the class and by two-
thirds of the dollar amounts of the claims within the class. It is possible 
in theory for a pre-packaged bankruptcy to be confirmed in four to six 
weeks, with obvious substantial attendant advantages in savings of 
. d 164 time an expense. 
Companies facing bankruptcy because of increased asbestos filings 
may seek out the attorneys or the latter may initiate the contact. In 
conventional asbestos-related bankruptcies, control over the reorganized 
company is usually reposed in the plaintiff lawyers. However, in a pre-
pack, the company's officers and directors may be promised that they 
will be able to retain control of the company after it emerges from 
bankruptcy. The deal struck with the plaintiff lawyers calls for the 
company to issue a promissory note payable to the § 524(g) trust secured 
by the company's stock. 165 The assets of the trust will mostly consist of 
the debtor's insurance coverage which is assigned to the trust. A pre-
petition trust may also be established to pay claims of the plaintiff 
lawyers' current inventory of clients at values that are considerably 
inflated when compared to the amounts to be paid out by the § 524(g) 
trust for similar claims after the approval of the plan and trust. 
Pre-packs have some procedural advantages over conventional 
bankruptcy filings. For example, after the filing of the petition, the court 
may than hold a single hearing to determine whether the requirements of 
163. See United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton (In re United Artists Theatre Co.), 315 F.3d 217, 
224 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003) (distinguishing pre-packs from "pre-approved" bankruptcies and 
conventional bankruptcy cases); In re NRG Energy, Inc., 294 B.R. 71 , 82 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2003) 
(citing additional cases and articles on pre-packs generally). 
164. Philip E. Karmel & Peter R. Paden, Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcy up in Smoke in 
Third Circuit?, N.Y. L.J. , Dec. 28, 2004, at 3 (footnotes omitted). 
165. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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the Bankruptcy Code have been adhered to and whether the plan should 
be approved. 166 
Despite the stated advantages and objectives of pre-packaged 
bankruptcy filings, 167 the practices that have developed reveal serious 
distortions and perversions of the bankruptcy process. As noted, asbestos 
bankruptcy pre-packs have been used to favor the interests of lawyers' 
current clients at the expense of future claimants. 168 This discriminatory 
treatment has led the Third Circuit to overturn the approval of the 
Combustion Engineering pre-pack in a decision that will likely have a 
significant impact on asbestos related bankruptcies. 169 
166. See generally Plevin et al., supra note 135. Asbestos-related pre-packaged bankruptcy 
filings have been made by Fuller-Austin Insulation Co., Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., J.T. 
Thorpe Company and Combustion Engineering, Inc. Id. at 889-91. Prepacks have also been filed by 
ACandS, Western Asbestos Co., Mid-Valley (involving certain Halliburton subsidiaries including 
DII Industries, LLC, formerly Dresser Industries, and Kellogg, Brown & Root), Utex and the 
Congoleum Corporation. See also Richard Barliant et al., From Free-Fall to Free-for-All: The Rise 
of Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 441,446 (2004). 
167. See Plevin et al. , supra note 135, at 889-91 . 
168. One particular abuse in asbestos pre-packs is the discriminatory treatment of claimants. 
An overriding purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to treat like claimants alike. 11 U.S.C. 
§ I 123(a)(4) ("[A] plan shall .. . provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a 
particular class .. .. ") However, because pre-pack negotiations take place in secret, select groups of 
claimants whose lawyers are part of or know about the negotiations are able to receive more 
favorable treatment than other similarly situated claimants. Such discriminatory actions would be 
objectionable in any context but are especially objectionable because some of the targets of the 
discrimination are persons who have suffered actual injury. See In re ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 39 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2004). This discriminatory treatment financially benefits the lawyers for the 
preferred claimants who typically charge contingency fees of 40 %. This benefit is spelled out in a 
recent law journal article: 
Because their clients get paid more, and sooner, than other claimants, these lawyers 
personally benefit when the plan is structured in such a fashion. If the plan treated all 
claimants the same, paying all current claimants through the mechanism of a post-
petition trust, the lawyers for the current claimants would make less money--even 
assuming the bankruptcy court or the trust made no effort to restrict the portion of a trust 
beneficiary's payment that could be paid as a contingent fee. This, as much as anything, 
explains why asbestos pre-packs are structured in such a Byzantine fashion that is so 
different than any "conventional" asbestos bankruptcy case. 
Plevin et al., supra note 135, at 912-13. For further analysis of these distortions and perversions, see 
House Comm. on the Judiciary Statement, supra note 136. See also Parloff, supra note 134, at 186. 
169. See In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 238-40 (3d Cir. 2004). The Third Circuit 
reversed confirmation of the plan and remanded for further proceedings, in part because of its 
concern that the plan provided preferential treatment to those claimants who participated in the 
Combustion Engineering (CE) Settlement Trust, a portion of the settlement that occurred pre-
bankruptcy. During the establishment of this trust, the future claimants were not represented, and 
received no funding through the trust. Additionally, eighty-seven days prior to the bankruptcy, CE 
transferred over $400 million, approximately half of its assets, to the CE Settlement Trust. The court 
found that the payments to this settlement trust may constitute a voidable preference (a transfer that 
provides a creditor with a greater payment of his claim against the debtor then he would have 
received through the bankruptcy proceeding at the expense of the other creditors. A payment found 
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D. The "Futures " Representative 
Complex conflicts of interest issues are raised by the appointment 
of a futures representative ("FCR") to represent the interests of future 
claimants. Section 524(g) of the bankruptcy code requires the 
appointment of a "futures representative" as part of the creation of a 
§ 524 trust. 170 In pre-packaged asbestos bankruptcies, often there is a 
"purported futures representative" appointed by the parties, though there 
is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code so requiring. 171 
1. The Future Claims Representative in a § 524(g) Trust 
The appointment of the § 524(g) FCR is intended to act as a counter 
to the interests of plaintiff lawyers in seeking to maximize payment to 
their current inventory of clients at the expense of future claimants. 
While the appointment of a futures representative is facially responsive 
to the statutory requirements set out in§ 524(g)172 as well as the thrust of 
Ortiz, 173 nonetheless, the role of the § 524(g) FCR is steeped in conflicts 
of interest. Irrespective of whether it is in the interests of future 
claimants that the proposed plan of reorganization be approved, it is in 
the financial interest of the FCR that a plan be approved since the FCR's 
fees, after approval, are typically quite lucrative. 174 Irrespective of the 
FCR's personal financial interests, conflicts of interest abound. For 
to be a voidable preference under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code must be returned to the 
bankruptcy estate to ensure the equal treatment of all similarly situated creditors). The court also 
found inequality in the plan in that the future and non-participating claimants received neither 
funding through nor representation during the establishment of the CE Settlement Trust, essentially 
the initial phase of this settlement. See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 724(c), 726(b), I 123(a)(4). 
The Third Circuit's rejection of the Combustion Engineering pre-pack was presaged by 
the decision of Judge Randall J. Newsome, sitting as a visiting judge in Delaware. See In re 
ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 40-42 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004). ACandS was filed as a conventional 
bankruptcy after negotiations over a pre-packaged plan failed. Some of the objectionable practices 
typical of a pre-pack, however, were carried over into the proposed plan. See Barliant et al. , supra 
note 165, at 441 n.l. Judge Newsome, in recommending that confirmation of the plan be denied, 
found that the plan discriminated unfairly within and among classes of claims and that it was not 
proposed in good faith. In re ACand S, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 42-43 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004). Tellingly, he 
observed: "The court is informed that other judges have confirmed plans with such discriminatory 
classifications. This judge cannot do so in good conscience." Id. at 43 . 
170. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i). 
171 . Although there is no mention of these purported futures representatives in the Bankruptcy 
Code, the Third Circuit, in In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004), essentially 
made appointment of a futures representatives a necessity while negotiating a pre-packaged 
bankruptcy. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
172. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(b)(i). 
173. See supra notes 83-86. 
174. See infra note 184. 
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example, it is common in asbestos bankruptcies to divide future claims 
into five to eight subgroups ranging from the unimpaireds to those with 
mesothelioma. Each subgroup typically has different applicable 
evidentiary requirements and different dollar amounts or ranges of dollar 
amounts. 175 These dollar values which are listed in the TDP, or the 
matrix that is part of the TDP, in effect represent allocations of the 
limited funds set aside for the future claimants among competing 
subgroups. It is doubtful that a single person, the futures representative, 
can adequately represent the conflicting interests of unimpaired 
asbestosis and pleural plaque claimants, impaired asbestosis claimants, 
asbestosis claimants with an ILO grade of 2/1 or higher, mesothelioma 
claimants, lung cancer claimants who were smokers and those that were 
nonsmokers and other future cancer claimants. To comply with the 
thrust of the Supreme Court's holding in Ortiz, each significant 
subgroup of future claimants would have to have separate representation. 
As stated by the Second Circuit: 
Within the category of health claimants, marked differences exist 
between identifiable subgroups that require division of health 
claimants themselves into appropriate subclasses. 
[W]here differences among members of a class are such that subclasses 
must be established, we know of no authority that permits a court to 
approve a settlement without creating subclasses on the basis of 
consents by members of a unitary class, some of whom happen to be 
members of the distinct subgroups. The class representatives may well 
have thought that the Settlement serves the aggregate interests of the 
entire class. But the adversity among subgroups requires that the 
members of each subgroup cannot be bound by a settlement except by 
consents given by those who understand that their role is to represent 
solely the members of their respective subgroups.116 
175. For example, the 2002 Manville TOP specifies eight levels of claimants ranging from 
Level I, for other asbestos diseases such as bilateral asbestos-related nonmalignant disease, with a 
scheduled value of $600, to Level VIII, for mesothelioma, with a scheduled value of $350,000. See 
MANVILLE PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT TRUST, 2002 TRUST DISTRIBUTION PROCESS § 0, 
available at http://www.mantrust.org/FTP/C&DTDP.pdf 
176. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig. , 982 F.2d 721, 741 , 743 (2d Cir. 
1992) (emphasis added), modified on other grounds, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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The Second Circuit's analysis was substantially adopted by the 
Third Circuit in rejecting the Amchem asbestos settlement. 177 The Third 
Circuit ruled that certifying a unitary class of asbestos claimants, 
including present and future claimants with such conflicting interests, 
was improper because the conflicts "preclude[ d] a finding of adequacy 
of representation. . . . Absent structural . protections to assure that 
differently situated plaintiffs negotiate for their own unique interests, the 
fact that plaintiffs of different types were among the named plaintiffs 
does not rectify the conflict."178 
The Third Circuit's opinion, which largely incorporated the Second 
Circuit's analysis, was adopted by the Supreme Court in rejecting the 
Amchem and Ortiz asbestos settlements. Both settlements had included 
claimants with widely conflicting interests in a unitary class represented 
by a single representative or undifferentiated group of representatives; 
both lacked the structural assurance of fair and adequate representation 
of groups with conflicting interests. 179 The conflicts of interest that 
surround the § 524(g) FCR are magnified many fold by the appointment 
of a purported future representative in the negotiation of a pre-packaged 
bankruptcy. 
2. The Pre-Pack Future Claims Representative 
In pre-packs, the debtor and the plaintiff lawyer together select a 
purported futures representative, arrange the terms of the 
representative's compensation and retain the right to hire and fire the 
representative. 1so This futures representative is often hired after the pre-
petition trust is in place and a majority of the negotiations between 
debtor and plaintiffs lawyers have taken place. 1st Even if the futures 
177. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc. 83 F .3d 610, 631 (3d Cir. 1996), ajf'd sub nom., 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
178. Id. at 631. 
179. See Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 627-28 (extensively quoting the Second Circuit's 
opinion and stating that "the settling parties, in sum, achieved a global compromise with no 
structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals 
affected. Although the named parties alleged a range of complaints, each served generally as 
representative for the whole, not for a separate constituency"); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 
815, 857-59 (1999) (holding that a unitary class with widely conflicting interests among the 
subgroups precludes a finding of adequacy of representation). 
180. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has suggested that a bankruptcy that is 
discharged without the appointment of a futures representative is likely a violation of the future 
claimants' due process rights. See NAT'L BANK.R. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT 
TWENTY YEARS: NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 316, 331-332 
(1997). 
181. See Plevin et al., supra note 135, at 917. This was the case in both Combustion 
Engineering and J.T. Thorpe. In Combustion Engineering, over half of all of the debtor's assets 
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representative is selected earlier in the negotiation, it is still the case that 
she will be negotiating on behalf of future claimants with those who 
hired her and on whom she depends for her future employment. 182 As a 
reward for "successfully" discharging the representative's duties in the 
negotiation of the pre-packaged plan, plaintiff lawyers and debtors, now 
in concert, may propose to the bankruptcy court that this hand-picked 
designee of parties with interests that may fundamentally conflict with 
those of future claimants, should be appointed by the bankruptcy court 
as the futures representative under the provisions of§ 524(g). 183 Such an 
were irrevocably committed to a pre-petition trust at the time when the prospective futures 
representative was hired. Id. Another problem impeding the effectiveness of the futures 
representative in a pre-packaged bankruptcy is their inability to acquire information. All information 
is provided by the debtor, and therefore the futures representative only acquired that which the 
debtor chose to provide. Id. at 9 I 8. 
182. See Barliant et al., supra note 166, at 467 (stating that "future claimants do not receive the 
benefit of a disinterested advocate" because the futures representative is retained and paid by parties 
adverse to the future claimants' interests, namely the debtor and claimant's counsel); see also 
Francis E. McGovern, Asbestos legislation II: Section 524(g) Without Bankruptcy, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 
233, 248 (2003) (arguing that "[t]he selection of the futures representative [in a pre-pack) is 
problematic because having a weak futures representative is in the interests of both the debtor and 
the current claimants"). 
183. Barliant et al., supra note 166, at 468 (stating that permitting this representative to be 
appointed as futures representative post-petition arguably violates constitutional due process). Due 
process in the futures representative context requires, as in other contexts of representation of absent 
parties, an identity of interests between the representative and the absent parties and the 
representative' s undivided loyalty to those parties. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 
(1999) (absent parties must have their "interests adequately represented by someone with the same 
interests") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Amchem Prods. , Inc. v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591, 627 (1997) (class representatives must operate under a proper understanding that their 
"role is to represent solely the members of their respective" class) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); Hansberry v. Lee, 3 I I U.S. 32, 45 (I 940) (selection of a representative whose 
interests are "not necessarily or even probably the same as those whom [the representative) is 
deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to absent parties which due process 
requires . . . [because of] the opportunities it would afford for the fraudulent and collusive sacrifice 
of the rights of absent parties"). Arguably, a pre-pack futures representative, who is looking forward 
to becoming the post-petition FCR, has additional interests separate from those interests of the 
future claimants-interests that are, at best, not the "same," and, at worst, "sacrificial" of the future 
claimants' rights. 
The Subcommittee on Mass Torts of the United States Judicial Conference has 
recommended that "a forceful and independent future claims representative is critical ... to prevent 
a mass tort future claims representative from colluding with, or simply being overswayed by, 
counsel for present claimants and debtors." Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts Bankruptcies: The Who, 
the Why, and the How, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 146 (2004) (Appendix A, U.S. Judicial Conference 
Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System, Report of the Subcommittee on Mass 
Torts). The Subcommittee continued: 
[T)he classic kind of collusion said to arise in certain "prepackaged" bankruptcies is very 
unlikely to arise in mass tort bankruptcies involving future claims representatives .. .. 
[T]he essence of a "prepack" is that most or all of the negotiation and solicitation occurs 
prebankruptcy and therefore is presented to the Court as a fait accompli . A future claims 
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appointment is often quite lucrative. 184 The power reposed in the parties 
to the pre-pack to reward the futures representative poses a significant 
threat to that representative's independence and poses conflicts of 
interest issues that have not been adequately addressed by bankruptcy 
courts. 185 
representative, however, would always be appointed after the bankruptcy petition has 
been filed. Because that additional party would be interjected, any prebankruptcy 
agreements among other parties could be challenged, and the future claims representative 
would often have a fiduciary duty to do so. By contrast, without that new party the 
"prepack" collusion would not likely be challenged. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
The Subcommittee did not consider that, in the prepack asbestos bankruptcy negotiations, the 
parties often designate a purported future claims representative, whom they would then propose to 
the bankruptcy court be appointed as the post-petition FCR. This feature of asbestos pre-packs 
would seem to eviscerate the Subcommittee's confidence that the FCR would check any pre-pack 
collusion, as the FCR will have already, pre-petition, essentially approved the reorganization plan, 
and will have a substantial interest in seeing it confirmed. Still, perhaps in recognition of this 
possibility, the Subcommittee advocated that the "Bankruptcy Court itself .. . play an active role in 
both the selection and the supervision of the future claims representative." Id. at 147. Ostensibly, 
active involvement of the Bankruptcy Court may help prevent the court's rubber-stamping of a pre-
pack futures representative (hired and retained by the parties, with promises of significant returns 
upon confirmation of the reorganization plan) as the post-petition FCR, who may have severe 
conflicts of interests-namely between her own financial interests and the interests of the future 
claimants. 
184. In the proceedings for the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings by Mid-Valley, Inc. and other 
subsidiaries of Halliburton, certain insurers of the debtors objected to the debtors' application for an 
order appointing Professor Eric Green as the 524(g) FCR. Brief of Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Co. and Affiliates at I, In re Mid-Valley, Inc., 305 B.R. 425 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2003) (No. 
03-35592) [hereinafter "Hartford ~r."]. The debtors retained Professor Eric Green, pre-petition, to 
represent the interests of future claimants in the bankruptcy plan negotiations. Hartford Br. at 13. 
The insurers asserted that during the sixteen-month period in which Professor Green was involved 
in the negotiations, "he was paid $9,000 per day plus expenses for time spent working on the 
proposed Plan- a total of $855,920.92 through July 31 , 2003 ." Hartford Br. at 13 (citing 
Application at 7-8). The insurers also asserted that, after appointment as the 524(g) FCR, not only 
would the terms of Professor Green's retention and payment remain as they were established by the 
debtors and the plaintiffs' lawyers pre-petition, but Professor Green would also earn further 
compensation if the plan was confirmed. Hartford Br. at 13. Upon confirmation, the insurers 
claimed, Professor Green would be "employed by the Asbestos Pl Trust and Silica Pl Trust at his 
regular hourly rate ( currently $600/hour) as the representative of unknown and future claimants." 
Hartford Br. at 13-14 (citing Plan§ 13.5; Disclosure Statement §§4.l(c}, 4.2(c)). (The court 
eventually ruled that the insurers had no standing to raise the interests of the asbestos claimants and 
overruled their objection to Professor Green' s appointment. In re Mid-Valley, Inc., 305 B.R. at 433-
35.) 
185. Professor Alan Resnick, a supporter of resolving asbestos claims through the bankruptcy 
process, cautions that the "essential characteristics" of a future claims representative (FCR) are 
"independence and a lack of conflicts of interest." Alan Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for 
Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 2080 (2000). 
Resnick argues that any pre-pack FCR appointed by the parties should not continue as the FCR 
post-filing: 
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3. The Unique Role of Gilbert Heintz & Randolph in Pre-
Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies 
881 
The law firm of Gilbert Heintz & Randolph ("GHR") has come to 
play a unique role in pre-packaged asbestos bankruptcy filings. The firm 
devotes a significant part of its practice to representing asbestos 
defendants in coverage disputes with the asbestos defendants' 
[T]he legal representative should be selected by the United States trustee with court 
approval, rather than by the debtor, parties in interest, or attorneys purporting to 
represent future claimants when the bankruptcy petition is filed. 
Caution should be exercised to assure that shortcuts are not taken regarding the 
selection of the legal representative. For this reason, courts should be extremely reluctant 
to permit a proposed settlement of future claims-negotiated with a legal representative 
selected by the parties before bankruptcy-to be presented to the court for confirmation 
in a "prepackaged" Chapter 11 plan. In such cases, any votes to accept the plan cast by 
the prebankruptcy legal representative should not count. A new, independent legal 
representative appointed after the filing of the bankruptcy case, with sufficient time to 
review any proposed estimation or settlement and an opportunity to vote on the proposed 
plan on behalf of future claimants, should be required. 
Id. at 2080-81 ; see also Frederick Tung, The Future Claims Representative in Mass Tort 
Bankruptcy: A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 CHAPMAN L. REV. 43, 44, 65 (2000) (arguing that "the FCR 
device has not received the careful scrutiny it deserves," and that the FCR faces considerable 
pressure to compromise the future claimants' interests). 
In the Congoleum Corp. Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, the debtors' insurers 
appealed to the District Court from the Bankruptcy Court' s order appointing the pre-petition futures 
representative as the 524(g) FCR. Insurer Appellants' Brief at I, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 04-
1517 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2004) (hereinafter "Insurer Appellants' Br."] Similar to the insurers' 
objections in Mid-Valley, the Congoleum insurers claimed that because the proposed reorganization 
plan, as written, was so contrary to the interests of the future asbestos claimants, any true and loyal 
representative of the future claimants' interests would have rejected it. Insurer Appellants' Br. at 5. 
The Congoleum insurers argued that the FCR had already essentially approved the plan while 
"beholden" to the debtors pre-petition, and thus, could not adequately represent the future 
claimants' interests. Insurer Appellants' Br. at 3, 5 (arguing that "this Plan should have been 
rejected by anyone considering the interests of the future claimants: It promises $225 million in 
payments to current claimants before the future claimants get one penny, restricting the future 
claimants to an uncertain and perhaps even non-existent pool of assets"). 
In Mid-Valley, the insurers also argued that the proposed plan significantly limited future 
claimants' rights: 
Whereas future claimants who hold valid claims would have the right, in the absence of 
the bankruptcy and proposed Plan, to liquidate their claims by any means that the tort 
system allows and to obtain payment in full in cash from these solvent Debtors, the 
proposed Plan would cap their claims at predetermined amounts, limit their percentage 
recoveries in light of available Trust assets (none of which will be cash) and estimates of 
competing claims, stretch out payment to fit Trust cash flow, and insulate the Debtors 
from deficiency claims. 
Hartford Br., supra note 184, at 11. Because it was doubtful that future claimants would fare as well 
under the proposed plan as they would outside of bankruptcy, the Mid-Valley insurers argued that 
Professor Green should not be appointed as the 524(g) FCR because "he had incentives to cooperate 
in creating the proposed Plan rather than to question why any bankruptcy filing was necessary." Id. 
at 4. 
882 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 :833 
insurers. 186 It has been retained by the defendant/debtor in a number of 
pre-packaged asbestos bankruptcies upon the recommendation of two 
plaintiff law firms, Weitz & Luxenberg and Motley Rice, because 
according to these firms, retention by the debtor of GHR will help 
facilitate the filing. 187 GHR also represents or is co-counsel to asbestos 
claimants asserting claims against the companies that retained the firm to 
facilitate the pre-packaged bankruptcies. 188 The firm's dual role has 
given rise to a considerable volume of litigation focusing on the issue of 
conflicts of interest. 
GHR's role in the pre-packaged Congoleum filing and related 
proceedings has given rise to two separate sets of challenges, one before 
the bankruptcy court and another before a New Jersey state court 
presiding over insurance coverage dispute litigation. In the Congoleum 
bankruptcy pre-pack, GHR was retained by the debtor, Congoleum, 
upon the recommendation of Perry Weitz of Weitz & Luxenberg, one of 
the lead plaintiffs attorneys in the bankruptcy to explore the option of a 
pre-packaged bankruptcy and to negotiate with its insurance carriers.189 
At the same time, GHR was also representing, as co-counsel with Weitz, 
asbestos claimants with claims against Congoleum and other 
defendants. 190 Additionally, GHR appointed the Kenesis Group, 191 of 
186. See Parloff, supra note 134, at 198; see also Brief of Plaintiff Congoleum Corporation in 
Opposition to Objecting Insurer ' s Motion to Disqualify Gilbert Heintz & Randolph LLP as Counsel 
at 4, In re Congoleum Corp., No. MID-L-890801 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2005). In addition to 
representing asbestos defendants, GHR also represents asbestos claimants in their "pursuit of 
insurance proceeds from policies issued to companies" but not in their underlying tort claims 
directly against the asbestos defendants. Id. 
187. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment by Continental 
Casualty Company and the Continental Insurance Company at 14-15, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 
MID-L8908-01 (N.J . Super. Ct. Sept. JO, 2003). The OHR/Weitz/Rice team collaborated to arrange 
the pre-packaged bankruptcies of ACandS, JT Thorpe, Shook & Fletcher and Congoleum. Id. 
188. See Parloff, supra note 134, at 200. 
189. See Opening Brief of Appellants ACE Companies Regarding the Retention of Gilbert 
Heintz & Randolph LLP at 16, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 04 Civ. 1709 (D.N.J . May 6, 2004) 
[hereinafter Opening Brief, May 2004]. In September 2002, Congoleum's chief officers had 
meetings with Mr. Weitz, in which Weitz learned that Congoleum held a large amount of insurance 
coverage, although their cash funds were almost fully depleted. Weitz recommended that 
Congoleum retain GHR to represent them in the pre-pack negotiation and an overall global 
settlement. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment by Continental 
Casualty Company and the Continental Insurance Company at 11-12, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 
MID-L8908-0l (N.J . Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2003). Weitz testified that his recommendation ofGHR to 
Congoleum served a dual purpose: both because the firm was experienced in asbestos pre-packs, 
and to ensure that someone he trusted verified the amount of coverage held by Congoleum. 
I 90. See Opening Brief, May 2004, supra note I 89, at 17. The day that GHR was retained by 
Congoleum, Gilbert and Weitz negotiated a multi-million dollar settlement regarding two ofWeitz' s 
clients, Cook and Arsenault. At the same time, Gilbert was also serving as co-counsel to Weitz in 
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which GHR is a 70% owner, to process the claims in the Congoleum 
pre-pack, and agreed to a billing arrangement in which Kenesis received 
payment on a per claimant basis. 192 
Congoleum's retention of GHR was challenged by Congoleum's 
insurers which claimed that GHR's retention violated § 327(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code which requires that counsel hired to represent the 
debtor in possession must not hold any interests adverse to the estate, 
and must be disinterested persons. 193 Congoleum argued that GHR was 
in fact special counsel, and therefore only subject to the more lenient 
requirements of § 327(e). The insurers also argued that GHR's 
the representation of these two clients against various . other asbestos defendants . OHR did not 
obtain a waiver of this conflict of interest from either plaintiff. 
191. Kenesis 's claims processing contract in the ACandS bankruptcy was the subject of a 
disgorgement order by the bankruptcy judge. See infra note 216. 
192. See Reply Brief in Further Support of Insurers ' Motion to Disqualify Gilbert Heintz & 
Randolph LLP as Counsel to Congoleum Corporation at 1, In re Congoleum Corp., No. MID-L-
8908-01 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2005). The payment to Kenesis on a per claim basis created a 
conflict of interest for OHR. That is, the more claims processed, the higher the monetary reward for 
Kenesis and its majority shareholder, OHR. Thus, GHR's interest that Kenesis process as many 
claims for payment as possible conflicted with the interest of Congoleum to limit the amount of 
claims approved. 
193. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a); see also supra Part VI.A.3. The insurer's argued that the§ 327(a) 
standard for general counsel should apply, see Reply of Certain Insurers to Debtor's Response to 
Objection to the Retention of Gilbert Heintz & Randolph, LLP as Counsel for the Debtors, In re 
Congoleum Corp., No. 03-51524 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2004), for the following reasons. First, the 
success of the pre-pack is entirely predicated upon a favorable decision in the insurance coverage 
litigation. Indeed, plan proponents seek to virtually entirely fund the § 524 (g) trust with insurance 
proceeds, with no contributions from the debtor. Id at 4. Moreover, Congoleum acknowledged that 
OHR will be advising it on insurance matters relating to the plan of reorganization. Therefore, since 
OHR has been retained because of its coverage expertise, it is acting as a general counsel and thus 
must meet the § 327(a) standard-which it cannot do. Because of its close ties with plaintiff 
lawyers, OHR fails the disinterested person test of§ 327(a). 
Second, the insurers argue that even if the court finds OHR to be special counsel, its fails 
to meet the no "adverse interest" requirement of§ 327(e) because GHR's interests are aligned with 
the plaintiff attorneys. OHR counters that this is not an adverse interest to the estate, as both the 
estate and the plaintiffs are seeking to maximize the insurance funding of the § 524(g) trust. The 
insurers dispute this, arguing that the primary interest of the debtor is to prevent the payment of 
invalid claims and the overpayment of valid claims, id. at 8-9, a goal adverse to that of plaintiffs 
counsel who has an obligation to seek the maximum amount of funding for individual claimants and 
to maximize the number of claims satisfied, regardless of the legitimacy of the claims. See Brief of 
Appellees Congoleum Corporation, Congoleum Sales Corporation, and Congoleum Fiscal, Inc. 
Regarding the Retention of Gilbert Heintz & Randolph LLP as Debtors' Counsel, In re Congoleum 
Corp., No. 04 Civ. 1709 (D.N.J. May 28, 2004). Congoleum, however, claimed that GHR's 
retention should be reviewed under the special counsel standard of 327(e). Id. at 14-15. Since OHR 
was retained for the limited purpose of negotiating with Congoleum's insurance carriers and 
advising Congoleum on matters regarding their insurance coverage during the bankruptcy 
proceedings, they argue that there was no conflict between the interests of Congoleum and that of 
the claimants whom OHR has represented in the past. 
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representation of Congoleum was prohibited by Model Rule l.7(A)(l) 
because GHR was acting simultaneously as advocate for Congoleum and 
separately representing claimants suing Congeleum. 194 
The bankruptcy court approved Congoleum's application to employ 
GHR, finding that they were special counsel, and that they met the 
§ 327(e) requirements because the interests of Congoleum and the 
claimants were aligned in regards to the insurance coverage. As for 
Model Rule 1.7(A)(l), the court found that the "current client" 
prohibition is limited to adverse positions "in the same matter,"195 
though prevailing interpretations of this rule of ethics are to the 
contrary. 196 After their appeal to the District Court was rejected, 197 the 
I 94. See MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. J.7(a)(J) (2004); id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 6 (stating that 
"absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer 
represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated"); HAZARD & HODES, 
supra note 58, at § 1.7:203 (interpreting Rule 1.7(a) as prohibiting a lawyer's representation of 
adverse interests even where the matters are wholly unrelated); see also Reply of Certain Insurer's 
to Debtors ' Response to Objection to the Retention of Gilbert Heintz & Randolph, LLP as Counsel 
for the Debtors at 10-13, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 03-51524 (D.N.J . Feb. 27, 2004). The insurers 
argued that there is no basis for applying waivers of conflict of interest to the conflicts that 
disqualify counsel under § 327 of the Bankruptcy Code; moreover, that even if waivers were 
possible, the waivers obtained by GHR were not valid as they were given by Perry Weitz, and the 
record does not reflect that the claimants were actually informed about, or gave their informed 
consent to this conflict of interest. 
195. See Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327 Granting Application to Employ Gilbert Heintz & 
Randolph LLP and Dughi, Hewit & Palatucci, P.C. as Special Counsel to the Debtors, In re 
Congoleum Corp., No. 03-51524 (D.N.J . Mar. 2, 2004); Reply of Certain Insurers to Debtors' 
Response to Objection to the Retention of Gilbert Heintz & Randolph, LLP as Counsel for the 
Debtors at I, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 03-51524 (D.N.J . Feb. 27, 2004). GHR claims that their 
representation of Congoleum is not a violation of Rule J.7(a)(I) as that rule only prevents counsel 
from representing adverse interests of current clients in the same matter. 
196. See supra note I 94. By simultaneously representing Congoleum and asbestos claimants 
suing Congoleum, GHR may also be violating Model Rule J.7(a)(2), which prohibits a lawyer, 
absent informed consent, to represent a client if "there is a significant risk that the representation of 
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a 
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer." MODEL RULES, supra note 
17, at R. 1.7 (a)(2). GHR' s duty to Congoleum is to minimize its liability whereas its duty to the 
individual claimants is to maximize their recovery. But see Expert Report of Bruce A. Green, 
Congoleum Corp. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., No. MID-L-8908-01 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2003); 
Declaration of Thomas D. Morgan, Congoleum Corp. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co. , No. MID-L-8908-01 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2003). Both experts found that Gilbert Heintz & Randolph's representation 
of Congoleum did not violate Rule 1.7 of the Washington D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Professor Green concluded that although Gilbert Heintz & Randolph had a "punch pulling" conflict 
of interest in representing Congoleum (referring to those situations where a lawyer's commitment to 
adverse clients, although not directly adverse, might tempt the lawyer the "pull her punches" on 
behalf of a client), Heintz was entitled to conclude that the firm was able to represent Congoleum to 
the best of their ability. Green, supra, at fl 9, 11. Therefore, Heintz was permitted to seek 
Congoleum's waiver of the conflict, which he successfully acquired in order to comply with Rule 
1.7. Id. at ,r 11. Professor Morgan came to the same conclusion by focusing on the "limited role" 
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insurers appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals where the matter 
is now sub Judice. 198 After the motion to reject the employment of GHR 
was argued in the bankruptcy court and the record was closed, GHR 
reluctantly disclosed that it is counsel with Perry Weitz in representing 
approximately 10,000 claimants who are currently suing Congoleum and 
others. 199 GHR has so far succeeded in fighting off all efforts to expand 
the record on this matter.200 
A somewhat parallel proceeding has been underway in state court 
where the insurers have been attempting to disqualify GHR from 
representing Congoleum in the coverage dispute litigation.201 After 
expressing concern about a conflict of interest,202 the insurers filed a 
complaint with the New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics, which, 
however, declined to act in the absence of a request from the presiding 
judge.203 After that declination, argument over the issue of 
that Gilbert Heintz & Randolph assumed in the Congoleum case. Morgan, supra, at ,Mi 7(a), 9. As 
Heintz's role was recovering insurance proceeds out of which the claimants would be paid, 
Professor Morgan contended that the interests he was representing were not adverse to those of his 
other clients. In forming his opinion, Professor Morgan relied upon the assertion that both 
Congoleum and the plaintiffs, through counsel, expressly waived this conflict. Id. at ,Mi 6(h), 7(b ). 
However, this assumption is questionable from the perspectives of whether the conflict was 
waivable and if it was, whether counsel had the authority to waive the conflict on behalf of the 
individual claimants who were not consulted about the conflict. 
197. See Notice of Appeal, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 03-51524 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2004); 
Opening Brief of Appellants ACE Companies Regarding the Retention of Gilbert Heintz & 
Randolph, LLP as Debtors' Counsel, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 04 Civ. 1709 (D.N.J. May 6, 
2004); Brief of Appellees Congoleum Corporation, Congoleum Sales Corporation, and Congoleum 
Fiscal, Inc. Regarding the Retention of Gilbert Heintz & Randolph LLP as Debtor's Counsel, In re 
Congoleum Corp., No. 04 Civ. 1709 (D.N.J. May 28, 2004). 
198. See Notice of Appeal, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 04 Civ. 1709 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2004); 
Notice of Docketing of Appeal, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 04-3609 (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 2004). 
199. See Brief in Support of Insurers' Motion to Disqualify Gilbert Heintz & Randolph LLP as 
Counsel to Congoleum Corporation at 17 n.59, In re Congoleum Corp., No. MID-L-8908-01 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2005). Under the retainer agreements, GHR is compensated on a contingency 
fee basis of ten percent of any recovery from the insurers. 
200. Id. at 17 n.59. The insurers are seeking have the cases remanded so that the record can be 
expanded and for reconsideration ofGHR's fitness to represent Congoleum in this matter. 
201. Congeleum Corp. v. ACE American Ins. Co., No. MID-L-8908-01 (N.J. Super. Ct.). 
202. See Brief in Support of Insurers' Motion to Disqualify Gilbert Heintz & Randolph LLP as 
Counsel to Congoleum Corporation at 17, In re Congoleum Corp., No. MID-L-8908-01 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Aj,r. 13, 2005). Judge Epstein stated: 
I have to express the concern I have about GHR's possible conflict of interest here and I 
think that's something that has to be addressed . ... I'm concerned about GHR's 
involvement because . . . they represent Congoleum in this case with whom claimants 
have made agreements and they represent those same claimants apparently in other 
matters. 
203. Id. at 17. The Office of Attorney Ethics made clear that they would conduct an ethics 
investigation, which could ultimately have led to disciplining GHR, if Judge Epstein had initiated 
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disqualification moved forward.204 While the insurer's case for 
disqualification in the state court proceeding was stronger because it was 
not laden down with the § 327(a) versus § 327(e) distinction, the long 
delay in proceeding with the disqualification motion led the presiding 
judge to dismiss it: 
I think if this application to disqualify GHR had been presented to 
me in a very early stage in these proceedings it would have been a 
fairly easy decision to preclude GHR from representing Congoleum. If 
for no other reason than to avoid the appearance of impropriety, to 
protect the integrity of the Court system and to instill and preserve 
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. 
However, at this late stage in the proceedings and considering all of 
the previously recited arguments and circumstances, including the 
Bankruptcy and District Court' s decisions, the waivers by Congoleum 
and the claimants' attorneys and the statement to the District Court by 
the insurance company attorneys they had no objection to GHR's 
continued representation in the New Jersey case, and despite ... 
argument which suggests that I ignore any possible underlying conflict 
GHR had in negotiating the claimants' agreement, which argument 
almost convinced me to grant this application, I'm reluctantly denying 
the insurance companies' motion to disqualify GHR as Congoleum's 
attorney. 205 
4. The Role of Joe Rice in the Combustion Engineering 
Pre-Packaged Bankruptcy 
Joe Rice, of the firm of Motley Rice, is one of the leading plaintiff 
asbestos lawyers in the country. He negotiated the terms of the 
the investigation. However, the OAE was unwilling to provide an advisory opinion based on best 
practices. Judge Epstein decided that he would not initiate the investigation, but would rather let the 
insurers file a motion to disqualify GHR if they so desired. 
204. See Reply Brief in Further Support of Insurers ' Motion to Disqualify Gilbert Heintz & 
Randolph LLP as Counsel to Congoleum Corporation at 1, In re Congoleum Corp., No. MID-L-
8908-01 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2005). The insurers ' motion to disqualify is based primarily on 
I) GHR's conflict of interest in representing both Congoleum and over 10,000 claimants who have 
current claims against Congoleum; 2) GHR never obtained valid waivers from these clients; 3) even 
if GHR had obtained waiver they would have been invalid, as these conflicts of interest at bar 
cannot be waived; 4) GHR has a continuing conflict of interest based on its longstanding 
relationship with Perry Weitz and Joe Rice, lead plaintiff's counsel in these proceedings; and 
5) GHR has an additional self-interest conflict in that the fee arrangement with Kenesis group is 
adverse to the interests of Congoleum. 
205. Transcript of Motion at 67-68, Congoleum Corp. v. ACE American Ins. Co. , No. MID-L-
8908-01 (N.J. Super. Ct. May 13, 2005). 
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Combustion Engineering pre-packaged bankruptcy agreement with ABB 
Ltd., the parent of Combustion.206 ABB agreed to pay Rice a "success 
fee" of $20 million for obtaining the requisite 75% claimants' vote in 
favor of the Combustion Engineering ("CE") Master Settlement 
Agreement ("MSA").207 While Bankruptcy Judge Judith K. Fitzgerald 
determined that this fee was not subject to the approval of the court, she 
held that she had equitable power to protect the process since Rice had 
"an actual conflict of interest in this case [because h ]e is being paid $20 
million by the parent of an entity he is suing. In addition, he has tort 
clients who have claims against Debtor ... and he has contingency fee 
agreements with those clients who will be or have been paid through the 
CE Settlement Trust ... and/or by the Asbestos PI Trust."208 Under that 
equitable power, she determined that Rice would have to return any 
amount of the fee paid and waive any unpaid amount to unwaiving 
clients unless he informed them of the existence and nature of the 
conflict and obtained written waivers from these clients.209 Nonetheless, 
despite the conflict of interest and the requirements of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the bankruptcy court approved the plan.210 
Rather than seek to obtain a waiver from his clients, Rice appealed. 
Judge Alfred Wolin, the district court judge, vacated that portion of the 
bankruptcy court's confirmation order concerning the "Claimants' 
Representative's" success fee, concluding that the bankruptcy court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the "Claimants' Representative's" 
"private, contractual relationship between himself and his asbestos 
plaintiff clients. "211 While it is true that Rice argued that he was acting 
only on behalf of his own clients and not on behalf of all asbestos 
206. See Parloff, supra note 134, at 200. 
207. See Alex Berenson, A Cauldron of Ethics and Asbestos, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at 
Cl; In re Combustion Eng'g, Irie., 295 B.R. 459,468 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
208. Combustion Eng 'g, Inc., 295 B.R. at 478-79. 
209. Id. However, she recommend withholding confirmation of the plan for ten days. Id. 
Despite finding a conflict and further finding considerable uncertainty as to just whom Rice was 
representing, as well as misrepresentation by Rice of his role as "Claimants' Representative," id. at 
478, the bankruptcy court concluded that it could not compel repayment or waiver. Id. at 479. The 
court further held that "the prepetition vote was not tainted under the unusual circumstances of this 
case," id. at 477, and that "there was no prejudice created by the misrepresentation that Mr. Rice 
was Claimants' Representative." Id. at 479. 
210. Id. at 488-90. In confirming the plan, the court seemingly ignored the fact that the plan 
was largely negotiated by a "Claimants' Representative" with an actual conflict of interest who was 
to receive improper payments from the debtor's parent. Id. at 477 n.29; see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a)(l)-(4). 
211. See Opinion and Order, Rice v. Combusion Eng'g, Inc. (In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc.), 
No. 03-755, 03-10495 (D. Del. Sept. 15, 2003) (emphasis added). 
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claimants affected by the MSA,212 the Disclosure Statement refers to 
Rice as "Claimants' Representative."213 Moreover, the bankruptcy court 
held that Rice could not have been retained as a Claimants' 
Representative because he had a conflict of interest as to the estate due 
to his employment and payment by Debtor's parent which is a creditor 
of Debtor.214 Furthermore, the "success fee" was not being paid by the 
claimants that he represented but by the parent of the debtor. If the 
district court's ruling is to the effect that the fee was, in actuality, a 
private contractual matter with his clients, then it effectively recognized 
that the $20 million would have been available to have been added to the 
trust to pay claimants had it not been paid to Rice-making it all the 
more bizarre that the district court gave its effective imprimatur to the 
fee. The fee arrangement was also arguably unethical because Rice was 
being paid part of his fee by the adversary of his client (the parent of the 
debtor-to-be, which was providing most of the funding of the trust) 
without the express knowledge and informed consent of his clients.215 
Finally, the somewhat bizarre circumstances surrounding Judge Wolin' s 
212. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 295 B.R. at 468. In a number of other bankruptcy proceedings, 
Rice has testified that although he and another attorney represented 75% of the asbestos claimants, 
he did not purport to "speak for" the claimants when he appeared before the court. See Motion to 
Compel the Law Firm of Motley Rice LLC to Comply with its Obligation Under Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 2019, In re Congoleum Corp. , No. 03-51524 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 6, 2004). 
Rice explained that he represents attorneys who in tum represent individual claimants. See Baron & 
Budd v. Unsecured Asbestos Claimants Comm., 321 B.R. 147, 160 & n.3 (D.N.J. 2005). Rice has 
testified that he has arrangements with law firms where his responsibility is only to negotiate on 
behalf of the law firms with various defendants, but not to actually represent the firm 's clients. Id. 
Recently, a client of one firm with which Rice presumably had such an arrangement sued Rice for, 
inter alia, breaching his alleged fiduciary duty to the plaintiff by helping to negotiate pre-pack 
bankruptcy plans for asbestos defendants. Pope v. Rice, No. 04 Civ. 4171 , 2005 WL 613085 at *I 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2005). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed 
the claims, agreeing with Rice that he had established no attorney-client relationship with, and owed 
no fiduciary duty to, the plaintiff. Id. at **6-9, 12. 
The issue of who Rice actually represents is compounded by the fact that despite repeated 
demands that he and other plaintiff counsel comply with Rule 2019 and list the names and addresses 
of their creditor/clients and the nature and amount of their claims, Rice and others have repeatedly 
failed to do so. See Motion to Compel, supra; see also supra note I 03. "The purpose of Rule 2019 
is to further the Bankruptcy Code ' s goal of complete disclosure" and to "'ensur[e] that lawyers 
adhere to ... ethical standards."' In re CF Holding Corp., 145 B.R. 124, 126-27 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
1992) (quoting In re Oklahoma P.A.C. First Ltd. P 'ship, 122 B.R. 387, 393 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990)). 
This includes disclosure of conflicts of interest so that bankruptcy courts can take prompt action to 
prevent such conflicts. Id. The consistent failure by plaintiff attorneys to comply with Rule 2019 in 
asbestos bankruptcies facilitates the continuation of conflicts of interest in bankruptcy proceedings. 
The effective exemption from adherence to Rule 2019 afforded to plaintiffs' counsels in asbestos 
bankruptcies may be coming to an end. See supra notes 100-105. 
213 . Combustion Eng 'g, Inc., 295 B.R. at 478. 
214. Id. (citing to FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014). 
215. See MODEL RULES, sup ra note 17, at R. 1.8(f). 
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reversal of the bankruptcy court's order requiring Rice to secure the 
informed consent of his clients may be seen to be a part of the conflicts 
of interest that appear to abound in this proceeding.216 
216. In addition to appointing David Gross and Judson Hamlin as advisors, see supra note 19, 
Judge Wolin also appointed Professor Francis McGovern as an Advisor to assist him in overseeing 
the bankruptcies of Owens Corning, W.R. Grace, USG, Federal Mogul and Armstrong World 
Industries. As noted previously, see id., Hamlin and David Gross, also served as class counsel for 
asbestos cases in the G-I Holdings bankruptcy. Because legal rulings by Judge Wolin could serve as 
a precedent for the G-1 Holdings bankruptcy in which these advisors had a financial interest, thereby 
giving rise to a conflict of interest, and further because of numerous ex parte meetings that Judge 
Wolin had with his Advisors and interested parties, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued a writ 
of mandamus to disqualify Judge Wolin from three of the bankruptcies. Id. 
Professor McGovern was later appointed as a Mediator in the Owens Coming bankruptcy. 
Professor McGovern had also served as a Trustee of both the Fibreboard Asbestos Compensation 
Trust (now the Fibreboard Settlement Trust) and the Celotex Asbestos Settlement Trust. Joe Rice 
and other plaintiff lawyers on the ACCs were responsible for Professor McGovern's appointments 
in those cases. Deposition of Francis McGovern at 57, In re Celotex Corp., Nos. 9010016881, 
901001781 (Bankr. D.D.C. July 8, 2003). It appears that Professor McGovern may have continued 
to serve as Trustee of the Fibreboard Settlement Trust long after Owens Coming had acquired 
Fibreboard in 1997 and perhaps as late as 2001 when Judge Wolin appointed him as Advisor. It 
further appears that Professor McGovern 's activities as mediator included negotiation of a plan that 
transferred $140 million of Owens Coming's assets to the Fibreboard Settlement Trust-a 
development favorable to the interests of Rice and the other plaintiff attorneys. 
While Professor McGovern was involved in his role as Mediator in the Owens Coming 
bankruptcy, he was employed by ABB, the parent of Combustion Engineering, "to mediate the 
Combustion Engineering bankruptcy" between the company and "any creditors of Combustion 
Engineering." Id. at 142. At the time he was hired by ABB, Rice was not involved in the 
deliberations. Rice was later engaged to put together a pre-packaged bankruptcy deal. Id. at 146, 
148-149. McGovern was one of three people present at a meeting in Zurich with ABB and Joe Rice 
when the offer of a $20,000,000 "success fee" was made and accepted. Id. at 147-49. When asked 
whether he had contacted Rice as part of his mediation effort for ABB, whether he had traveled to 
Zurich with Rice, and whether he had discussed Rice's compensation with Rice, Professor 
McGovern refused to answer, claiming these facts were confidential. Id.; see also St. Francis of 
Asbestos, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2004, at A14. 
On September 10, 2003, after the bankruptcy court found Rice's unconsented $20 million 
fee unethical because of an "actual conflict of interest" with his clients, and while the matter was on 
appeal to Judge Wolin, Rice participated in a six hour, ex parte meeting with Judge Wolin, 
Professor McGovern, Gross and other plaintiff counsel. Time Entry of David R. Gross, Sept. I 0, 
2003 (page 3571 of the Joint Appendix submitted to the Third Circuit, Feb. 20, 2004), in In re 
Kensington. Judge Wolin's log refers to this meeting as a session with "Francis and the boys"-the 
latter a term he used to refer to Rice and other leading plaintiffs' attorneys with whom he 
periodically met ex parte. Five days after this ex parte meeting, on September 15, 2003, Judge 
Wolin reversed Judge Fitzgerald's order requiring Rice to acknowledge his conflict and obtain 
waivers from his clients or forfeit the fee. See Order, In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., No. 03-10495 
(D. Del. Sept. 15, 2003); see also supra notes 211-215 . 
Little is known about the details of this meeting. Professor McGovern, when deposed less 
than four months later, said he did not remember what had occurred. Deposition of Francis 
McGovern, supra, at 65-66. Though 
0
Judge Wolin barred any inquiry into Professor McGovern's 
role in the Combustion Engineering case, see Deposition of David R. Gross at 253, In re Owens 
Coming, No. 00-3837/00-3854 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 5, 2004), there is evidence that Judge Wolin did 
in fact discuss the CE pre-packaged plan with Professor McGovern and his other Advisors both 
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VIL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION: 
THE DEFENSE SIDE 
Conflicts of interest on the defense side arise because some firms 
represent multiple clients.217 In addition to multiple representation, 
conflicts of interest may also arise because firms that had previously 
represented defendants that were bankrupted have continued to work in 
the field by taking on new solvent asbestos defendant clients. 
Concurrent and past-client conflicts of interest arise because it is 
increasingly in the interest of current clients to have juries apportion 
liability to other defendants as well as to previous defendants which 
before and after CE filed for Chapter 11. See Motion of Kensington Int'! Ltd., et al. Pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. §§ 105 and 327 and Delaware Local Bankruptcy Rule 9019 for Order Disqualifying and 
Terminating Appointment of Francis E. McGovern as Mediator in These Chapter 11 Cases at ,i 34, 
In re Owens Corning, No. 00-03837 (Bankr. D. Del. May 24, 2004). The court's approval of the CE 
pre-packaged plan was reversed by the Third Circuit. See supra note 169. However, there is no 
mention of the $20 million fee in that appellate opinion. 
The September I 0, 2003 ex parte meeting was followed approximately two weeks later by 
another ruling by Judge Wolin which was favorable to Rice 's interests. Judge Wolin stayed a $2.4 
million disgorgement order issued by Judge Newsome in the ACandS bankruptcy against the 
Kenesis Group, LLC ("Kenesis"). See In re ACandS, Inc., 297 B.R. 395, 404 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) 
(ordering disgorgement of the $2.4 million fee) ; Order Granting Stay Pending Appeal, In re 
ACandS, Inc. , No. 03-895, 02-12687 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 26, 2003) (staying Judge Newsome' s 
order). The following recitation of facts about Kenesis is taken from Memorandum of the United 
States Trustee in Support of Objection to Debtor's Application to Employ the Kenesis Group, In re 
ACandS, Inc., No. 02-12687 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 7, 2003). The Kenesis group is a claims 
processing firm 70% owned by Gilbert Heintz, the law firm hired by the debtor in the ACandS pre-
packaged bankruptcy filing which works closely with plaintiff law firms involved in asbestos 
litigation and bankruptcies, including Motley Rice and Weitz & Luxenberg. See supra notes 186-
188. Kenesis was to be paid $3 million to do postpetition claims processing. Kenesis, in turn, 
subcontracted two thirds of that work to and paid approximately $2 million to another entity which 
was owned by a paralegal on leave from employment at Rice's law firm but using the firm as her 
address . Under this arrangement, it appears that the Rice firm's paralegal was determining the 
eligibility of claims submitted by Rice's law firm on behalf of its clients for payment from the 
ACandS settlement trust. 
Given the circumstances described above with reference to Ken es is' s subcontracting 
claims processing to a paralegal on leave from Rice's law firm, Judge Wolin ' s stay of Judge 
Newsome's order to disgorge the $2.4 million so far paid to Kenesis, see Findings of Fact, Opinion 
and Conclusions of Law Re: Debtor's Motion to Employ the Kenesis Group, LLC, In re ACandS, 
Inc., No. 02-12687 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 25, 2003), despite numerous violations of the Bankruptcy 
Code, see Memorandum of the United States Trustee in Support of Objection to Debtor's 
Application to Employ the Kenesis Group, supra, at 6-13, would appear to have been highly 
favorable to Rice. 
217. Some counties that host large volumes of asbestos litigation maintain lists of asbestos 
defendants and their counsel. These lists document the multiple defendants some attorneys 
represent. See, e.g., Travis County Asbestos Litigation Standing Order Defendant Distribution List, 
at http://www.co.travis.tx.us/district_courts/pdffiles/asbestosdefendant.pdf (last visited May 28, 
2005); Dallas County Counsel List, at http://www.inreasbestos.com/ServiceList.html (last visited 
May 20, 2005). 
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entered bankruptcy and are now survived for asbestos claiming purposes 
by § 524(g) trusts. In those instances, the interests of client one, and the 
other present or past clients, to whom client one seeks to apportion 
liability, conflict;218 because of the incompatibility of interests, Model 
Rule 1.7(a)(2)219 prohibits the multi-defendant representation. Likewise, 
Rule 1.9(a)220 prohibits attorneys from representing a current client who 
attempts to shift blame to a former client, such as where a solvent 
asbestos defendant seeks to apportion liability to a past client which the 
attorney no longer represents, usually because that past client has filed 
for bankruptcy. 
Moreover, the conflicts raised by representation of multiple 
defendants may be unconsentable under either Rule 1.7(b)(l) (if the 
attorney could not reasonably believe that he or she "will be able to 
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client"/21 
or Rule 1.7(b)(3) (if the allocation defense constitutes "the assertion of a 
claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in 
the same litigation").222 Even if waiver of such conflicts is permissible, 
client consent is effective only where the client is sufficiently informed, 
that is, where the attorney adequately disclosed the nature of the 
conflicts the common representation might present. 223 Where the waiver 
218. The commentary following Model Rule 1.7 states that "[a) conflict [between codefendants 
represented by the same lawyer] may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' 
testimony, [or] incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party .. . . " MODEL RULES, 
supra note 17, at R. I. 7 cmt. 23 . Positions taken by, and testimony on behalf of, codefendants 
seeking to apportion liability to one another for the plaintiffs alleged injuries are certainly 
incompatible. Id. 
2 I 9. Id. at R. 1.7(a)(2). 
220. Id. at R. 1.9. 
221. Id. at R. l.7(b)(l). In Franklin High Income Trust v. APP Global, Ltd. , for example, the 
court disqualified an attorney for representing multiple clients with conflicting interests despite the 
conflict waiver forms the clients had signed. Franklin High Income Trust v. APP Global , Ltd., No. 
602567/02, 2004 WL 2963916 at ••2-3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 23 , 2004). The attorney in that case 
represented both the plaintiff and one of the plaintiffs affiliate companies, which the defendant 
named as a third party defendant for contribution. Id. at * I . Professor Geoffrey Hazard, a legal 
ethics expert, reviewed and approved the dual representation. Michael Bobelian, Counsel Is 
Disqualified Despite Waiver, N.Y. L.J., July 1, 2004, at 5. Still, the court found that, since the 
plaintiff could potentially have an independent cause of action against the third party defendant, the 
interests of the two clients conflicted. Franklin High Income Trust, 2004 WL 2963916 at •2. The 
court further found the conflict unconsentable. Id. Quoting the New York Court of Appeals, the 
court stated that "'where a lawyer represents parties whose interests conflict as to the particular 
subject matter, the likelihood of prejudice to one party may be so great that misconduct will be 
found despite disclosure and consent. " ' Id. (quoting In re Kelly, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 378 (1968)). 
222. MODEL RULES, supra note I 7, at R. l.7(b)(3). 
223. Id. at R. 1.7 cmts. 18-19. Where the attorney makes adequate disclosure when obtaining 
consent, waivers by asbestos codefendants are likely to be effective since asbestos defendants are 
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at issue was signed by a past client purportedly consenting to future 
conflicts of interest (a so-called "advance waiver"), it is "subject to 
special scrutiny"224 and thus less likely to be enforced. 
The conflicts of interest are heightened because of an endemic 
feature of asbestos litigation: the ability of plaintiffs (and their lawyers) 
to counteract the negative effects of the bankruptcies of leading 
defendants on claim values by continuously drawing other companies in 
as replacement revenue sources to maintain claim values. Doing so 
reflects a seemingly uncanny ability to shift party and witness testimony 
with regard to the identity and relative quantity of asbestos-containing 
products used at job sites thirty to fifty years prior to the testimony in a 
way that is consistent with the financial interests of claimants and their 
lawyers. 225 Despite this "evergreen" aspect of asbestos litigation, it is 
beyond cavil that the greatest amount of injury inflicted on the largest 
numbers of workers exposed to asbestos-containing products was caused 
by or at least has been attributed to a comparative handful of 
companies-most of which have filed for bankruptcy, including: Johns 
Manville, Celotex, National Gypsum, H.K. Porter, W.R. Grace, 
Armstrong Industries, Babcock & Wilcox, USG, G-1 Holdings (GAF), 
Combustion Engineering, subsidiaries of Halliburton, Federal Mogul 
and Owens Coming. 
As the list of companies bankrupted by asbestos litigation grows 
longer, the opportunities for the solvent companies to attribute even 
more substantial percentages of liability to those on the bankruptcy list 
grows wider. The confluence of an ever widening bankruptcy list and 
certain practices of defense lawyers including multiple representation 
and replacing bankrupted clients with newly inculpated asbestos clients 
generates conflict of interest issues what have been largely ignored. 
To be sure, there is no hard evidence on the incidence of multiple 
representation or on the number of defense firms that formerly 
represented companies that have become bankrupt and now represent 
solvent defendants. However, the incidence of both types of 
representation appear to be sufficiently widespread to merit if not 
mandate attention. 
"already familiar" with the "particular type of conflict" and are "experienced user[ s] of the legal 
services involved." Id. at cmt. 22. 
224. RESTATEMENT, supra note 51 , at§ 122 cmt. d; see also APRL Speakers and Audience 
Debate Possibility of Model Advance Waiver Form, 21 A.B.A./B.N.A LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 
96, 96-97 (2005). 
225. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 137-4 I. 
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There are a variety of reasons why multiple representation 
occurs.226 In some cases, it ·undertaken at the request of a common 
insurer. The insurer's action may be prompted by the fact that it had 
issued liability policies providing for defense cost coverage that did not 
count against policy limits. For example, a ten million dollar aggregate 
policy might well cost the insurer fifty million dollars in defense cost 
reimbursement if the insured aggressively defended against claims. In 
addition, having a single firm represent multiple defendants can give rise 
to economies of scale and therefore defense cost savings. Insurers may 
also urge its insureds to retain a particular firm because the insurer has 
negotiated a favorable fee structure with that firm. 
Historically, in asbestos litigation, the desire to avoid incurring 
substantial defense costs in litigated cases and also outlier verdicts in 
jurisdictions especially favorable to plaintiffs has also induced insurers 
to urge its insureds to enter into large scale settlements of plaintiff 
lawyers' current inventories of claimants. Often such "inventory 
settlements" also provide for settlement of future acquired claims. 
Typically, the settlement values are set forth in a matrix and vary by 
disease category as well as several other criteria. Settlement values are 
informed by prior tort system outcomes, including jury trials, the ability 
of that firm to command certain courts' dockets and schedule cases for 
trial at an expedited rate as well as its ability to join or consolidate 
substantial numbers of claims in jurisdictions where plaintiffs have 
obtained huge judgements, and the ability of a defendant to generate the 
requisite cash flow to sustain such a settlement policy which is a 
function of its business income, insurance coverage and experience with 
other plaintiff law firms. 
226. In Northern California, a court order requires that all defense counsel use the "Designated 
Defense Counsel" ("DDC"}-a specified law firm-as co-counsel for all administrative matters 
involved in asbestos case management. Dominica C. Anderson & Kathryn L. Martin, The Asbestos 
litigation System in the San Francisco Bay Area: A Paradigm of the National Asbestos litigation 
Crisis , 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. I, 26-27 (2004). In Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry, a 
fee dispute between a client and the DOC, the California Court of Appeal identified a conflict of 
interest arising out of the DDC's simultaneous representation of multiple defendants, but did not 
address the issue because the issue had not been preserved for appeal. Id. at 28-29. Still, the court 
upheld its authority to require that defendants use the DOC, suggesting that courts must monitor 
DOC representation for impropriety such as that identified in Berry & Berry. Id. at 29. However, 
Berry & Berry, the firm which has served as DOC since the position was created, has received little 
judicial oversight. Id. at 28 n.143, 32. 
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Asbestos defendants seek to minimize their own liability by, at least 
in part, maximizing the liability of other asbestos defendants and the 
§ 524(g) trusts established upon confirmation of the plan of 
reorganization in bankruptcy proceedings. The conflicts of interest 
generated by this defense strategy are being accentuated by tort reform 
measures being adopted by states, including those eliminating or limiting 
joint liability.227 When liability is several only, there is an increased 
impetus for each defendant to minimize its own liability by, for example, 
arguing that the quantity of its product that the plaintiff was exposed to 
as well as the friability of the asbestos in that product was substantially 
less than the products of other manufacturers. Necessarily that strategy 
includes shifting responsibility to other defendants, including the trusts 
established to which claims against bankrupted defendants are now 
channelled. 
As allocation of liability among defendants becomes a more 
prominent part of the defense of asbestos claims, so to does the issue of 
conflicts of interest stemming from former representation of asbestos 
clients which are now in bankruptcy and multiple representation. To 
illustrate the conflicts generated by multiple representation, a number of 
scenarios are presented below and are analyzed in the context of tort 
reform measures adopted in California and Texas. 
For purposes of analysis of the ethical issues, defendants in 
asbestos litigation may be divided into two classes: 1) manufacturers, 
installers228 or sellers of asbestos-containing products; and 2) owners of 
227. Joint and several liability means that "each liable party is individually responsible for the 
entire obligation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999); see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 47, at 328 (5th ed. 1984). Therefore, a defendant that 
is found to be only one percent at fault could end up being liable for all of the damages awarded if 
the defendants with the 99% share are insolvent. Proponents of tort reform note that "[a]s a result of 
this shortcoming, plaintiffs often target persons they perceive to have the greatest resources from 
which to pay claims[, c]ommonly known as 'deep-pocket' defendants." Senator Larry Pressler & 
Kevin V. Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Case/or Reform, 64 U. DENY. L. REV. 651 , 652 
(1988) (referring to such targeting as "deep pocket abuse"). Frequently the "deep pocket" is a 
municipal government. At least one author has argued that deep pocket abuse has made Americans 
perceive "civil suit[ s] against a corporation or municipality as a kind of lottery- a lottery to be 
played whenever they can." Jill Andresky et al., A World Without Insurance? , FORBES, July 15, 
1985, at 40. 
228. Additional conflicts may be given rise to because of differing insurance coverage for 
manufacturers of asbestos-containing products and installers of those products. Coverage of the 
former usually is subject to an aggregate policy limit whereas coverage for the latter may not be 
subject to any aggregate limit. The same company may have both types of coverage. 
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premises which have asbestos-containing products on their premises, 
exposures to which have allegedly resulted in injury.229 Each asbestos 
claimant typically sues sixty to seventy different defendants and 
bankruptcy trusts, claiming exposure to asbestos-containing products 
either manufactured, installed or sold by these multiple defendants or 
present on the premises of a defendant.230 
The process of apportionment of asbestos liability in which each 
defendant seeks to minimize the degree of exposure to its products or to 
asbestos on its premises and therefore its responsibility for any injury 
and conversely, maximize the evidence of exposure to others' products 
or asbestos located on others' premises, creates, at least in theory, a 
zero-sum game similar to that which exists on the plaintiffs' side. In 
reality, the situation is more complex. When claiming against defendants 
or bankruptcy trusts, plaintiff lawyers typically refuse to disclose the 
settlement amounts they have already received from other defendants or 
trusts.231 While such information is available when there are settlements 
and trials involving multiple defendants in a single consolidated action, 
only a tiny percentage of asbestos claims go to trial. Hence, plaintiff 
lawyers can obtain settlements for a single plaintiff which may 
effectively amount to more than 100% of the liability that would be 
determined in a single consolidated trial. Indeed, that effective 
percentage could be many multiples of 100%.232 
In defending asbestos cases, the litany of defenses largely conforms 
to the following template: 
229. Premises owners which have been sued on such a basis include Dow Chemical, Dupont, 
Shell Oil Co., Exxon, Motorola, Mars Candy and Rhone Poulenc. 
230. While there is some data available in RAND reports on the incidence of multiple 
claiming, there is little hard data. See RAND REPORT, supra note 3. The RAND survey shows this 
number rose from approximately twenty defendants named by the average asbestos claimant in the 
1980s. Id. The number of claims made per claimant is an estimate based mostly on conversation 
with some defense lawyers. There is also a dearth of data on the amounts that plaintiff lawyers 
collect, in toto, for individual claimants. Indeed, this appears to be a closely guarded secret. 
231. See Anderson & Martin, supra note 226, at 38-39. Anderson and Martin note that, 
although Northern California court orders require plaintiffs to disclose compensation they have 
received from bankruptcy trusts, plaintiffs often object and ultimately avoid such disclosure. Id. at 
38. As a result, "asbestos defendants feel that they are 'negotiating in a vacuum,' not knowing 
whether the plaintiff has received nothing for his injuries, or whether he has already received 
hundreds of thousands of dollars from bankruptcy trusts or other defendants, ultimately receiving 
what could amount to double or even triple recovery." Id. at 38-39. 
232. This is one of the factors that accounted for plaintiff lawyer opposition to S.1125, The 
Fairness In Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003. See FAIR Act, supra note I IO. The bill set 
damage caps for each disease category. In many cases, claimants in plaintiff firms' inventories had 
already obtained gross recoveries in excess of those caps. Thus, if the bill passed, the value of 
plaintiff lawyers' inventories would have precipitously declined. Id. 
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1) the claimant was not exposed to my client's product; 
2) whether or not the claimant was exposed, he or she does not have 
an injury or does not have an injury caused by exposure to an asbestos-
containing product; 
3) the claimant was exposed but my client's product does not (and 
did not) cause an asbestos-related disease; 
4) the claimant was exposed to my client's product, the product can 
cause harm, the claimant suffered an injury but the exposure was 
insignificant and was not a substantial factor in causing that injury; 
5) the claimant was exposed to my client's products and though 
injury resulted, it was not the result of any negligence or actionable 
conduct; 
6) the claimant was meaningfully exposed to my client's products, 
thus contributing to an injury, but those exposures account for only a 
small portion of the injury and the largest contributor to the injury was 
exposure to others' products; and 
7) the claimant was exposed to my client's products or premises as 
well as other products or premises, injury resulted, but irrespective of 
whether my clients' products or premises account for a portion of the 
injury, the independent acts or omissions of others in failing to warn my 
client of the dangers of asbestos-containing products supercedes my 
client's liabilities. 233 
233 . While I am unaware of any invocation of such a "superceding act or omission" argument 
by an asbestos defendant, such a defense, which is in part modeled after plaintiff theories of 
liability, is plausible. Consider the suit brought by Owens-Illinois ("OJ") against T &N, Ltd. (Turner 
& Newell). Both companies have been major targets of plaintiffs seeking damages for injuries 
arising from asbestos exposure. OJ brought suit in June 1999, seeking more than one billion dollars 
in damages, and alleging that though T &N knew as early as the 1940s of the health risks that end 
users of asbestos insulation fibers were exposed to, T &N knowingly withheld that information from 
consumers, unions and government officials, and that had 01 known about the inherent dangers of 
asbestos, it would never have gotten involved in selling asbestos-containing products. See Texas 
Court Vacates $1.63B Judgment in Civil Conspiracy Action, Trial Ordered, 15 MEALEY'S LITIG. 
REP.: ASBESTOS 1 (Apr. 7, 2000). Although I was not able to obtain a copy of the complaint, it is 
substantially repeated in the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the default judgment in the 
amount of $1 ,630,604,268.29 entered against T&N. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. T &N Ltd., No. 2:99CVII 7DF (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 1999). In that judgment, 
the court stated the following Findings of Fact: 
23. Beginning in the late 1920's and continuing through the 1950's and beyond, T&N 
engaged in a scheme to defraud and a conspiracy with other asbestos fiber suppliers to 
create and protect a demand for asbestos through the suppression and misrepresentation 
of information concerning health risks to users of finished insulation products containing 
asbestos. 
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30. The wrongful acts of T&N which are deemed admitted relate to a conspiracy and 
scheme which was designed to conceal the costs, especially the long-term liability costs, 
of incorporating asbestos fibers into the products of Owens-Illinois and others. 
31. The conspiracy and scheme perpetrated by T &N upon Owens-Illinois included, but 
is not limited to, the following acts: 
a. Concealing from the public, the scientific and regulatory authorities and their 
customers (including Owens-Illinois) the fact that contract unit employees of certain 
conspirators developed asbestos related disease; 
b. Failing to advise purchasers of asbestos fiber of disease risks known to the 
conspirators and discouraging efforts to disclose such information; 
c. Making false and misleading statements to the British government that the use of 
finished insulation products containing asbestos did not result in asbestos-related 
diseases. 
d. Suppressing publication of scientific research concerning the potential risks posed 
by exposure to asbestos dust; and 
e. Monitoring and editing scientific research prior to their publication in order to 
eliminate references to unfavorable results, withholding information about asbestos-
related illnesses from their own employees and from the public, and attempting to 
suppress publication of scientific research. 
32. All of the above acts, and others, were committed by T&N with the knowledge that, 
if its customers, such as Owens-Illinois, learned that end users of the finished insulation 
products were at risk of contracting asbestos-related diseases, demand for asbestos fiber 
would be negatively affected. The above outlined acts created an inequality of 
bargaining power between the conspirators and Owens-Illinois, relating to the terms 
under which the purchase of asbestos fibers would be made. 
33. This scheme to defraud and conspiracy induced Owens-Illinois to enter into a 
business which Owens-Illinois would not have entered had it known the full costs and 
risks associated with the incorporation of asbestos fibers in insulation and other asbestos 
containing products. 
37. Owens-Illinois purchased asbestos fiber in reliance on the false perception, 
perpetuated by T &N and its conspirators, that end-users of asbestos-containing products 
were not at risk. 
40. But for T&N's acts in furtherance of the purposes of the conspiracy to perpetuate the 
false perception, Owens-Illinois would not have entered into production of asbestos 
containing products, or Owens-Illinois would have conducted its business differently. As 
a direct and proximate result of the conspiracy and scheme to defraud set out herein and 
in the Complaint, Owens-Illinois has suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial injury 
to its business and property. 
Id. at 3-8. 
The court stated the following Conclusions of Law: 
10. T&N fraudulently concealed its conduct and Owens-Illinois could not have 
previously discovered the fraudulent scheme and its harmful effects on Owens-Illinois. 
11. T&N committed fraud, conspired with others to commit fraud upon Owens-Illinois 
and others and made negligent misrepresentations to Owens-Illinois by actively 
suppressing the information that its insulation workers had contracted asbestos-related 
diseases and interfering with the development of the medical and scientific literature by 
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suppressing and altering scientific publications, thus distorting the published medical and 
scientific literature. T&N knew or should have known that revealing this information 
would jeopardize its ability to sell asbestos fibers to Owens-Illinois and others and that 
this information was material to the decision of customers to purchase asbestos fiber and, 
if purchased, to the terms under which the purchase would be made. T&N knew or 
should have known that Owens-Illinois and others would rely, and indeed Owens-Illinois 
did rely on the absence of information contrary to that published in medical and 
scientific literature. T &N intended to deceive Owens-Illinois by its conduct in 
furtherance of its scheme to defraud and conspiracy. 
12. T &N aided and abetted other members of this conspiracy to defraud in their illegal 
actions which were designed to, and actually did, suppress and misrepresent the true 
nature of the health hazards faced by end-users of asbestos containing products. The 
misrepresentations of T &N and the other aiders and abettors thus became part of the 
state of the art about asbestos related health risks available to Owens-Illinois and the 
medical and scientific communities. The aiders and abettors knew or should have known 
that Owens-Illinois would rely and in fact Owens-Illinois did rely, on the absence of 
information contradicting the available medical and scientific literature in deciding to 
purchase asbestos fiber and/or attempting to negotiate terms which would reflect the 
incorporation of the concealed information into its normal commercial decision-making 
process, thus creating unequal bargaining power between Owens-Illinois and the 
members of the conspiracy which includes T &N. 
14. At the time Owens-Illinois purchased asbestos fibers, T&N knew or should have 
known that its knowledge regarding health risks to end-users of asbestos-containing 
products was more accurate and complete than the information available in the published 
medical and scientific literature and than the knowledge possessed by Owens-Illinois. 
The information possessed by T &N regarding the health hazards posed to end-users of 
asbestos-containing products was unique in that it was contrary to the state of the 
medical and scientific art. T &N and the conspirators owed Owens-Illinois a duty to 
reveal what they knew. Owens-Illinois had a right to rely, and did rely, on T&N and the 
conspirators to reveal what they knew about the health risks associated with use of 
finished asbestos-containing products. 
Id. at 13-15. 
After issuing a default judgment against T&N for over $1,630,000,000, the court later set 
aside the judgment pending settlement negotiations and when these failed, permanently vacated the 
judgment, ruling that the case could go to trial. See Texas Court Vacates $1 .63B Judgment in Civil 
Conspiracy Action, Trial Ordered, 15 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 1 (Apr. 7, 2000). The 
parties thereafter settled the suit though the terms are confidential. Had the court allowed the default 
judgment to stand, it would have posed a serious threat to the viability of other asbestos defendants. 
This is so because T&N was a member of the CCR (Center for Claims Resolution) defense 
consortium which was a substantial settlement source for plaintiffs. T &N would have been forced 
into bankruptcy by the judgment. Since it was one of the four largest contributors to the CCR and 
the CCR was a major provider of funds to plaintiffs, the CCR' s continued existence would have 
been in jeopardy. Id. 
The substance of OI's suit against T &N could have also been pleaded by 01 as a defense 
against suits against 01 for failure to warn of the dangerous condition of products containing 
asbestos that it manufactured or marketed. Other asbestos defendants could plausibly take a page 
out of the plaintiff lawyer's playbook, and argue that the conspiracy between Johns-Manville and 
Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation and others to suppress information regarding the hazards of 
asbestos inhalation, see generally PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS 
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Despite the conflicts of interest generated by multiple and former 
client representation, there is virtually no discussion in the literature of 
these issues. In large measure, this appears to be a function of defense 
lawyers' failure to seek to apportion liability to others-which itself may 
be a conflict of interest and, in any event, could constitute malpractice. 
Once again, there is no hard evidence on the incidence of defense 
lawyers seeking, or failing to seek, apportionment of liability. 
Nonetheless, on the basis of inquiries, I am convinced that defense 
lawyers are not actively seeking to apportion liability in cases where it 
would appear to their clients' advantage to do so. There are a variety of 
plausible explanations for this failure: (1) a stigma-avoiding etiquette 
may be prevalent among defense counsel and their clients, of not seeking 
to shift blame to solvent defendants (with the notable exception of 
Owens Corning before it entered the NSP); (2) lawyers representing a 
solvent defendant who formerly represented one or more companies that 
became bankrupt may think it unseemingly to aggressively seek to 
inculpate their former clients;234 (3) these same lawyers may further 
conclude that seeking to inculpate former clients now in bankruptcy may 
involve using confidential information acquired during the course of that 
representation to the disadvantage of that former client, thus raising an 
ethical issue;235 (4) defense counsel may be concerned that a vigorous 
policy of allocating liability to other entities including bankruptcy trusts 
that pay only a fraction of their shares, may be sufficiently successful 
that it significantly reduces plaintiff lawyers' cash flow and that some of 
the latter may react by communicating to defendant companies that it 
INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985), precluded or limited that defendant's ability to learn of the dangers of 
the asbestos-containing products it had manufactured or installed on its premises. The argument 
would be that those actions by third parties supercede defendant's liability for negligence (but not 
strict liability). Even if the argument fails, it may still be a basis for interpleading those third parties. 
Other similar scenarios exist. For example, taking another page out of the plaintiff lawyer's 
playbook, a product manufacturer could claim that certain insurers (life and liability) had become 
aware in the 1930s and 1940s, of the dangers of asbestos exposure and though arguably having a 
duty to do so because those insurers also insured the product manufacturer or premises owners who 
installed those products on its premises, failed to make that information available to their insureds. 
234. Inculpating a former client would likely require the lawyer to put on the same "plaintiffs 
case" that she defended against when she represented that former client. That might well include 
arguing that a certain document produced in discovery which was introduced to support a punitive 
damages claim against the former client-which the lawyer zealously argued against- in fact 
demonstrates the culpability of that former client. Or that the "chrysotile" defense that the lawyer 
had previously put on should be rejected by the jury being called upon to apportion liability. 
235. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. I .9(b). However, if the former client has emerged 
from bankruptcy and has established a § 524(g) trust to which all future asbestos claims are 
channeled, then it would appear that seeking to apportion liability to that former client may not be to 
the disadvantage of that former client. 
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would be in their self-interest to discontinue use of that defense firm; 236 
( 5) law firms seeking to allocate significant shares of liability to other 
solvent defendants may be concerned that doing so will focus attention 
on the firms' multiple representations and the conflicts of interest 
thereby created; ( 6) a desire not to offend insurance carriers which are 
sometimes instrumental in the selection of law firms to represent 
insureds; (7) joint and several liability which tempers somewhat the 
advantages of one defendant's pinning a share of responsibility on 
another; (8) bankruptcy trusts may be relatively easy targets for 
assignment of a share of liability, thus perhaps obviating the felt need to 
identify other solvent defendants as tortfeasors; (9) on the other hand, 
defense counsel may find it difficult to identify the bankrupt entities to 
whom they might seek to apportion liability because plaintiffs' counsel 
are motivated by apportionment statutes to minimize information in the 
record about the identity of potentially responsible bankrupt entities;237 
and (10) even where plaintiffs identify ( or defendants are able to 
ascertain the identities of) such potentially responsible bankrupt entities, 
defense counsel may lack the time or resources required to mount 
"plaintiffs"' cases successfully implicating the bankruptcy trusts as 
responsible parties. 238 
The last factor-joint and several liability-has been the subject of 
intensive state tort reform efforts. 239 In 1986, California voters approved 
236. Cf Brickman, Theories of Asbestos litigation, supra note 8, at 157 n.463 . 
237. See Anderson & Martin, supra note 226, at 37. In California, where Proposition 51 
eliminated joint liability among asbestos defendants for non-economic damages, see infra text 
accompanying note 240, Anderson and Martin report that "(d)iscussions with asbestos defense 
practitioners reveal a prevailing belief that plaintiffs do not identify these (potentially responsible 
bankrupt) parties because of the effect of Proposition 51" (that is, because bankrupt entities will pay 
only a fraction of any damages for which they are severally liable). Anderson & Martin, supra note 
226, at 37. Anderson and Martin conclude that the failure of plaintiffs ' counsel to identify 
potentially responsible bankrupt defendants prevents defendants from fully utilizing the allocation 
defense. Id. at 37-38. Indeed, at a recent asbestos litigation conference I attended, several plaintiffs' 
counsels acknowledged to me that, in so-called "apportionment states," they do not file claims 
against bankruptcy trusts in order to preclude defendants from using the filings to seek to apportion 
liability to those trusts. HarrisMartin, Conference: Asbestos Allocation: Apportioning Liability in 
Asbestos Litigation, San Francisco, June 17-18, 2004. Defense counsel, of course, may counter this 
tactic by propounding interrogatories and deposing plaintiffs to obtain a complete statement of all 
past employments and asbestos exposures at those employments. 
238. See Anderson & Martin, supra note 226, at 37. Successfully employing the allocation 
defense places a "significant burden" on defendants; "most defendants do not have the time or 
resources to spend building a case against a third-party defendant on the off chance that a jury will 
accept the proffered evidence and apportion some liability to the third party, thereby reducing the 
named defendants ' liability for non-economic damages." Id. at 38. 
239. In addition to California and Texas, discussed in the text that follows, numerous other 
states have enacted legislation eliminating or limiting joint liability and/or permitting allocation of 
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Proposition 51 by initiative.240 To more closely align tort defendants 
financial liability to their degree of fault, the initiative provided that 
(a) In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful 
death, based upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of each 
defendant for non-economic damages shall be several only and shall 
not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-
economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to 
that defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judgment shall be 
rendered against that defendant for that amount.241 
liability to nonparties. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 7102 (2004) (eliminating joint liability for 
defendants found less than 60% liable); WIS. STAT. § 895.045 (1995) (eliminating joint liability for 
defendants found less than 51 % liable); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601 (1996) (same); IND. CODE§ 34-51-2-
14-17 (1998) (permitting apportionment of liability to nonparties). For a discussion of similar 
measures in various other states, see Alan J. Brinkmeier, Damages: Apportionment Among Joint 
Tortfeasors, DCBA BRIEF (DuPage County Bar Association) (Oct. 1997), at 4-5 (discussing tort 
reform measures eliminating joint and several liability in Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming; limiting joint and several liability in Idaho, Iowa, Ohio, and 
Montana; and allowing apportionment of liability to nonparties in Florida, Illinois, Kansas, and 
Utah), available at http://www.dcba.org/brief/octissue/ l 997/art3 l097.htm; see also UNIF. 
APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILITY ACT (2003). The Uniform Act proposes to eliminate 
joint and several liability in favor of a reapportionment system under which courts, after 
apportioning liability severally among defendants, may reallocate any uncollectible share of such 
liability severally among the other parties to whom the court initially allocated responsibility. Id. at 
§ 5. The Uniform Act would not, however, permit allocation of fault to nonparties. Id. at§ 5 cmt. 
240. Proposition 51 was approved by 62% of California voters and was codified as CAL. CIV. 
CODE§ 1431.1 (2004). One of the main arguments for the enactment of The Fair Responsibility Act 
of 1986 was the perceived injustices of a system based on joint and several liability and the 
perception of the unfairness of "deep pocket" abuse. See Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P .2d 
585, app. at 614 (Cal. 1988) (argument in favor of Proposition 51 stating that the deep pocket rule 
turns the taxpayer into another victim of the tort); see also Carolyn Hacker, Fair To Whom? 
Misapplication of the Fair Responsibility Act, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 69, 81 (2002) (noting that the 
legislature was seemingly "concerned above all with ensuring justice"); Ellyn Moscowitz, The Fair 
Responsibility Act of 1986: How Fair Is It?, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 909, 910 (1992). Others have 
argued that the movement for tort reform in the 1980s was really a result of a perceived insurance 
crisis. James A. Gash, Rethinking Principles of Comparative Fault in Light of California 's 
Proposition 51 , 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (1992); Robert L. Habash, The Insurance "Crisis ": 
Reality or Myth? A Plaintiffs ' Lawyer 's Perspective, 64 DENV. U.L. REV. 641, 641 (1988) (also 
noting that the perceived crisis was created by the "wealthy and powerful insurance industry and 
related interests .. . to reap higher profits"). 
The statute states two basic goals. The first goal is to protect public and private entities 
from the "inequity and injustice" of a rule that imposes liability on defendants based on their ability 
to pay rather than in proportion to each defendant's fault. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.l(a)-(b); see 
Hacker, supra, at 70. The statute was also enacted to remedy the increased burden on "taxpayers 
and consumers alike," of having to "pay for these lawsuits in the form of higher taxes, higher prices 
and higher insurance premiums." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.l(b); see Moscowitz, supra, at 910 
(noting that the Proposition "promised ... a reduction or windfall in their insurance premiums"). 
241. CAL.CIV.CODE§ 1432. l(a)(emphasisadded). 
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California Supreme Court opinions construing Proposition 51 suggest 
that liability may be apportioned to all responsible parties including 
bankrupt entities.242 
California's elimination of joint liability for noneconomic damages 
impacts both plaintiff and defendant lawyers. For plaintiff lawyers, 
Proposition 51 "changes the dynamic of against whom you go to trial 
and what kind of loss you can take to trial, because if you do not have 
large economic damages, and you have a one percent responsible 
defendant, it is not economically viable to take that case to trial."243 For 
defense lawyers, Proposition 51 makes it incumbent to seek to apportion 
damages to other named defendants as well as to non-parties which may 
arguably have contributed to the harm being alleged by the plaintiff.244 
Because this would create conflicts of interest where attorneys 
represented multiple defendants and might create conflicts of interest 
where attorneys formerly represented defendants which have gone into 
bankruptcy, one would expect that defense lawyers' practices would 
change as a consequence. Neither premise-that defense lawyers would 
actively seek to apportion damages to others and that conflicts of interest 
generated by multiple representation would necessitate changes in 
lawyers' practices-appears to have come to fruition. 245 Though the 
242. Though it did not mention bankruptcy trusts specifically, the California Supreme Court in 
Evangelatos v. Superior Court recognized that, under Proposition 51, plaintiffs would recover less 
than full damages where liability is apportioned to insolvent defendants. The court later clarified 
that "with respect to .. . non-economic damages, the plaintiff alone now assumes the risk that a 
proportionate contribution cannot be obtained from each person responsible for the injury." Dafonte 
v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 144 (Cal. 1992). See Anderson & Martin, supra note 226, at 35-36 
(discussing the Evangelatos and DaFonte cases and concluding that California Supreme Court 
rulings support allocation to bankrupt defendants). 
Judge Helen Freedman, who heads the asbestos docket in New York, has reached a 
similar result in construing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601. In re New York City Asbestos Litigation 
("Tancredi"), 750 N.Y.S.2d 469 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002), aff'd, 6 A.D.3d 352 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
She held that "the culpability of a bankrupt, nonparty tortfeasor will be included when calculating 
the defendant tortfeasors' exposure ... . " Id. at 479. This case has not yet been reviewed by the 
New York Court of Appeals. 
243 . Alan Brayton, Alternatives to Asbestos Impairment Standards, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 29, 29-30 
(2004). 
244. Proposition 51 has been construed to allow a defendant to request apportionment of 
damages if that defendant can attribute a portion of the fault to a non-party. Wilson v. Ritto, 105 
Cal. App. 4th 361,369 (Ct. App. 2003). The Wilson court also noted that a defendant has the burden 
of proving the fault of a non-party joint tortfeasor in order to request apportionment. Id. Assuming 
that an attorney representing a named defendant has confidential information regarding a non-party 
client, that attorney would have to choose between keeping such information confidential or using it 
to prove the fault of a non-party tortfeasors. In such a situation it is unclear whether there can be a 
waiver of a possible conflict of interests by the informed consent of each client. 
245. See Anderson & Martin, supra note 226, at 36 ("(W]hile Proposition 51 theoretically 
provides an empty chair for asbestos defendants to point to, this defense is significantly 
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empirical evidence is at best murky,_ it appears that Proposition 51 has 
been significantly underused by defense lawyers.246 Firms are, however, 
apparently aware of the conflicts generated by multiple representation in 
the post Proposition 51 era because several include conflict waiver 
provisions in their retainer agreements.247 Presumably, these waivers248 
contain provisions similar to the following: 
I) you, the client, acknowledge that it is our policy to not actively 
pursue a claim agt:inst an existing client of the firm; discussion of 
waiver. 
2) by so acknowledging, you are waiving your right to have us seek 
to reduce your share of liability by attempting to ascribe some share of 
liability to one of our existing or future clients; 
3) you further acknowledge that one effect of our policy is to 
protect you since we will not activel)' pursue a claim against you when 
representing another client; 
4) you further acknowledge that you will benefit from the 
efficiency and lower costs generated by our representation of multiple 
asbestos defendants; and 
5) you have independently verified that this waiver serves your best 
interest for the above stated reasons. 
Use of conflict of interest waivers may be part of a joint defense 
agreement. 249 Such an agreement might provide that in the event one or 
more parties to the agreement were not named as defendants in a 
proceeding, the common attorney for the participants could seek to 
allocate liability to that party or parties. In such instances, any conflict of 
interest would appear to be waivable by informed consent.250 However, 
the issue would be complicated if seeking apportionment of liability to 
underutilized because the identities of bankrupt manufacturing defendants are not easily obtainable 
through discovery. Defendants do not often use discovery motions to press plaintiffs for information 
about potentially liable third parties. As long · as plaintiffs are allowed to withhold information or 
knowledge about product identification and the issues relating to exposure, defendants will be 
unable to utilize Proposition 51 to its fullest extent."). 
246. Id. at 37. 
247. Again, the use of conflicts waivers is based on off-the-record conversations with defense 
lawyers. I have not seen any of the waiver provisions. My discussion is therefore conjecture. 
248. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text. 
249. See Hanson, Bridgett, Marcus, Vlahos, Rudy LLP, Mealey's Asbestos Premises Liability 
Conference: Identifying and Managing Potential Conflicts in Joint Defense Groups (Dec. 9-10, 
2004) (recommending that joint defense agreements a) specify how the attorney will handle 
conflicts of interest among the joint defendants and b) provide for potential future conflicts, perhaps 
with a provision waiving the right of joint defendants to seek disqualification of the attorney in 
future lawsuits). 
250. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
904 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:833 
the non-party client included revealing confidential information that 
could operate to the detriment of that client in a future litigation.251 
Accordingly, the waiver and joint defense agreement may provide that 
the license granted to the attorney to seek to apportion liability to a non-
party joint defense client is limited to the use of publicly available 
information regarding that non-party's culpability· and specifically 
excludes the use of confidential information. 
A presumably more common type of joint defense agreement 
entered into by asbestos defendants would provide that when named as 
defendants in the same litigation, they will coordinate their defense and 
use a common lawyer. Each participating defendant in that joint defense 
agreement may agree not to seek to apportion liability to other 
participants and may further provide that irrespective of how the jury 
apportions liability, each will contribute to their joint allocation of 
liability according to agreed upon shares.252 
251. Where codefendants share a common interest in litigation, their communications with 
each other and with their counsel may be protected against disclosure to third parties by the joint 
defense privilege. See, e.g., Ageloff v. Novanda, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 72, 76 (D. R.l. 1996); In re 
Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990), cited in Joseph C. Kearfott- & D. Alan 
Rudlin, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORT MATTERS: 
ADVANCED CIVIL LITIGATION (Course No. SG084 LEXIS Combined ALI-ABA Course of Study 
Materials File) § (8)(1) (Jan. 2002). The rationale behind this privilege is that parties with a 
common interest in litigation, whether as coplaintiffs or codefendants, should be able to share 
information with each other to more effectively litigate their claims or defenses. Id. However, in 
subsequent litigation between joint defendants (such as actions for contribution), such confidential 
information loses its privileged status. Kearfott & Rudlin, supra. In Waste Management, Inc. v. 
International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., for example, the insured, after defending against a tort 
claim, sued its insurer for indemnification. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int'I Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 
N.E.2d 322 (Ill . 1991), cited in Kearfott & Rudlin, supra. The court found that, although the insurer 
was not directly involved in the litigation, the joint defense privilege attached to information shared 
by the insured with its attorney because the insured and the insurer shared a common interest in the 
litigation. Id. at 328-29. Thus, in a subsequent action by the insured against the insurer for 
indemnification, the insured had to disclose information from the underlying tort litigation to the 
insurer because the information retained no protection. Id. Since not all jurisdictions recognize the 
joint defense privilege, the American Law Institute recommends that joint defendants enter a joint 
defense agreement expressing their understanding that their arrangement does not waive applicable 
privileges and spelling out the steps they will take to keep shared information confidential. Kearfott 
& Rudlin, supra, at§ 8(2); see also Hanson, Bridgett, Marcus, Vlahos, Rudy LLP, supra note 249. 
252. Although I have not seen an agreement expressly pre-determining allocation of liability, I 
have found instances in which defendants defer the question of proportionate responsibility until 
after conclusion of the underlying litigation. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Gen. Cable 
Indus., Inc. , 966 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing action for contribution based on 
agreement between codefendants to jointly settle with the plaintiff and later litigate their 
proportionate responsibility), cited in Gregory J. Lensing, Proportionate Responsibility and 
Contribution Before and After the Tort Reform of 2003, 35 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 1125, 1160 (2004); 
Hanson, Bridgett, Marcus, Vlahos, Rudy LLP, supra note 249 (recommending that joint defendants 
agree to wait to litigate cross-claims until the underlying litigation concludes). 
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The use of joint defense agreements may constitute valid reasons 
for defendants both to waive conflicts of interest and to not demand that 
their counsel seek to shift significant percentages of liability to certain 
other parties. Nonetheless, it continues to appear that a primary 
motivation for most defense firms' failure to seek to allocate 
responsibility to others is an amalgam of one or more of the ten factors 
listed above, ranging from etiquette to self-interest. To the extent that 
self-interest is implicated, that may lead defense firms to fail to fully 
explicate the full nature of the conflict generated by multiple client 
representation to their clients. Even though these clients are, by 
definition, "sophisticated clients,"253 in actual fact, many clients may not 
be fully aware of the dimensions of the multiple and former client 
conflicts. Accordingly, the waiver may not represent "informed 
consent. "254 Moreover, even when armed with a sophisticated client 
waiver, the waiver may be invalid because "it is 'not reasonably' likely 
that the lawyers will be able to provide 'adequate representation' to the 
[affected] clients."255 If the conflict is unconsentable, the law firm may 
have to decline to represent each of the multiple asbestos clients that he 
represents which would negatively impact the firms' fees. 
Whatever the explanation for the apparent failure of California 
defense firms to seek to invoke Proposition 51 on behalf of their clients, 
the tort reform that has been enacted in Texas with regard to joint 
liability is more extensive and raises the issue of conflicts of interest to 
even more commanding heights. 
Texas H.B. 4, Article 4 amended Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil 
Practice and Remedies Code (TCPRC) to allow defendants to have the 
benefits of joinder of third parties for allocation purposes without having 
to actually join them in the action.256 Instead of joinder, they need only 
designate another entity as a "responsible third party" (RTP). An RTP is 
defined as "any person who is alleged to have caused or contributed to 
causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought, 
whether by negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably 
dangerous product, by other conduct or activity that violates an 
applicable legal standard, or by any combination of these."257 
253 . SeeMODELRULES,supranote 17, atR. l.7. 
254. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
255 . HAZARD & HODES, supra note 58, at 11-59- 11-60 (interpreting Model Rule 1.7 (b)) . 
256. 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 204 (Vernon) (amending TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 33 .004 (1995)). 
257. Id. at§ 4.05. 
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A three-step process is prescribed. 258 If as a result of that process, 
an R TP is named on the jury charge, then the jury can allocate a 
percentage of the responsibility for the claimant's injury to the RTP.259 
Thus, under the Texas statute, the jury can assign a share of the liability 
to an entity which is not made a party to the lawsuit. The larger the share 
assigned to one or more RTPs, the less the share assigned to named 
defendants. However, if a person is designated by a defendant as an 
RTP, the plaintiff may then join that person as a defendant even though 
"such joinder would otherwise be barred by [a statute of] 
limitations .... [provided the plaintiff] join[s] that person ... not later 
than 60 days after" designation as an RTP.260 
The potential effects of H.B.4 on litigation strategies are profound. 
Whereas defendants' strategy in depositions was to minimize a 
plaintiffs exposure to asbestos-containing products, the defendants may 
now be expected to seek to maximize that exposure.261 To do so, 
defendants will need to adopt litigation practices employed by plaintiff 
lawyers, including the use of "picture books" containing photographs of 
a wide array of asbestos containing products shown to plaintiffs to 
258. First, the defendant must initially provide "sufficient facts" (§ 4.04(g)) in its pleading 
"concerning the alleged responsibility of [the RTP] ." Id. at § 4.04(g). If the motion to designate an 
RTP is objected to, then the motion is to be granted "unless the objecting party establishes that: (I) 
the defendant did not plead sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to 
satisfy the pleading requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) after having been 
granted leave to replead, the defendant failed to plead sufficient facts concerning the alleged 
responsibility of the person to satisfy the pleading requirement of the Texas Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Id. 
If the defendant's motion has been granted, then the objecting party has a second 
opportunity to strike the RTP designation. After adequate time for discovery, the objecting party can 
move to strike the RTP designation on the ground that there is "no evidence that the designated 
person is responsible for any portion of the claimant's alleged injury or damage." § 4.04(/). 
If the defendant prevails once again, then the defendant has one more hurdle: getting the 
designated RTP named on the jury charge. The issues here are whether there is "sufficient 
evidence" to support such designation and the standard by which that is to determined-a matter of 
the intersection of H.B. 4, § 4 .2, with TCPRC § 33.003. See generally JACK RATLIF & WILSON 
ALBRIGHT, TEXAS COURTS TRIAL & APPEAL: CASES & MATERIALS 29 (8th ed. 2002); Lensing, 
supra note 252. 
259. If the percentage of responsibility attributed to defendant is greater than 50% (or the 
defendant is found to have had "the specific intent to do [ criminal] harm," then the defendant, in 
addition to the percentage of damages determined by the trier of fact, shall be jointly and severally 
liable for the damages.§ 4.07(b)(l)-(2) (emphasis added). 
260. § 4.04(e). 
261. See Lensing, supra note 252, at 1186 ("[A] defendant names a responsible third party in 
the hope of shifting a large percentage of responsibility onto it and of avoiding joint and several 
liability."). 
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refresh their recollections of the products that they were exposed to 
twenty to fifty years earlier at a variety of job sites.262 
Plaintiff lawyers' strategies may also be expected to change. In 
preparing parties and witnesses for testimony, they will seek to have the 
plaintiff not identify the products of the bankrupt companies rather than 
just minimize the quantity of those products relative to others at the 
work sites. In cases of severe injury where substantial damages are being 
sought, as for example, most mesothelioma claims, plaintiff lawyers will 
likely delay filing claims with the § 524(g) trusts until after the litigation 
has been concluded because the product exposure statements that 
accompany those trust filings can be obtained by subpoena by 
defendants and used to increase allocation to those bankrupts.263 To 
illustrate the range of conflicts of interest that may result under the 
Texas statute, four scenarios are set forth below: 
1) Two clients, one a product manufacturer and the other a premise 
owner/two distinct causes of action/both parties named in the same 
action. 
Assume defense counsel represents two separate clients, one a 
premise owner and the other, a product manufacturer, in the same action. 
Assume further that the manufacturer's product has been identified as 
being at the premise owner' s site at relevant times. Under traditional 
joint and several liability law, there is no conflict if the joint defense is 
that the disease alleged is nonexistent or that it has not been caused by 
exposure to asbestos. However, if that defense is not sustained and there 
is sufficient proof of a disease attributed to asbestos exposure, then the 
two clients' interests conflict. 
The premise owner, sued under a negligence theory, will want to 
defend the case by arguing "state of the art," that is, by claiming that it 
did not breach a duty to warn of the danger posed because it did not 
know asbestos was harmful; it is held to the standard of a reasonable 
person in this regard. The premise owner will further argue that the 
262. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 139. There is evidence 
that some law firms sought to instill false memories in witnesses. Id. at 137-57. 
263 . The incentive for plaintiff lawyers to hide or minimize the responsibility of bankrupt 
entities under H.B. 4 is similar to that which exists in California under Proposition 51 . See supra 
note 241. In addition, since § 33.012(b) of the Texas Code reduces a claimaint 's recovery by the 
percentage of fault apportioned to any entities with whom the claimant has already settled 
(regardless of the dollar amount of the settlement), Texas plaintiffs will seek to minimize the 
liability apportioned to such settling entities. See Lensing, supra note 252, at 1139-40 ("[T)he 
plaintiffs incentive after a settlement is to adopt a trial strategy that downplays the settling 
persons 's culpability and maximizes the fact finder' s assessment of proportionate responsibility 
against the defendants."); see also id. at 1151-52 (discussing § 33 .012(b)). 
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product manufacturer, which is also being sued on the basis of strict 
liability, is held to the standard of an expert and is strictly liable for the 
harm caused. 
The product manufacturer, sued under a strict liability theory, will 
defend by claiming that its product did not cause the harm; the product 
manufacturer will also want to seek to establish that the premise owner 
should be allocated a share of the liability because it negligently failed to 
follow proper workplace safety practices, such as providing adequate 
ventilation, isolation of workers, wet down techniques, respirators, air 
monitoring, etc. 
Assuming that both clients have entered into retainer agreements 
containing conflicts waivers as described above, 264 then two issues are 
raised: ( 1) whether counsel "reasonably believes that the lawyer will be 
able to provide competent and diligent representation to 
each ... client,"265 and (2) whether the representation involves "the 
assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by 
the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a 
tribunal."266 It would appear that under Model Rule 1.7(b)(3), the 
conflict is not waivable because the clients will, in effect, be asserting 
claims against each other. Even if the word "claim" is interpreted so 
literally that Rule l.7(b)(3) does not make the conflict unwaivable, it 
appears unlikely that by the objective standard set forth in Model Rule 
1.7(b)(l), a lawyer could reasonably believe that he or she could provide 
"competent and diligent" representation to both clients. It would appear 
that the objective standard could be met, however, if the clients had 
entered into an arms length joint defense agreement that included a 
provision that irrespective of the jury's allocation, they would, as 
between them, reallocate their total liability to conform to the division in 
their agreement. 
I have been unable to determine whether joint defense agreements 
exist that include such a provision. Moreover, the complexity of the 
scenarios generating such an agreement makes conjecture difficult at 
best. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely, given the exigencies of asbestos 
litigation, that both clients would enter such a joint defense agreement 
that would apply to all asbestos litigation to which either or both were 
named as a defendant. Negotiating a joint defense agreement for each 
lawsuit, however, would pose substantial transactional costs. 
264. See supra text following note 248. 
265. MODELRULES,supranote 17, atR. l.7(b)(I). 
266. Id. at R. 1.7(b)(3). 
2005] ETHICAL ISSUES IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 909 
Accordingly, it seems doubtful that joint defense agreements that include 
allocation of liability shares are being negotiated. 
2) Two product manufacturer clients/the same cause of action/both 
parties named in the same action. 
Assume defense counsel represents more than one product 
manufacturer and that each is named as a defendant. Again, there is no 
conflict if the joint defense is that no disease is present. However, if 
plaintiff is able to prevail on the issue of whether an asbestos-caused 
illness occurred, than the defendants' interests conflict. Liability will 
then rest on those companies which produced, sold or installed products 
which contributed to the overall asbestos fiber dose, exposure to which 
brought about the disease. Therefore, to escape or at least minimize 
liability, it is in the best interests of each manufacturing client to argue 
that there was little or no exposure to its product and that in any event, 
any such exposure did not cause the harm; conversely, each will want to 
argue that there was substantial exposure to the other manufacturers' 
products including counsel's other client and that that was the cause of 
any harm to the claimant. 
Here again, the conflict would appear to be nonwaivable because in 
the litigation, each client is effectively asserting a claim against the 
other.267 However, if Rule l.7(b)(3) was not interpreted to make the 
conflict nonwaivable, then waivability of the conflict depends on the 
reasonableness of the lawyer's belief that he or she can provide 
competent and diligent representation to each client. If the clients had 
entered into a joint defense agreement, then as per the discussion in 
scenario (I), the conflict would appear to waivable. Even in the absence 
of such an agreement, however, if each client has been fully informed of 
the risks of joint representation, in particular, the consequences of each 
failing to seek to apportion liability to the other, then it would appear 
that informed consent to the conflict would permit the joint 
representation. 
However, it should be noted that while informed consent to the 
joint representation conflict would also insulate the lawyer from civil 
liability for failing to seek to apportion a share of liability on behalf of 
each client to the other, it would not insulate the lawyer from liability for 
failing to seek to apportion liability to other entities. 
267. Id. 
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3) Two premises owner clients/the same cause of action/both 
parties named in the same action. 
Assume defense counsel represents two ( or more) premise owners 
and that both are named in the same action. Again there is no conflict if 
the joint defense is that plaintiff does not have an asbestos-caused 
illness. A conflict exists, however, if the plaintiff is able to prevail on 
whether an asbestos-caused illness is present. 
Here, it is in the best interest of each client to argue that the time 
the plaintiff was present on its respective premises and the degree of 
exposure while there was insubstantial compared with the time and 
exposure alleged to have occurred while the claimant was on other 
premises, including the premises of the other client of the firm. 
Moreover, the conflict is exacerbated if, for example, it is plausible to 
argue that the industrial hygiene practices at one site more closely 
adhered to industry or government standards than those practiced at 
other sites. 
Here again, Rule 1.7(b)(3) would appear to make the conflict 
nonwaivable because, in effect, both clients are asserting claims against 
each other. If, however, Rule 1.7(b)(3) was not interpreted so as to 
render the conflict nonwaivable, then informed consent to the conflict 
would permit the joint representation under the same analysis as that set 
forth in scenario (2). 
4) Two clients/two distinct causes of action/only one client named 
in the action. 
Assume that only one of the law firm's two (or more) clients is 
named as a defendant in Texas, then the attorney has an obligation to the 
named defendant to seek to have the jury allocate responsibility for the 
injury to other named defendants and, as well, to other manufacturers 
and premise owners who have not been named as defendants. However, 
by seeking to have the unnamed client designated as an RTP, the 
attorney may be exposing that second client to liability because plaintiff 
can then join that second client as a defendant even if the statute of 
limitations has run.268 Unless that second client has previously been sued 
268. By itself, the act of naming an entity as a responsible third party does not expose that 
entity to liability ( either in the current lawsuit or in a future suit under res Judicata ). TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004. See Lensing, supra note 252, at 1188. However, as noted 
above, the RTP may incur liability if the plaintiff joins the RTP as a defendant, or if the defendant 
either impleads or later brings a contribution claim against the RTP. Id. Under § 33 .015, if a 
defendant is found jointly and severally liable and pays more than its several share of the damages 
award, it is entitled to contribution from any codefendant that paid less than its several share of the 
damages, as well as a,y non-party that was held partially liable. Id. at 1158-59. 
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as a defendant by the plaintiff and can defend against a subsequent suit 
by the same plaintiff on the grounds of res judicata, then their interests 
conflict. 
It is unclear whether Model Rule l.7(b)(3) would preclude a waiver 
of the conflict. Naming the second client as an RTP does not as directly 
put the lawyer in the position of representing both sides in an adversarial 
proceeding as does the other scenarios. However, if the plaintiff then 
adds the second client as a named defendant, that poses the same Rule 
1.7 issue as posed above. Assuming that Model Rule 1.7(b)(3) is not 
interpreted so as to make the conflict unwaivable, then the analysis that 
follows largely tracks that of the prior scenarios. If the clients had 
entered a joint defense agreement and agreed to reallocate their 
respective liabilities as determined by the jury to conform to the division 
in their agreement, then the conflict would appear waivable under Rule 
1.7(b)(l). In the absence of both a joint defense agreement and the 
defense of res judicata, however, it is difficult to perceive of a situation 
where a non-party client would consent to joint representation if that 
meant that the lawyer would seek to add that non-party as an RTP. There 
is thus reason to doubt that the lawyer could meet the objective standard 
and, as well, that any consent was informed. 269 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Given the massive numbers of specious claims that make up the 
bulk of asbestos litigation270 and the likelihood that a substantial portion 
of these specious claims are fraudulent,271 it may not be surprising that 
plaintiff lawyers who account for the bulk of these claims appear largely 
immune from both legal process272 and ethical rules. Even so, the 
pervasiveness of the absence of application of ethical rules to asbestos 
litigation and to a large extent, to asbestos bankruptcy proceedings as 
well, can only stand as an indictment of the courts, disciplinary 
authorities and indeed, the legal profession. On the defense side, the 
enumerated failures to seek apportionment of liability appear to be a 
largely underappreciated agency cost. The paucity of discussion of these 
269. If the lawyer intended not to seek to designate the non-party client as an RTP and this was 
agreeable to the client named as a defendant because there was little basis for arguing for any 
appreciable share to be apportioned to the non-party client, then the objective standard could be met 
and the named defendant could give its informed consent. 
270. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 8, at 35-41. 
271. Seeidat41-44. 
272. See id. at 74-76 n.120, 141 n.399, 164 n.503. 
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phenomena in the legal literature273 suggests that a dense fog has 
descended over asbestos litigation, obscuring much of it from plain 
view. It remains to be seen whether piercing that fog-as I have 
intended to do in this article, will pave the way for others to follow. 
To this point, however, rules of legal ethics remain largely 
inapplicable to asbestos litigation-apparently a victim of the vast sums 
of money that are at stake. 
273 . See supra notes 8, 36, 115, I 19, 121 and 165 for a listing of the articles discussing ethical 
issues raised by asbestos litigation. 
